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Abstract 
Efficient information sharing among rescue personnel is crucial for a successful res-
cue operation. If computer networks were actively used by the rescue personnel, it 
would allow for more efficient communication, and information sharing in general, 
compared to standard walkie-talkies still in use today (often more than one at a 
time). However, emergency and rescue operations present the system with a num-
ber of characteristic requirements, compared to traditional networks. The most 
significant difference is that the network must be built up by the rescue personnel 
on the spot, and that the presence of existing infrastructure cannot be relied on. 
Moreover, the rescue personnel’s movements make the network topology very dy-
namic and unstable. We call this type of networks mobile ad-hoc networks 
(MANETs). 
In this thesis, we analyze in detail the requirements for usage of MANETs in 
emergency and rescue operations, with particular focus on security and data shar-
ing. Based on this analysis, the thesis suggests solutions to a selected set of major 
challenges. The thesis’ main contributions are threefold. 
The first contribution is a concrete solution for one of the main security issues, 
namely ensuring that only authorized personnel has access to the network. This is 
achieved by means of a simple and efficient key exchange protocol that relies on 
device credentials being installed prior to the operation. 
Next, the thesis contributes with a shared data space that can be used to effi-
ciently and robustly distribute information among the rescue personnel. The dis-
tributed nature of the data space is transparent to the applications, as well as the 
fact that data versioning is performed for the purposes of consistency, conflict reso-
lution, and auditing. Data placement in such a distributed and dynamic environ-
ment has to be performed with outmost care. In the cases where network topology 
or the applications’ access pattern to the data space are unknown upfront, we 
show that placing replicas on 10 % well chosen nodes, achieved e.g. by means of  
clustering techniques, leads to close-to-optimal placement with regards to network 
usage. 
The final contribution of this thesis is a network emulation test-bed imple-
mented to facilitate development of specialized applications and protocols for 
MANETs. The test-bed has been utilized in a number of Master’s and PhD theses, 
demonstrating its usefulness and flexibility with respect to development time and 
cost, as well as choice of programming languages.  

  
Acknowledgment 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Thomas Plagemann, Jon 
Andersson and Yves Roudier for most valuable inputs and guidelines throughout 
these years. The same goes to all of my current and former colleagues from the 
Distributed Multimedia Systems group at the Department of Informatics, espe-
cially my fellow PhD students from the Ad-Hoc InfoWare project, Katrine Stem-
land Skjelsvik, Ovidiu Valentin Drugan and Norun Christine Sanderson. 
I would also like to thank my former supervisor Maja Matijaševi from the 
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing in Zagreb, for showing me the 
way. 
From the MIDAS project, there are a few persons I would particularly like to 
thank for a great collaboration in our technical discussions, both during and after 
the project’s lifetime – José Pablo Gañán Blanco, Micha Koziuk, Alisa Devli and 
Wybe Horsman. 
Special thanks to Ellen Munthe-Kaas and Katrine Stemland Skjelsvik for tak-
ing their time to proof-read the thesis and giving me valuable feedback, and to the 
latter, for the crash course in Norwegian during my first years in the country, and 
for not giving up on me or kicking me out of the office. 
Finally, big thanks to my wonderful wife Snežana for her support and for being 
who she is.  
 

  
Table of Contents 
I  Overview 1 
1 Introduction 3 
1.1 Problem Statement ..................................................................................... 4 
1.2 Methodology................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 Main Contributions..................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................... 6 
2 Background 7 
2.1 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks............................................................................ 7 
2.1.1 Routing in MANETs........................................................................ 8 
2.1.2 Security in MANETs ....................................................................... 9 
2.1.3 Data Sharing and Replication in MANETs ....................................10 
2.1.4 Testing and Evaluation of MANET protocols ................................11 
2.2 Research Projects.......................................................................................11 
2.2.1 Ad-Hoc InfoWare ............................................................................12 
2.2.2 MIDAS ............................................................................................14 
3 Application Requirements 15 
3.1 Emergency and Rescue Operations............................................................15 
3.1.1 Example Scenario: Earthquake .......................................................16 
3.1.2 Example Scenario: Railway Accident .............................................17 
3.1.3 Example Scenario: Subway Station Accident .................................18 
3.1.4 Summary.........................................................................................19 
3.2 Requirements Analysis...............................................................................21 
3.2.1 Security Aspects..............................................................................21 
3.2.2 Network Characteristics..................................................................22 
3.2.3 Data Sharing ...................................................................................22 
4 MIDAS Data Space 23 
4.1 MDS within MIDAS ..................................................................................24 
4.2 MDS Architecture......................................................................................24 
4.3 Database Support ......................................................................................26 
4.4 Data Versioning .........................................................................................26 
4.5 Data Storage and Retrieval .......................................................................27 
4.6 Data Replication ........................................................................................29 
vi Table of Contents  
4.7 MDS Schema............................................................................................. 31 
4.8 Examples ................................................................................................... 34 
4.8.1 Example: Update While Network is Partitioned............................ 34 
4.8.2 Example: Query.............................................................................. 36 
4.8.3 Example: Delete or Update While Network is Partitioned............ 37 
4.8.4 Example: Problems When No Versioning ...................................... 38 
4.9 Subscription and Notification Mechanism ................................................ 39 
4.10 Performance Experiments on the MDS Prototype ................................... 39 
4.10.1 Memory Cards in Nokia Internet Tablets ...................................... 39 
4.10.2 Choice of Java Interpreter.............................................................. 40 
4.10.3 Packet Loss as a Result of Route Changes .................................... 40 
4.11 Final Notes on MDS.................................................................................. 41 
5 Overview of the Research Papers 43 
5.1 Paper #1 ................................................................................................... 44 
5.2 Paper #2 ................................................................................................... 44 
5.3 Paper #3 ................................................................................................... 45 
5.4 Paper #4 ................................................................................................... 46 
5.5 Paper #5 ................................................................................................... 46 
5.6 Paper #6 ................................................................................................... 47 
5.7 Paper #7 ................................................................................................... 47 
5.8 Other Publications .................................................................................... 48 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 49 
6.1 Summary ................................................................................................... 49 
6.2 Critical Review of Claims.......................................................................... 50 
6.3 Open Problems and Future Work............................................................. 52 
Bibliography 55 
II Research Papers 61 
7 Security and Privacy Issues in Middleware for Emergency and Rescue 
Applications 63 
7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 64 
7.2 The MIDAS Architecture.......................................................................... 64 
7.3 Basic Assumptions and Our Approach ..................................................... 66 
7.4 The Key Management Protocol ................................................................ 67 
7.5 Dynamic Role Based Access Control ........................................................ 68 
7.6 A Combined Solution ................................................................................ 69 
7.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 70 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................. 70 
References.......................................................................................................... 71 
8 SKiMPy: A Simple Key Management Protocol for MANETs in Emergency and 
Rescue Operations 73 
8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 74 
8.2 Protocol Description.................................................................................. 75 
 vii 
8.3 Design Considerations................................................................................77 
8.3.1 Authentication ................................................................................77 
8.3.2 Choosing Keys.................................................................................77 
8.3.3 Key Distribution .............................................................................79 
8.3.4 Key Update .....................................................................................79 
8.3.5 Exclusion of Nodes ..........................................................................80 
8.3.6 Batching..........................................................................................81 
8.3.7 Additional Issues.............................................................................81 
8.4 Protocol Implementation and Evaluation..................................................81 
8.4.1 Implementation ...............................................................................81 
8.4.2 Evaluation Results ..........................................................................82 
8.5 Related Work.............................................................................................83 
8.6 Conclusion..................................................................................................85 
Acknowledgment ................................................................................................85 
References...........................................................................................................85 
9 NEMAN: A Network Emulator for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 89 
9.1 Introduction ...............................................................................................90 
9.2 Related Work.............................................................................................92 
9.3 Architecture ...............................................................................................93 
9.4 Implementation Details..............................................................................95 
9.5 Application Development...........................................................................96 
9.6 Experiences ................................................................................................97 
9.6.1 A Simple Key Management Protocol for MANETs........................97 
9.6.2 Distributed Event Notification Service (DENS) .............................99 
9.7 Performance and Scalability ......................................................................99 
9.8 Conclusion and Future Work ..................................................................100 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................101 
References.........................................................................................................101 
10 Cross-layer Overlay Synchronization in Sparse MANETs 103 
10.1 Introduction .............................................................................................104 
10.2 DENS .......................................................................................................106 
10.3 Routing Table Information ......................................................................107 
10.4 Synchronization Protocol .........................................................................109 
10.4.1 Synchronization Initialization .......................................................109 
10.4.2 Basic Protocol ...............................................................................110 
10.4.3 Exception Handling.......................................................................112 
10.4.4 Complexity....................................................................................114 
10.5 Conclusions ..............................................................................................115 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................116 
References.........................................................................................................117 
11 Information Sharing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Metadata Management in the 
MIDAS Dataspace 119 
11.1 Introduction .............................................................................................121 
11.2 MIDAS Architecture................................................................................122 
11.3 Routing in MANETs................................................................................124 
viii Table of Contents  
11.3.1 MANET Characteristics................................................................124 
11.3.2 MANET Routing Techniques and Challenges ..............................124 
11.4 Metadata Propagation .............................................................................125 
11.4.1 Synchronisation .............................................................................125 
11.4.2 Triggers .........................................................................................125 
11.4.3 Metadata Propagation Protocols...................................................126 
11.5 Test Setup ................................................................................................127 
11.5.1 Metrics...........................................................................................127 
11.5.2 Test Scenarios ...............................................................................128 
11.6 Test Results .............................................................................................129 
11.6.1 Comparison of Metrics ..................................................................130 
11.6.2 Dissemination Results ...................................................................131 
11.6.3 Group Dissemination Results ........................................................133 
11.7 Discussion and Conclusion .......................................................................133 
Acknowledgment ..............................................................................................134 
References.........................................................................................................134 
12 Information Sharing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Evaluation of the MIDAS 
Data Space Prototype 137 
12.1 Introduction .............................................................................................138 
12.2 MDS Design .............................................................................................139 
12.2.1 Architecture...................................................................................140 
12.2.2 Versioning......................................................................................140 
12.2.3 Synchronization.............................................................................141 
12.3 Prototype Implementation .......................................................................141 
12.4 Evaluation ................................................................................................142 
12.4.1 MDS overhead...............................................................................145 
12.4.2 Performance experiments on physical devices...............................145 
12.4.3 Emulation experiments on a static network..................................146 
12.4.4 Emulation experiments on a mobile network................................147 
12.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................149 
Acknowledgment ..............................................................................................149 
References.........................................................................................................150 
13 Evaluation of Replica Placement Strategies for a Shared Data Space in Mobile 
Ad-Hoc Networks 151 
13.1 Introduction .............................................................................................152 
13.2 Related Work ...........................................................................................153 
13.3 MDS and the Traffic Controller...............................................................154 
13.4 Methodology.............................................................................................157 
13.5 Static Network Experiments ....................................................................158 
13.6 Mobile Network Experiments...................................................................161 
13.6.1 Frequent Reconfiguration vs. Static Configuration.......................161 
13.6.2 Gains and Costs of Frequent Reconfiguration ..............................162 
13.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................164 
Acknowledgment ..............................................................................................165 
References.........................................................................................................165 
  
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1: Organization and structure in rescue operations ..................................16 
Figure 4.1: MIDAS Architecture .............................................................................24 
Figure 4.2: MDS Architecture .................................................................................24 
Figure 4.3: Lazy synchronization process ................................................................30 
Figure 4.4: Example of the MDS Schema ...............................................................33 
Figure 4.5: Automatically generated SQL statement for creating tables ................34 
Figure 4.6: Total number of packets vs. lost packets..............................................41 
Figure 4.7: Impact of Hello Message interval on packet loss ..................................41 
Figure 7.1: MIDAS Architecture .............................................................................65 
Figure 8.1: Message Flow Diagram .........................................................................75 
Figure 8.2: Traffic analysis of the first, non-optimized protocol implementation ...80 
Figure 8.3: Results for the same scenario, after introducing the batching process .80 
Figure 8.4: Example of a chain scenario..................................................................82 
Figure 8.5: Example of a mesh scenario ..................................................................82 
Figure 8.6: Time needed to achieve a stable shared key .........................................83 
Figure 9.1: NEMAN architecture ............................................................................93 
Figure 9.2: Example screenshot taken from the GUI ..............................................93 
Figure 9.3: Workflow diagram of using NEMAN....................................................96 
Figure 9.4: Time needed to achieve a stable shared key .........................................98 
Figure 10.1: Two mobile groups merging and partitioning ...................................107 
Figure 10.2: Mediator and partition_representative states ...................................110 
Figure 10.3: Mediator Discovery (messages) .........................................................111 
Figure 10.4: Global Synchronization (messages) ...................................................111 
Figure 10.5: Local Update (messages) ...................................................................112 
Figure 10.6: Nr. of Mediators from one Mediator’s perspective............................112 
Figure 11.1: Relationship between message count and message size.....................130 
Figure 11.2: Chain scenario message and metadata count....................................131 
Figure 11.3: Grid scenario message and metadata count ......................................131 
Figure 11.4: Merge scenario message and metadata count....................................132 
Figure 11.5: Ferry scenario message and metadata count.....................................132 
Figure 11.6: Metadata dissemination on a per node basis.....................................134 
Figure 12.1: MDS Architecture .............................................................................139 
x List of Figures 
Figure 12.2: Start-up times on Nokia N800 and N810, and query times on N810 142 
Figure 12.3: Network traffic during the initialisation process ...............................146 
Figure 12.4: Network traffic when workload is added ...........................................147 
Figure 12.5: Unsuccessful queries due to packet loss.............................................148 
Figure 13.1: Screenshot from the test application .................................................155 
Figure 13.2: Link usage, S1, manual replica placement.........................................159 
Figure 13.3: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S1, manual replica placement ...........159 
Figure 13.4: Link usage, S1, using clustering algorithms.......................................159 
Figure 13.5: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S1, clustering algorithms...................159 
Figure 13.6: Link usage, S1, manual replica placement.........................................160 
Figure 13.7: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S1, manual replica placement ...........160 
Figure 13.8: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S2, manual placement .......................161 
Figure 13.9: Link usage, S2, using clustering, 1 reader / 100 writers....................161 
Figure 13.10: Total bandwidth usage in 4 different cases, S4 ...............................162 
Figure 13.11: Potential bandwidth savings or costs ..............................................164 
  
List of Tables 
Table 4.1: Patient table on nodes 1 and 2, before partitioning...............................34 
Table 4.2: Patient table on Node 1, during partitioning.........................................35 
Table 4.3: Patient table on Node 2, during partitioning.........................................35 
Table 4.4: Patient table on Node 1, after the two partitions have merged ............35 
Table 4.5: Patient table on Node 2, after the two partitions have merged ............36 
Table 4.6: Patient table on nodes 1 and 2, before partitioning...............................37 
Table 4.7: Patient table on Node 1, during partitioning.........................................37 
Table 4.8: Patient table on Node 2, during partitioning.........................................37 
Table 4.9: Patient table on Node 1,after the two partitions have merged..............38 
Table 4.10: Patient table on Node 2, after the two partitions have merged...........38 
Table 4.11: Patient table on nodes 1 and 2, before partitioning.............................38 
Table 4.12: Patient table on Node 1, after the record has been deleted .................38 
Table 4.13: Access times for the sqlite database on Nokia Internet tablets............40 
Table 9.1: Properties of Various Emulators for Mobile Networks ..........................92 
Table 10.1: Resulting times for merging and partitioning ....................................108 
Table 10.2. Exception Handling when Idle............................................................113 
Table 10.3. Exception Handling in Mediator Discovery phase .............................113 
Table 10.4. Exception Handling in the Global Synch phase .................................113 
Table 10.5. Exception Handling in the Local Update phase .................................113 
Table 11.1: Message count during the dissemination phase..................................129 
Table 11.2: Traffic measured during the dissemination phase ..............................130 
Table 12.1: Results of the MDS overhead experiments.........................................144 
Table 12.2: Results for network queries (in milliseconds) .....................................145 
Table 12.3: Results for local queries (in milliseconds)...........................................145 
Table 13.1: Request and response size of the queries used in the experiments.....158 

  
List of Abbreviations 
AODV Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing 
API Application Programming Interface 
DBMS Database Management System 
DENS Distributed Event Notification Service 
DSDV Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing 
DSR Dynamic Source Routing 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CRT Communication and Routing 
DA Data Allocator 
DS Data Synchronizer 
GMDM Global MetaData Manager 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
HNA Host and Network Association 
LS Local Storage 
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
MDS MIDAS Data Space 
MIDAS Middleware Platform for Developing and Deploying Advanced Mobile 
 Services 
NEMAN Network Emulator for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
OLSR Optimized Link State Routing protocol 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
QA Query Analyzer 
SKiMPy Simple Key Management Protocol 
SM Subscription Manager 
SQL Structured Query Language 
TC Traffic Controller 

  
Part I 
 
Overview 
 

  
1Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In an emergency and rescue operation, where people’s lives might be at stake, effi-
cient data sharing between the organizations and individuals involved is of out-
most importance for the mission’s success. Disasters often happen where and when 
it is least expected, making it hard or impossible to prepare a working infrastruc-
ture on the location in question, or to expect such an infrastructure to be present 
when the rescue personnel arrives. For that reason, a more practical solution needs 
to be present, which would work anywhere and at any time. 
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a wireless network created on the spot 
by the devices present at the time. Devices taking part in the network’s activity 
might be of very heterogeneous nature with regards to hardware and software 
specifications. They do however need to support the same network protocols to be 
able to form a network. In a MANET, each device works both as a host node and 
a router node, and routes between nodes are constantly updated depending on the 
nodes’ connectivity. Existing infrastructure, if present, can be used to increase 
connectivity or to gain access to external networks (such as the Internet), but it is 
not a prerequisite. Given the abovementioned characteristics, MANETs are a 
natural candidate for our target scenario, i.e., emergency and rescue operations. 
However, using MANETs introduces challenges on several fronts. The broad-
cast nature of wireless networks has a big impact on network and data security. 
On the other hand, the dynamic and unpredictable nature of MANETs influences 
in a high degree data availability. Both of these areas need to be researched, and 
satisfactory solutions need to be present, in order to achieve a system that is ac-
ceptable for data sharing in emergency and rescue operations. 
This thesis is tied to two research projects, Ad-Hoc InfoWare [39] and MIDAS 
[9], both of which focus on MANETs in emergency and rescue operations. As part 
of these two projects, the thesis focuses on securing the network layer and imple-
menting and optimizing the presented solution for a distributed data sharing 
space. Furthermore, the thesis contributes with a working emulation environment, 
which was necessary to develop, test, and evaluate applications and protocols. 
4 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Emergency and rescue operations present the system with numerous requirements. 
In this chapter, we present the main requirements of interest for this thesis.  
The first, basic requirement is security. A typical example are patients’ medi-
cal records that might be sent through the network, where one must make sure 
that only certain people (e.g., medical personnel) are allowed to see them. On the 
other hand, information such as pictures and other details of the incident area 
might be of interest for all the involved parts, which clearly shows that different 
security policies need to be present with regards to access control and confidential-
ity. 
Authorization is another security objective that needs to be taken care of. 
Given the fact that malicious individuals or groups not only might be present at 
the incident area, but might also be directly responsible for the incident itself, it 
must be ensured that only authorized persons have access to the network. A mali-
cious person could easily interfere with the rescue operation by means of signal 
jamming or by inducing false routing information, which would in both cases dis-
rupt the network and make data sharing over MANETs impossible. Signal jam-
ming is something that needs to be addressed by other means, e.g., channel coding 
at the link layer [28], or by detecting at the physical layer, physically locating the 
source, and making sure it is disabled. On the higher levels, however, more ad-
vanced methods need to be designed and implemented to protect the network from 
intruders. It has been shown that a very small percentage of misbehaving nodes 
might cause the whole network to collapse [16]. Consequently, protecting the rout-
ing protocol is fundamental for having an operational network. 
Availability of data is also important for the success of a rescue operation. In 
traditional wired networks, one can assume that the data will always be available, 
except in specific situations. In mobile networks, however, a node hosting impor-
tant data might suddenly disappear due to the device entering a building, its bat-
tery being empty, etc. Thus, such situations constitute more a rule than an excep-
tion, making it necessary to have mechanisms in place that would prevent data 
loss and increase availability. This can only be achieved by means of data replica-
tion. Replication, in cases where data is constantly generated or updated, intro-
duces the need for synchronization, which is costly with regards to network usage. 
The number of replicas, as well as their locations in the network, should therefore 
be planned and implemented carefully. Failure to do so might cause synchroniza-
tion traffic to consume all network resources, and thus render the whole infrastruc-
ture unusable to the rescue personnel. 
To ensure that the applications and protocols work correctly and meet the ex-
pectations imposed in the design phase, they need to be tested and evaluated. For 
network protocols specifically, there are three main possibilities to do so, namely 
simulation, emulation, and field tests. Simulations usually do not run in real-time, 
and are suitable for larger networks. In addition, they might include a detailed 
representation of the physical layer, and the results are reproducible. The downside 
is that one must spend a certain amount of time to learn the simulator, and im-
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plement the protocol specifically for a given simulation, only to be re-implemented 
later for real devices. Emulations allow for a certain part of the protocol stack to 
be simulated, while the rest consists of real code (implementation) running in real-
time. This can considerably reduce the time needed to implement an application or 
protocol, with the possibility to later install them to target devices with minor 
changes or no changes at all. Emulation results can be reproducible to a certain 
extent. The downside is that the emulation environment, depending on its imple-
mentation, might not be scalable. Field tests, where real code runs on real devices, 
give the most realistic results. They are, however, the most costly alternative with 
regards to the number of devices and people involved. In addition, debugging and 
bug-fixing can be problematic, and results are hardly reproducible. 
To summarize, this thesis addresses the following problems: 
 security in MANETs, 
 data sharing and replica placement in MANETs, and 
 testing and evaluation of MANET protocols. 
1.2 Methodology 
To address the abovementioned problems, we used the following methods. We per-
formed an in-depth requirement analysis of the target scenario, i.e., emergency and 
rescue operations. We analyzed the existing related work and state-of-the-art in 
the topics in question, namely security in MANETs, data sharing and replica 
placement in MANETs, and network simulators and emulators. Since we aim for a 
real proof-of-concept implementation, we follow a typical systems approach com-
prising design of applications and protocols, followed by their implementation in 
various programming languages, and last by testing and evaluation. For the pur-
pose of testing and evaluation, we developed our own emulation platform, called 
NEMAN, which is also one of the contributions of this thesis. We designed and ran 
most of the experiments on the emulation platform, but for more resource demand-
ing experiments, we used modeling and simulation. We successfully ran some of 
the solutions in field tests on target devices. 
1.3 Main Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized by the following four 
claims: 
Claim 1: 
In emergency and rescue operations, security has to be present at the lowest lay-
ers, in order to prevent malicious nodes from disrupting the network. The hierar-
chical organization of the entities involved in these kinds of operations can provide 
a basis for trust establishment between rescue personnel’s devices. We provide a 
solution that exploits this fact in order to agree on a shared key. The solution can 
6 Introduction 
be used to ensure that intruders cannot disrupt the network by injecting false 
routing information. Moreover, the solution can be used to secure all the traffic 
from being tampered with by unauthorized persons. 
Claim 2: 
With a secured infrastructure, the system can be used for information sharing be-
tween the rescue personnel. A shared data space, such as MIDAS Data Space, can 
be used to efficiently and robustly distribute information, even on small resource-
limited devices. The strict requirement of accounting for such operations can be 
achieved by means of versioning. 
Claim 3: 
It is possible to achieve a close-to-optimal placement of table replicas within the 
network, which works well for most scenarios where the applications’ access pat-
tern to the data space or the network topology are unknown a priori. At a later 
point, the system can adjust to the concrete situation by analyzing the applica-
tions’ access pattern and network topology.  
Claim 4: 
In order to develop and evaluate protocols, an adequate test-bed has to be in 
place. An emulation test-bed is the most flexible choice with respect to develop-
ment time and costs, as well as choice of programming languages. We have imple-
mented such an emulation test-bed and used it to develop, test and evaluate a va-
riety of protocols. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided in two main parts – the introductory part and the collection 
of research papers. 
The introductory part gives some background information about the work pre-
sented in the papers. In Chapter 2, we present the main issues in mobile ad-hoc 
networks that the thesis focuses on, as well as the two research projects in context 
of which the thesis is done. Chapter 3 describes the application requirements for 
the two research projects, and consequently for this thesis. In Chapter 4, we intro-
duce the MIDAS Data Space and the proof-of-concept implementation made as 
part of the MIDAS project. Chapter 5 gives a short overview of the research pa-
pers included in the second part. Finally, in Chapter 6 we give a conclusion, in-
cluding critical review of the claims introduced in Chapter 1.3, and plans for future 
work. 
The second part (Chapters 7-13) presents the seven research papers that con-
stitute the main contribution of the thesis. Each paper is given in its entirety, as 
published in the respective conference or workshop. The papers have, however, 
been re-formatted to match the rest of the thesis’ layout. 
 
 
  
2Chapter 2 
Background 
 
In this chapter, we introduce mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) and give an 
overview of the main topics within MANETs that constitute the background for 
work on this thesis, namely security and data sharing. We also present briefly the 
research projects this thesis is tied to. 
2.1 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
While in traditional infrastructured networks the topology is static and predict-
able, and nodes often have distinct roles (end-user node, router, access point, etc.), 
mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are basically characterized by having each 
node performing all these functions. Another important difference between infra-
structured networks and MANETs is that the former often have a steady topology, 
while the latter’s main characteristic is that their topology can be highly dynamic 
and unpredictable. As nodes move around, they constantly form new links, while 
removing old ones.  
The advantage of MANETs is that one can establish them at any place and 
any point of time, as they are not dependent on any infrastructure being set up 
upfront. If an infrastructure is present, however, MANETs can easily connect to it 
to achieve a broader range. As an example, a node in a MANET can have an addi-
tional 3G/GPRS/satellite connection and use it to act as a gateway to the Inter-
net, and through it to the organization’s headquarters. Another example might be 
to use such a connection to communicate with another MANET on a distant or 
out-of-reach location, e.g. two rescue teams located on the opposite sides of a tun-
nel. 
As such, MANETs represent ideal candidates for emergency and rescue opera-
tions, whose locations are not known upfront, or military operations on an enemy 
territory, whose locations might be known upfront but there is no physical access 
to them. 
8 Background 
2.1.1 Routing in MANETs 
To be able to communicate and to forward packets within a MANET, nodes in the 
network must use a routing protocol. Routing protocols in MANETs can be 
roughly put into two categories, proactive and reactive. 
In proactive routing protocols (such as OLSR [4], DSDV [36]), nodes regularly 
send broadcast beacons to inform neighbors about their presence. As a conse-
quence, each node can at any time have a complete picture of the network’s topol-
ogy, but having a proactive routing protocol causes constant traffic that might be 
unnecessary. 
Reactive protocols (such as AODV [35], DSR [23]), on the other hand, are 
triggered by outgoing traffic, and routes are only discovered when needed. As a 
consequence, nodes might not know about their neighbors until they in fact try to 
communicate with them, but no bandwidth is used by the routing protocol unless 
necessary. 
A variety of other routing protocols exist for MANETs, such as hybrid proto-
cols trying to include the best characteristics of both proactive and reactive ideas, 
geographical routing protocols, taking into consideration nodes’ physical locations, 
multicast protocols, etc. 
As part of the research projects this thesis is bound to, the choice fell on the 
proactive principle, more precisely the OLSR protocol. Using a proactive routing 
protocol opens doors to a number of possible applications that rely on (or benefit 
from) knowledge of the network topology. One such application, described in this 
thesis, is using this knowledge to better plan the location of database replicas in 
the network, to minimize network traffic caused by remote database queries and 
data synchronization, and to increase the probability of data being available in 
case of network disruptions. The Distributed Event Notification Service (DENS 
[52]) is another example of an application that benefits from knowledge of the net-
work topology. 
The OLSR Protocol 
OLSR stands for Optimized Link State Routing, and is a proactive routing proto-
col for MANETs. OLSR aims at providing each node in the network with the 
whole logical picture of what the network looks like (i.e., network topology). This 
is mainly achieved by means of different types of messages. 
Each node sends periodic Hello messages (typically every 1-2 seconds), to in-
form potential neighbors of its presence. Hello messages include a list of all known 
direct (i.e., 1-hop) neighbors, making it possible for recipients to create a picture of 
the whole 2-hop neighborhood. By doing this, it is easy for a node to find the 
minimal number of its 1-hop neighbors needed to cover the 2-hop neighborhood, 
for the purpose of flooding the network. These chosen nodes are called Multipoint 
Relays (MPRs) and are specific to each node separately, and each node’s MPR set 
is known to all of its neighbors. This way, each neighbor knows whether it should 
later retransmit broadcast messages or not. Topology Control messages are an ex-
ample of such broadcast messages, which include all the information necessary to 
calculate routes. 
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OLSR allows for connection to other networks as well. By means of Host and 
Network Association (HNA) messages, a node can inform other nodes in the 
MANET if it has additional interfaces which might give connectivity to other net-
works. 
OLSR has been designed with modularity in mind. The packet format allows 
for multiple messages being sent together, as well as including support for custom 
messages. As part of our research, we have implemented an extension to the secu-
rity plugin [15] distributed with the UniK olsrd [58] implementation, adding the 
functionality of node authentication and key distribution, as described in Chapter 
8 (i.e., Paper #2). We used the same functionality to work on other plugins, such 
as transparent gateways [2], piggybacking of custom messages on broadcast pack-
ets [54], etc. 
2.1.2 Security in MANETs 
Use of wireless networking presents the system with a series of security related 
challenges. Network security comprises four main objectives: authenticity, integ-
rity, access control, and non-repudiation. Starting from the medium itself, one of 
its main characteristics is that anyone with a tuned wireless device can listen to 
the traffic in the network, as well as generate and induce bogus traffic into it. 
Since neither of these two issues can be efficiently prevented in a rescue operation, 
they introduce problems into at least three of the abovementioned security catego-
ries: 
 Authenticity: mechanisms need to be present to ensure that only authorized 
devices can be part of the network. 
 Integrity: it must be ensured that no one can manipulate the network traffic 
by, e.g., changing its contents before retransmitting it. 
 Access Control: some data must be kept confidential, i.e., inaccessible to 
unauthorized recipients. 
Another issue not directly related to data security but still directly related to 
the efficiency of the network (and as such to the efficiency of the rescue operation 
itself) is signal jamming. Unlike wired networks where a device needs physical ac-
cess to the medium to perform any action, wireless networks are highly prone to 
such attacks and there is no real solution other than locating the perpetrator and 
disabling the source of jamming, or at least by using some channel coding tech-
niques at the link layer [28]. 
All the abovementioned issues are considered as external attacks [24], i.e., at-
tacks coming from nodes that are not (or not supposed to be) part of the network. 
One of this thesis’ main contributions, presented in Chapter 8 (i.e., Paper #2) is a 
key management protocol that can be used by the rescue personnel to prevent un-
authorized nodes from joining the network. 
A much different, and in some cases more dangerous type of attacks are so 
called internal attacks [46]. These attacks come from nodes that have already been 
authenticated and as such considered legitimate members of the network, but at 
some point have become compromised. This can happen if devices are stolen, lost 
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and then found by a malicious person, or even worse, if their legitimate owner be-
comes compromised. Detecting and excluding such nodes is a much more difficult 
process and requires specialized solutions. 
Other than attacks, the system must take care of confidentiality within the 
network. Inter-organizational collaboration is one of the key functionalities in a 
rescue operation. Nevertheless, different organizations may have different security 
requirements and policies and, in addition, not all data within the network should 
be seen by every member. Examples of such data may be medical records, police 
records, other personal or confidential information, etc. Additional challenges are 
imposed by different organizational structures and levels of confidentiality within 
the organizations themselves, which could also change dynamically. 
With regards to implementation, security can be implemented in either the 
traditional layered approach or a more adaptive cross-layered one, both having 
their advantages and disadvantages. The layered approach, by putting clear bor-
ders to data flow, offers a high level of security. In our case, a more flexible ap-
proach might be a better choice, provided that it does not significantly weaken the 
overall security level. A lightweight adaptable cross-layer middleware solution, 
based for example on the reflection technique [29], [3], would allow middleware 
services to adapt to the heterogeneous dynamic environment. Examples of such ar-
chitectures are Open ORB 2 [3] and ReMMoC [14]. The programming language 
Obol [1] can be used to face the security issues, and with help of Aspect Oriented 
Programming [26], the cross-concern integration can be faced early in the devel-
opment phase. 
For a more extensive look into security issues in MANETs, focused on middle-
ware for emergency and rescue operations, see Chapter 7 (i.e., Paper #1). 
2.1.3 Data Sharing and Replication in MANETs 
The dynamic and unpredictable nature of MANETs poses special challenges with 
regards to data sharing, more precisely availability and consistency. Availability 
can be degraded by nodes disappearing, something that can be compensated by 
means of data replication. Data replication is, however, a potentially costly opera-
tion with regards to the amount of data that need to be transferred from one rep-
lica to the other, in order to achieve a consistent state where all replicas have the 
same information. Such a consistent state can only be guaranteed through the use 
of transactions. Due to MANETs being prone to partitioning and frequent route 
changes, transactions might often fail or lead to locks, and are therefore undesir-
able. Since it has been proven that it is impossible to have a system that is prone 
to partitions, and that at the same time provides data consistency and availability 
[8], we must accept a trade-off between the levels of data consistency and availabil-
ity. Eventual consistency is such a model where, under certain requirements, it is 
guaranteed that all accesses to the data eventually will give the same result. The 
MIDAS Data Space, described in Chapter 4, is an example of a system that en-
sures eventual consistency by means of eager and lazy synchronization. 
A variety of other data replication techniques exist for databases in MANETs, 
some of which are categorized and presented in [34]. 
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2.1.4 Testing and Evaluation of MANET protocols 
Testing and evaluation are important stages in the process of developing network 
applications and protocols. For MANETs, this is particularly difficult due to the 
fact that the network topology might be constantly changing. Applications and 
protocols need to be designed to cope with this issue, but whether they actually 
manage it is something that needs to be tested. Three basic methods are available 
for doing so, namely simulation, emulation, and field tests. 
In simulations, the whole protocol stack is simulated, making it necessary to 
implement everything specifically for the given simulation environment. It is the 
cheapest solution with regards to the number of devices needed, and results are re-
producible. However, the learning curve for the simulator may be steep, and appli-
cations need later to be rewritten in order to run on real devices. Network Simula-
tor ns-2 [55], its successor ns-3 [57], OMNeT++ [60] and GloMoSim [64] are exam-
ples of well-known simulators used within the research community. 
In field tests, where real devices are used, real implementations of the applica-
tions are also used. This may, however, be expensive with regards to both man-
power and the number of devices needed. Moreover, deployment and debugging 
can be a challenge, and the results (which might depend on persons’ movements) 
are not reproducible. 
Emulation environments present a compromise between simulation and field 
tests, by having parts of the protocol stack (typically the lowest layers) being 
simulated, while other parts run the real implementation. This is the most cost-
effective way of testing and evaluating network applications and protocols since 
not every node needs its own physical device, and the code can later be moved to 
real devices with minor changes or no changes at all. NEMAN [42], presented in 
Chapter 9 of this thesis, and a distributed version of NEMAN called DINEMO [13] 
are examples of network emulators. IMUNES [62] with its follow-up project 
VIRTNET [61], Mobile Emulab [21], MobiNet [30], and ORBIT [47] are some 
other examples. ns-3, even though it is mainly a simulator, introduces support for 
different types of emulation, with respect to which layers are being simulated or 
emulated. 
For a comprehensive list of emulation platforms and test beds, see the surveys 
presented in [12] and [25]. 
2.2 Research Projects 
Work on this thesis has been done in the context of two research projects, Ad-Hoc 
InfoWare and MIDAS. Both the projects have emergency and rescue operations as 
a target scenario, though they focus on different aspects of the scenario and ap-
proach it in different ways. In this chapter, we describe both the projects individu-
ally, as well as their connection to this thesis. 
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2.2.1 Ad-Hoc InfoWare 
Ad-Hoc InfoWare [39] is a research project funded by the Norwegian Research 
Council, running in the period 2003-2006. The aim of the project is to develop 
middleware services for emergency and rescue operations, in order to fulfill the fol-
lowing requirements: Intra- and inter-organizational information flow, service 
availability, context management, profiling and personalization, group- and organ-
izational support, dynamic security, communication, resource sharing (especially 
data sharing), and graceful degradation. These requirements are addressed by six 
middleware concerns: 
 Knowledge Management – to handle ontologies, support metadata integra-
tion and interpretation;  
 Context Management – to manage context models, context sharing, profil-
ing and personalization;  
 Data Management – to cater for capabilities similar to those of distributed 
databases;  
 Communication Infrastructure – for supporting distributed event notifica-
tion, publish and subscribe services, and message mediation;  
 Resource Management – to register and discover information sources and 
web services as well as resources available, to handle neighbor awareness, 
computation and application sharing, mobile agents, proxy and replica 
placement, and movement prediction;  
 Security Management – for access control, message signing and encryption, 
supporting group- and organizational structure, group key assignment, and 
dynamic security services.  
In the middleware architecture, these concerns correspond to five components 
which we present shortly in this chapter, together with the respective PhD theses 
addressing them. 
The Knowledge Manager component corresponds to the concerns Knowledge 
Management and Context Management. The purpose of this component is to pro-
vide flexible services that allow relating metadata descriptions of information items 
to a semantic context and support management of knowledge sharing and integra-
tion in a rescue operation scenario. The Knowledge Manager offers support for the 
dissemination, sharing and interpretation of ontologies, and browsing and querying 
of ontologies and ontology contents. Issues that needed addressing included under-
standing across domains and organizations through use of knowledge management 
techniques, avoiding information overflow through content filtering and personal-
ization, managing availability of information, metadata and ontologies, offering in-
formation query and retrieval services, and supporting information exchange. Work 
on the Knowledge Manager has been documented as part of Norun Christine San-
derson’s PhD thesis [49]. The thesis has contributed with a three-layered architec-
ture for efficient metadata management, an approach to ontology based dynamic 
update, and a high level design of the Knowledge Manager component targeted at 
the given scenario’s requirements. 
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Distributed Event Notification Service (DENS) and Watchdogs provide a pub-
lish/subscribe service and delay-tolerant delivery of notifications in case of, e.g., 
network partitioning. In the publish/subscribe service a subscriber subscribes for 
information, and the publishers publish information, independently. If DENS can-
not deliver a notification to a subscriber, the service will store the notification and 
try to deliver the notification using the store-carry-forward paradigm. The main 
design goals for DENS were to support a flexible subscription model, ensure a high 
delivery ratio, as close to at-least-once semantics as possible, and use a-priori in-
formation and information collected at run-time to best configure the system. To-
gether with watchdogs, DENS corresponds to the Communication Infrastructure 
concern, and is the main contribution of the PhD thesis written by Katrine Stem-
land Skjelsvik [52]. 
Resource Manager, the component for Resource Management, aims at enabling 
best possible resource sharing among the devices involved in the network. During a 
rescue operation the involved personnel has a very strong incentive to collaborate 
and cooperate across organizations. This requires them to share knowledge and re-
sources in order to fulfill their tasks. In a resource constraint environment such as 
a rescue operation, a distributed application needs the help of a resource manager 
in order to make the best out of the available resources. A resource manager’s 
main duties in such environments are to register, discover services and data 
sources, and make the information available through the network. For this, each 
node can maintain a sharing profile with information about locally available re-
sources and running services. The physical resources need to be frequently moni-
tored, which can be achieved by using mechanisms provided by the operating sys-
tem. Resource availability information can be disseminated in the network by us-
ing a shared data space as the one provided by the Data Management. Other al-
ternatives are to announce availability of resources as notifications by using DENS, 
or to discover resources by querying the other nodes. Design of a non-intrusive and 
location information independent Resource Manager, deployed in a network with 
constrained devices and unreliable channels, is the main contribution of Ovidiu 
Valentin Drugan’s PhD thesis [6]. The very part about Data Management, how-
ever, is being addressed in detail in this thesis. 
Finally, the Security and Privacy Manager is in charge of Security Manage-
ment. This component has a direct impact on the functionality of all the other 
components and therefore has to be considered from an early stage of development. 
The Security Management has to make sure that all the security requirements are 
fulfilled during the other components’ operation. In addition to being something 
every other component depends on, the Security Management itself depends on 
some of the other components, such as key distribution, storage of keys and certifi-
cates, getting information on the neighborhood, etc. This cross-dependence be-
tween components, however, poses additional security issues that need to be taken 
care of. Security and privacy issues are being addressed in detail in this thesis. 
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2.2.2 MIDAS 
MIDAS (Middleware Platform for Developing and Deploying Advanced Mobile 
Services, [9]) is a project funded by the European Commission (2006-2008). The 
main objective of the project is to simplify and speed up the task of developing 
and deploying mobile applications and services for larger heterogeneous networks. 
The two scenarios addressed by the MIDAS project include (but are not limited 
to) big sports events, e.g. Tour de France, and emergency and rescue operations. 
Although very different in their basics, these scenarios do share some common re-
quirements and assumptions, such as: large number of users, limited duration of 
the event, networks consisting of a variety of different devices (possibly supporting 
different network technologies), the fact that infrastructure might be present but 
should not be solely relied on, strict consistency not being a requirement (i.e., if 
the situation does not allow it, it is better to get some information than no infor-
mation at all). Next, we present shortly the three key features of MIDAS. 
In heterogeneous networks, such as MIDAS is targeting, different devices might 
have support for different of network technologies, some of them might even sup-
port more than one. In general, this would cause compatibility problems. MIDAS, 
however, uses this fact to its advantage, by selecting the most adequate technology 
for communication between a group of nodes and thus extending the communica-
tion possibilities within the network, or even across different networks. This fact is 
transparent to the applications, which only need to know which nodes are avail-
able at any time, or possibly the network topology as well. If a node is not avail-
able at a certain point in time, an application may allow MIDAS to effectuate the 
message delivery at a later point in time when the recipient node is reachable 
again, by means of a store-and-forward mechanism.  
To facilitate application development, MIDAS provides a higher level data ab-
straction known as context information, where context is interpreted as any infor-
mation that could be relevant to the interaction between the user and the applica-
tion. Context information is structured according to a domain model ontology 
which describes the current domain of deployment of the MIDAS middleware (e.g., 
the Tour de France race). MIDAS offers two context related services: context op-
erators and context-addressable messaging, which rely very closely on the domain 
model structure. Context operators work as means for extraction of context infor-
mation, possibly with synthesis of the information carried out by dedicated scripts 
(as an example, the application could query the middleware for the positions of us-
ers within a 500 m radius of another user) [5]. Context-addressable messaging is a 
best-effort service used to push messages to users described through their context 
(as an example, a message could be sent to all “Norwegian cyclists”) [27]. By using 
an ontology based context model, both of these services can rely on underlying 
reasoning mechanisms and the information level interoperability between inde-
pendent applications. 
Information sharing by means of a distributed data space is addressed in the 
project by the MIDAS Data Space (MDS) middleware component. This component 
provides its users with a means of accessing the distributed shared data space 
without actually knowing where data are located. In addition, it performs trans-
parent versioning of data, to allow for consistency management and conflict resolu-
tion in a dynamic environment, such as the one MIDAS is targeting. The MDS 
component represents the main focus of this thesis and will thus be described in 
more detail in the Chapter 4. 
  
3Chapter 3 
Application Requirements 
 
Emergency and rescue operations have specific characteristics and requirements. In 
the Ad-Hoc InfoWare [39] and MIDAS [9] projects, we have designed middleware 
services to facilitate the development of applications and services for emergency 
and rescue operations. 
The content of this chapter is based on our previous work documented in form 
of a technical report [48]. The chapter includes three different example scenarios, 
followed by a requirements analysis of the scenarios’ main aspects of interest for 
this thesis. 
3.1 Emergency and Rescue Operations 
Emergency and rescue operations are characterized by a number of organizations 
and individuals involved. As such, they form a heterogeneous composition with re-
gards to organizational structure and devices present at the scene. However, by 
having a common goal, i.e., saving lives and limiting material damage, there must 
be mechanisms present that will cope with such heterogeneity and allow for effi-
cient data sharing between the participants.  
Organizations that are typically involved in such operations include the police 
department, paramedics, firefighters, armed forces, and possibly several additional 
organizations. In Norway, the police department has the main responsibility for 
rescue site management and coordination between all the organizations involved, 
as well as the county governor and other governmental departments who might get 
involved during the event. Even though each organization has its own set of rescue 
operation procedures and guidelines, cross-organizational interaction procedures 
and coordination structure must be defined. The coordination structure should to 
some extent shape the flow of information on the scene, even though the latter 
might sometimes deviate during the course of the event, if that improves efficiency. 
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In Norway, land operations are usually handled by the Rescue Sub-Centre 
(RSC), which has regional responsibility and appoints the on-scene coordina-
tor/commander (OSC) at operation initiation. For larger operations, there is usu-
ally one person from each of the three main organizations (police, firefighters, and 
paramedics), in charge for the different aspects of the operation (public order, fire 
control, and medical treatment respectively), who all report directly to the OSC. 
On top of the hierarchy there is the Joint Rescue Coordination Command Central 
(RCC), whose role is mainly to monitor the operation and give advice. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the organizational structure of rescue operations in Norway, as well as 
the role hierarchy and lines of reporting. The information is based on descriptions 
taken from the Norwegian Rescue and Search Service (SAR) [56]. It is this very 
model that we have used as basis for designing a key exchange protocol, presented 
and described in Chapter 8 (i.e., Paper #2). 
3.1.1 Example Scenario: Earthquake  
In this section, we present a scenario of a rescue operation after an earthquake. 
Even though it is a hypothetical scenario, it is based on information from a real 
earthquake that took place in western Nevada in September 1994 [7]. A strong 
earthquake may cause a high number of casualties and injured people, as well as 
severe material damages. This includes possible loss of electricity, communication 
infrastructure, blocked roads, etc., all of which might severely affect the rescue op-
eration. 
 
Figure 3.1: Organization and structure in rescue operations 
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The rescue operation following such an earthquake may last for days or weeks, 
and will generally cover a large geographical area. Not only might blocked roads 
prevent rescue personnel’s vehicles from coming to certain places, it might also 
hinder fuel supply to the same vehicles. Communication infrastructure might also 
be unavailable, either because cables have been damaged, or due to overload as a 
consequence of many people placing calls simultaneously. As a consequence, infor-
mation sharing between the rescue personnel, necessary for a successful operation, 
might be highly challenging. 
Efficient information sharing and means for information dissemination can 
speed up the work, which in turn may save lives. Such information include, but is 
not limited to patient files, drawings of buildings, maps, either from the Internet 
(if accessible) or from one of the devices present at the rescue scene (i.e., by form-
ing an ad-hoc network). The fact that there are many different types of informa-
tion causes a number of different flows of information, i.e., instructions from higher 
ranked officers to the next level in the hierarchy, status reports from the “ground 
people”, information from sensors to people on the scene, information from experts 
not directly involved in the operation, etc.  
3.1.2 Example Scenario: Railway Accident 
A railway accident might happen in inaccessible terrain due to landslides, technical 
failure, sabotage, collisions, etc. The hypothetical rescue operation presented in 
this section is based on a serious train accident that happened in Norway in Janu-
ary 2000 [45]. 
The accident in question happens in a tunnel at a mountain pass, as a conse-
quence of a rockslide outside the tunnel causing broken rail tracks. An incoming 
train hits the rocks on the way out of the tunnel, causing the locomotive to derail. 
There are a number of injured people, some of them still trapped in the train, 
while others managed to walk out. Both the locomotive and one of the train car-
riages are completely crashed, and there is high risk of fire. The train driver fol-
lows the procedure and reports the incident and location to the train control cen-
tre, who immediately forwards this information to the fire department and ambu-
lance, and starts necessary emergency procedures. The temperature is -10C, with 
deep snow in the area. The area has weak infrastructure and a need for special 
services. There is a mountain lodge located nearby, which can be accessed by a 
mountain road, and used for collecting evacuated train passengers. All personnel 
get relevant information (maps of the area, weather condition, available personnel 
and equipment, etc.) to their devices before leaving for the accident. RCC together 
with RSC starts a rescue operation to evacuate those in need of acute medical 
treatment which, due to harsh weather conditions, includes not injured people as 
well. 
The tunnel, rocks, train carriages, and an area that is not very accessible – all 
of these hinder communication between the rescue personnel, and the rescue opera-
tion as a whole. Inside the tunnel, there is limited communication range. Outside, 
there is problem of communicating with both people inside, and people on the 
other side of the tunnel. 
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The leader of the first team arriving at the scene takes immediately the role of 
on-site commander (OSC), which he keeps until a higher ranked police officer ar-
rives and takes over the role. The OSC gathers all necessary information, and co-
ordinates equipment and personnel as they keep arriving. It is imperative to 
evacuate people from the carriages, something firefighters are in charge of. Medical 
personnel take over as people are outside of the tunnel, and categorize them by the 
degree of injury and need for acute treatment. They are then transported to the 
mountain lodge for further treatment. 
Examples of communication flows in this scenario include information ex-
change among team members from the same organization (e.g., between medical 
personnel sharing registration and medical information about patients, or firefight-
ers sharing temperature information in the monitored area, etc.), among task 
forces created on the spot between team members from same or different organiza-
tions (e.g., a team consisting of a few firefighters and paramedics, assigned to go 
through a certain train carriage to report on the situation), or communication be-
tween different levels in the rescue operation organizational hierarchy, e.g., RSC 
and OSC, team members and team leaders, or team leaders and OSC. 
The landscape of the accident area has a big impact on the network topology, 
causing temporary or permanent partitions within or on the different sides of the 
tunnel. It must be ensured that all necessary data services are present in all the 
possible network partitions, and the mobility of the nodes has to be used as an ad-
vantage to deliver information across the partitions. 
3.1.3 Example Scenario: Subway Station Accident 
The following hypothetical scenario is located in an underground station of the ur-
ban metro system of Paris, France, based on a scenario description provided by 
the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP) [19]. 
The area has a good and well-maintained infrastructure, as opposed to the two 
previous scenarios. Still, some communication services might be unavailable at cer-
tain places of the subway system (e.g., tunnels between stations). 
In this scenario, there are two trains standing on the opposite platforms of the 
same stations. One of the drivers notices smoke coming from one of his carriages, 
and immediately reports all the necessary details to the operation control centre 
(PCC). The PCC turns on the fire alarm, shuts down the traction power for the 
trains in the area of the station, asks the passengers to evacuate the station, and 
notifies the nearby stations. The information is then passed on higher up in the hi-
erarchy, to the operation duty inspector (IPEX). The drivers of the two trains take 
pictures with their mobile devices and send them to the PCC, together with all 
necessary metadata (such as date, time, location, etc.). The IPEX calls for external 
support from the fire department, ambulance, police, etc., and informs the neces-
sary instances about the accident. The passengers are evacuated and the station is 
secured. 
The metro has a set of different emergency procedures, and a very precise hier-
archy for the information flow, depending on who is on duty. All this information 
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is readily available, which shortens the briefing phase. The incident manager, i.e., 
the first operation supervisor arriving at the scene, receives information from the 
mobile agents at the site and sends reports to the control centre. The IPEX keeps 
agents at nearby stations informed about the status of the accident. They may also 
send personalized to-do-lists to the agents, in form of tasks. When a task is com-
pleted, the information about this is immediately sent to the control unit. 
Also in this scenario different organizations and groups of people are involved, 
e.g., train drivers, people working on the station, emergency teams, accident lead-
ers form the metro department, etc. They all carry mobile devices for purpose of 
communication sharing, using infrastructure (e.g., GPRS or IEEE 802.11) where 
available, or forming an ad-hoc network otherwise. 
3.1.4 Summary 
The scenarios presented in the previous three sections are very different with re-
spect to location, landscape, size of the accident area, number of people involved, 
available resources, time span, etc. While the earthquake scenario covers a large 
area and number of people, and might last for several days, the other two scenar-
ios are more limited with respect to these factors. 
On the other hand, the scenarios do share a lot of similarities, something that 
has to be looked into when designing a generic middleware. Many of the same or-
ganizations are involved in the scenarios (e.g., paramedics, firefighters, and police), 
with similar tasks, but with different numbers of people involved. 
Possible sources of information include, for all scenarios, mobile devices carried 
by the rescue personnel, stationary devices, PCs in vehicles, sensors, possible access 
to data from the Internet, etc. Some of the information can be shared, but other 
information might be confidential (e.g., medical records). Infrastructure might be 
present, but should not be solely counted on due to possible breakages. Various 
types of information flow might be present in all the scenarios, e.g., among team 
members from the same organization, between different organizations, or between 
different levels in the rescue operation organizational hierarchy. 
As part of the Ad-Hoc InfoWare project, we have identified six different phases 
[31] of a typical emergency and rescue operation. 
Phase 1 – A priori 
This phase is before any accident takes place, when the relevant organizations, in 
cooperation with the authorities, exchange information on data formats and shared 
vocabularies, and make agreements on procedures and working methods. Required 
certificates would be installed in this phase, and applications can be installed and 
run so as to allow completion of an initial self-configuration phase. A communica-
tion and knowledge environment tailored to relevant applications can be prepared, 
and data replication strategies chosen by the middleware. In a context aware sys-
tem, contexts reflecting different scenarios can be prepared, group memberships 
based on user profiles set up. 
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Phase 2 – Briefing 
This phase starts once the incident has been reported. The briefing involves gath-
ering of information about the accident, e.g., weather, location, number of people 
involved, and facilities in the area. Some preliminary decisions about rescue proce-
dures and working methods are also made at this stage. Based on information 
gathered during this phase, applications can be configured further, security levels 
chosen, and, if applicable, relevant rescue contexts and profiles put in force.  
Phase 3 – Bootstrapping the network 
This phase takes place at the rescue site, and involves devices joining and register-
ing as nodes in the network on arrival. In addition, the appointing of rescue leaders 
takes place in this phase. By preparing communication and taking care of security 
restrictions in force, the middleware can improve the working environment of the 
applications.  
Phase 4 – Running of the network 
This is the main phase during the rescue operation, and the one this thesis focuses 
mostly on. Events that may affect the middleware services include nodes joining 
and leaving the network and network partitions and merges. Information is col-
lected, exchanged and distributed. There may be changes in the roles different per-
sonnel have in the rescue operation, e.g., change of rescue site leader. New organi-
zations and personnel may arrive and leave the rescue site, new groups of an ad-
hoc, task-oriented kind may form, possibly involving people from different organi-
zations. Applications communicate about available resources and capabilities of the 
nodes in the network, using whatever knowledge is provided by the middleware. It 
can update to changes in available resources as the network is evolving, query for 
more data or information as it becomes available, and adjust its configuration and 
behavior accordingly. Computing resources, processing environments and applica-
tions situated at neighbors can be utilized, using resource information provided by 
the middleware and obeying accepted policies for resource sharing. Replicas and 
proxies can be placed at strategic nodes in the network, and nodes can receive 
event notifications based on relevance and priority. As nodes join and leave the 
network the middleware can keep track of available resources and adjust its com-
munication and knowledge environment accordingly. This is especially important 
for the location of database replicas, to ensure high data availability at all times. 
Phase 5 – Closing of the network 
At the end of the rescue operation all services must be terminated. Applications 
can adapt to the closing of the network by acting on received information about 
degradation of the capabilities and resources of the network. 
Phase 6 – Post processing 
After the rescue operation, operation specific data, e.g., resource use, user move-
ments, and how and what type of information was shared, may be analyzed to 
gain knowledge for future situations. Depending on the nature of the application, it 
may have gathered statistical or other information for post scenario analysis or for 
future use. 
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Infrastructured networks cannot be relied on during the rescue operation itself. 
However, in the opening phases (phases 1-2), there are no such restrictions, which 
gives possibilities for preparations that to some degree can compensate for a lack of 
resources during the rescue operation. 
3.2 Requirements Analysis 
The three main aspects from the application scenarios of interest for this thesis are 
security (both towards and within the network), network characteristics, and data 
sharing. 
3.2.1 Security Aspects 
In emergency and rescue operations, where people’s lives are at stake, certain as-
pects of security are of outmost importance. Authentication of rescue personnel 
and their devices, as well as data integrity, must be ensured in order to prevent in-
truders from injecting false information, which might allow them to disrupt com-
munication and jeopardize the whole operation, or to gain access to confidential in-
formation. Certain types of data, e.g., medical records, are regarded as being 
strictly confidential. Not only intruders must be prevented from accessing them, 
but their access should be limited among the rescue personnel as well. For that 
reason, there must exist mechanisms that would ensure that only authorized per-
sons/devices, groups, ranks, etc., have access to certain data. 
The abovementioned issues are especially hard to achieve in an environment 
where wireless technologies are used for information exchange. Unlike wired net-
works, where one needs physical access to gain access to the network, the wireless 
medium allows anyone in the vicinity to be part of it, both passively and actively. 
It is fairly easy for an intruder to bring down the whole network by means of sig-
nal jamming, something that would need to be taken care of by physically locating 
and removing them. However, there are more subtle ways of achieving the same ef-
fect, i.e., by means of eavesdropping, injecting false information, or re-sending old 
but perfectly valid packets, that might be harder to locate and resolve. Another is-
sue that is very much plausible, yet hard to be taken care of, is introduced by the 
fact that rescue operations are hectic and dynamic in nature, which makes it easy 
for a member of the rescue personnel to lose their (already authenticated) devices. 
If an intruder gets hold of such a device, and nothing is done to exclude it from 
the network, they might easily get the possibility to do anything the device’s 
owner could do, something that in wrong hands could be disastrous. 
All this has to be kept in mind when implementing a system that should meet 
the security demands for such a specific scenario as emergency and rescue opera-
tions. 
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3.2.2 Network Characteristics 
Using MANETs on the rescue site is a promising approach, due to the fact that 
existing infrastructure might not be present or might be destroyed. However, the 
layout of the affected area, physical obstacles, and the mobility of the rescue per-
sonnel and their devices, might lead to frequent and/or long term network parti-
tions. 
In the train accident described in Section 3.1.2, rescue personnel needs to take 
care of passengers at both sides of the tunnel, causing two network partitions. 
There might be ways to connect these partitions (e.g., by means of GSM, satel-
lites, or ad-hoc placed base stations above the tunnel if possible), but they need to 
be able to function properly even if this is not possible. In addition, some teams 
might go into the tunnel, causing new partitions that also need to function inde-
pendently. 
The rescue personnel’s devices might be very heterogeneous with respect to 
hardware (PDAs, mobile phones, laptops, stationary computers within vehicles, 
etc.) and available resources (e.g., battery power, storage space, CPU, etc.). Both 
the heterogeneity of devices, and the broad range of functional and non-functional 
requirements, impose the need for resource management mechanisms. In order to 
have efficient resource management mechanisms, prediction of network connec-
tivity is an important, albeit challenging factor. 
Node mobility in a MANET poses challenges also with regards to packet rout-
ing, creating a need for specialized routing protocols, to be able to find paths be-
tween pairs of nodes. Given the fact that there is no infrastructure in a MANET, 
each node needs to be able to act both as an end-user device and a router (as seen 
from a traditional network’s perspective). This issue is described in more detail in 
Section 2.1.1. 
3.2.3 Data Sharing 
Due to the dynamicity of the network, data sharing poses challenges with regards 
to storing, locating, and retrieving data. The fact that a certain node might be out 
of reach could cause important data to be unavailable. To ensure availability of 
data, even if the network is partitioned, the data must be replicated on more than 
one node, and consistency between replicas needs to be taken care of. A system 
such as MIDAS Data Space (see Chapter 4) can be used to address this issue. 
The fact that a node might not be reachable at a certain point of time makes it 
also necessary to develop protocols for a more asynchronous, i.e., delay tolerant 
communication. This can be achieved e.g. by means of a publish/subscribe mecha-
nism, in combination with mechanisms such as store-carry-forward, epidemic rout-
ing [59], message ferrying [63], etc., to deliver notifications. Data sharing in emer-
gency and rescue operations is not a trivial issue, not only due to the fact that the 
network is dynamic, but also because each organization might use its own stan-
dardized vocabulary and data model. Therefore, it is desirable to support subscrip-
tions that are targeting different vocabularies, including translation or mapping 
between different vocabularies. 
  
4Chapter 4 
MIDAS Data Space 
 
The core purpose of the MIDAS Data Space (MDS) is to provide applications and 
other MIDAS components (so called MDS users) running on different nodes a 
mechanism to share information by inserting data in and retrieving data from a 
shared data space. To the MDS users, the shared data space is very similar to a 
standard relational database, with functions to create, add data to, retrieve data 
from and remove data from tables. These MDS functions work in such a way that 
data added by an application on one node is made available for retrieval on other 
nodes, without any intervention needed from the application program. The shared 
data space is implemented using a combination of data replication and remote op-
erations, but this fact is transparent to applications. To the applications, it looks 
as if there is just one instance of each table, accessible from all nodes. However, 
multiple table instances (replicas) may exist in the network, providing higher reli-
ability in case of network partitioning. MDS uses a cross-layer approach when per-
forming decisions on where replicas should be placed, taking into account both the 
network topology and applications’ access pattern to the data. To ensure eventual 
consistency, conflict resolution and auditing, MDS implements data versioning, i.e., 
data are never physically deleted and, if updated, old versions are kept. 
In short, MDS can be summarized by the following main features: 
 shared data space where data location and distribution issues are transpar-
ent to the users 
 two types of replication (eager and lazy), to ensure data availability and 
eventual consistency between the replicas 
 data versioning, for purposes of consistency, conflict resolution, and auditing 
 cross-layer optimizations, to minimize the resource usage due to data repli-
cation 
In this chapter, we describe in detail the MDS component, as well as the proof-
of-concept implementation used as the basis for this thesis. Due to time constraints 
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imposed by the project’s duration and deadlines, the proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of the MDS, as presented in this chapter, has certain limitations. The focus 
was put on getting the component functional, and as a consequence not all sub-
component implementations take into account issues such as scalability and re-
source usage. These issues were further studied after the project’s end, and are 
presented in Chapter 13. 
4.1 MDS within MIDAS 
MDS is one of the core components of the MIDAS Architecture, as shown in 
Figure 4.1, taken from [53]. MDS uses mostly services from the Connectivity and 
Routing component, as well as some Common Functions. MDS offers its services 
to both applications and other MIDAS components, mostly the Context Space 
component. 
4.2 MDS Architecture 
The MDS component consists of the following sub-components: 
 Query Analyzer (QA) – supports queries towards the local database, as well 
as towards remote nodes. 
 Global MetaData Manager (GMDM) – keeps track of which tables have 
replicas on which nodes.  
 Data Allocator (DA) – decides where in the network replicas of each table 
should be placed. 
 Data Synchronizer (DS) – performs synchronization of data between nodes 
having replicas of the same table. 
 Subscription Manager (SM) – offers publish/subscribe functionality where 
an application may subscribe to changes to a table and receive notifications 
when and if such a change takes place. 
 Local Storage (LS) – manages data persistence on behalf of the other MDS 
subcomponents. 
 
Figure 4.1: MIDAS Architecture 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: MDS Architecture 
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Figure 4.2 shows the overall design of MDS and the interaction between its 
sub-components. Here are some observations: 
 QA is the only sub-component that other MIDAS components (or applica-
tions, through the Middleware Core) have contact with, serving as a so 
called façade component. 
 The only sub-components communicating directly with the database (i.e., 
LS) are QA and GMDM. 
The QA sub-component receives queries containing INSERT, SELECT, 
UPDATE or DELETE statements. It is the task of MDS to choose on which node 
a query will be performed, and thus provide applications with transparency on 
where data are located. In addition, MDS users are given the possibility to make 
that decision themselves in case they might have knowledge about where a table is 
(or should be) stored. Being a façade component towards MDS, QA also imple-
ments the functionality for allocating or de-allocating table replicas, as well as in-
forming GMDM on such events, although the decision on where to place replicas is 
the realm of the DA sub-component. QA performs transparent versioning of data, 
as explained in Section 4.4 of this thesis. QA takes care of immediately propagat-
ing data changes that might take place as a consequence of a query, to all replicas 
in the network. This process is called eager synchronization. 
The GMDM sub-component keeps track of which table replicas are located on 
which nodes. Ideally, all the nodes’ GMDMs should have the same view of the 
network. For this purpose, when a new table is created, GMDM stores new meta-
data information on the table in question and immediately starts a metadata syn-
chronization process with its neighbors. When a query is received from the applica-
tion, it is GMDM who knows where the query can be performed. When a new 
node joins the network, the GMDMs synchronize metadata information, thus get-
ting an updated view on what table replicas exist on which nodes. When done, 
GMDM calls DS to synchronize the actual data in tables that the local node has in 
common with the newly arrived node. This process is called lazy synchronization. 
The DA sub-component decides when and where in the network instances of 
each table (i.e., replicas) should be placed. As part of this thesis, we have imple-
mented a solution where an instance of DA on each node continuously monitors 
usage patterns (local and remote) of each table. This information is periodically 
sent to a central node, called Traffic Controller (TC), whose DA sub-component 
uses it to actually decide on the placement of each replica. Work on the DA sub-
component, including evaluation results, has been described in detail in Chapter 13 
(i.e., Paper #7). 
The LS sub-component gives access to local data, stored in a relational data-
base. LS makes it possible for any node to choose any of the supported relational 
database management systems (see Section 4.3 for details). 
The DS sub-component is used to perform lazy synchronization of data be-
tween nodes having replicas of the same table. When a change in the network is 
reported by the MIDAS Communication and Routing component, involving one or 
more nodes that have entered the network, a synchronization process is started. 
26 MIDAS Data Space 
After the GMDMs have synchronized their metadata information, they each call 
their respective DS to start peer-to-peer synchronization on the data level with 
nodes having replicas of the same table. Due to network disruptions and messages 
being lost for other reasons, the abovementioned procedure might not be sufficient. 
To make sure that eventual consistency is obtained, DS therefore performs periodic 
synchronization with nodes with which it has tables in common. 
The SM sub-component provides a subscription and notification mechanism. 
MDS users may subscribe to changes to certain fields in a certain table (e.g., “no-
tify me if Paul’s temperature gets over 38C”). 
4.3 Database Support 
In order to be able to run the LS sub-component of MDS, a 3rd party DBMS solu-
tion is used, with the responsibility for managing table definitions and their infor-
mation content locally at a node. The functionality provided to MDS users 
through the MDS information management API will be a subset of what the 
DBMS solution provides. The exact subset of SQL calls supported by MDS is de-
scribed in Section 4.5. 
MDS currently supports the following free SQL databases:  
 H2 [18] is implemented in Java and may run within the middleware or as a 
standalone server. The database is stored on disk. 
 Sqlite [51] is implemented in Java, and runs within the middleware. It can 
be chosen whether the database during operation will only be kept in mem-
ory or on disk. 
 HSQLDB [17] is implemented in Java, and runs within the middleware. It 
can be chosen whether the database during operation will only be kept in 
memory or on disk.  
 MySQL [33] is not implemented in Java and therefore must be run sepa-
rately. The database is stored on disk. 
Since synchronization of tables is done by means of standard SQL statements, 
different nodes may run different types of databases (e.g., one node may use H2, 
while another one uses HSQLDB), not affecting synchronization of shared tables. 
4.4 Data Versioning 
Contrary to standard relational databases, MDS provides transparent versioning of 
data. Instead of doing updates and deletions on the data items, the items are 
marked as obsolete and a new prevailing (valid) version is created. For this pur-
pose, each table has a Status field, which can have one of the following values: 
 VALID – denotes a valid record, i.e., it will be included into the result set 
when an application sends a query, and it will be considered for a user’s 
UPDATE or DELETE statement. 
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 UPDATED – denotes a record that once was valid, but has been updated 
since. Such records are kept for book-keeping and auditioning purposes and, 
unless explicitly asked for, they will not be included into the result set of a 
query, and neither will they be considered for a user’s UPDATE or 
DELETE statement. 
 DELETED – denotes a record that has been deleted. Such records are kept 
for book-keeping and auditing purposes only and will never be considered 
for any user request.  
All three types of records are used by MDS to perform limited automatic con-
flict resolution during the lazy synchronization process. This process is illustrated 
by examples in Section 4.8. 
The primary key in a table is a system generated number (incremented for 
each new record), called Local_ID. The Local_ID field is only used by the local da-
tabase on each node and is not included in the synchronization process. For syn-
chronization purposes, we have an additional identifier (called ID), consisting of 
the fields NodeID_Created and TS_Created. The NodeID_Created and TS_Created 
fields are set when a new record is inserted into a table, and contain the node ID 
and timestamp respectively, and are later used by MDS to identify whether two 
records are actually different versions of the same record.  
Since versioning is performed internally by MDS, applications cannot define 
primary keys as they would in a traditional relational database. The reason for this 
is that, due to versioning, there may exist more than one record having the same 
value for such a key. It is however possible to define a so called application defined 
key. Each table can have one field that will act as such a key. By doing this, the 
application developers tell MDS upfront what they consider to be an identifier, and 
MDS later uses that field as the basis for doing conflict resolution. 
4.5 Data Storage and Retrieval  
MDS allows storage and retrieval of data by means of SQL statements. When a 
query is received by MDS, it is the QA component that parses it. After determin-
ing the type of SQL statement and the table or tables being affected, QA needs to 
know on which node the query should be run. This procedure can be explained by 
the following pseudo code: 
 
if destination node specified { 
perform query on specified node 
} else { 
ask GMDM which nodes have replicas of all the tables in question 
if local node on the list 
send request to the local LS component 
else 
send request to a remote node from the list  
} 
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In the current implementation, GMDM first sorts the nodes according the rules 
for greylisting and blacklisting, explained later in Section 4.11. Next, the nodes are 
sorted by the number of hops. Finally, QA selects the first node from the list if it 
is a remote query. 
The next step is to process the query. Here, we describe in detail what happens 
for each of the four types of queries supported. 
SELECT statement 
Syntax:  SELECT <fields> FROM <table> 
[WHERE <condition>] 
[GROUP BY <fields>] 
[HAVING <condition>] 
[ORDER BY <fields> [ASC | DESC]] 
[LIMIT <number>] 
A SELECT statement is always performed only on one node. It returns the result 
of the query as a result set if it succeeds, or a null-pointer if it fails on local que-
ries. On remote queries, a timeout exception is thrown if the remote node does not 
respond within the predefined timeout period. The default period is set to 30s, 
unless it is overridden in the configuration file, or within the query call itself. 
It is possible to specify more than one table on which to perform the query (so 
called joined query), however a joined query will only work if there exists a node 
hosting replicas of all the tables in question. To be able to use this functionality 
and rely on it, applications should have knowledge on where data are stored. This 
is, for instance, possible if the applications want to force creation of a table replica 
on a certain node. Even though this might contradict with the principle of trans-
parency, it gives applications useful additional functionality that otherwise would 
not be available. 
Table aliasing in the SELECT statement is not supported. 
With respect to versioning, it is possible to specify which and what kind of re-
cords that should be returned. Some examples are presented in Section 4.8.2. 
INSERT statement 
Syntax:  INSERT INTO <table> (<fields>) VALUES (<values>) 
An INSERT statement adds a record to the table given in the SQL statement, and 
if an instance of this table does not exist yet, it is created on a node picked by DA. 
If it is a table with an existing instance, and there are replicas within the network, 
the record is immediately sent to all the replicas on the nodes that are reachable 
(i.e., eager synchronization is invoked). 
If the INSERT statement caused creation of a new table replica, QA notifies 
GMDM on this fact, which then makes sure metadata are synchronized on all 
nodes. If replicas of the given table already existed prior to the creation, which 
could happen if this latest creation was a result of an application forcing the op-
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eration to be performed on a specific node, lazy synchronization takes place to 
make sure the newly created instance has a copy of the old data as well. 
The status of the newly inserted record is automatically marked as VALID. 
UPDATE and DELETE statements 
Syntax:  UPDATE <table> SET <fields_and_values> 
 [WHERE <condition>] 
 DELETE FROM <table> 
 [WHERE <condition>] 
From the application point of view, an UPDATE statement updates and a 
DELETE statement deletes a record or records, just like any other relational data-
base. As with INSERT, any changes will be immediately propagated to all other 
reachable nodes having replicas of the same table. If a remote node or nodes are 
not reachable, the eager synchronization operation will not be carried out, and lazy 
synchronization will take care of it when these nodes become reachable.  
In reality, UPDATE and DELETE statements are transformed by MDS to 
perform versioning of data. An UPDATE statement first marks the old record(s) 
matching the given condition as UPDATED, after which VALID version(s), with 
the new values, are inserted. A DELETE statement marks the old record(s) 
matching the given condition as DELETED. 
4.6 Data Replication 
Multiple instances (replicas) of each table might be present in the network. Con-
trary to some other systems, MDS does not make a distinction between a main 
(often called master) copy and secondary ones, i.e., all replicas are treated equally.  
The proof-of-concept implementation of MDS includes a simple solution for doing 
replication and synchronization, and only a few performance issues are taken into 
consideration. When the DA decides where to create a table, it always picks the 
local node. For performance and reliability reasons, the application can request 
MDS to create a replica of a specific table on a specific node. Information about 
this operation is sent to the local GMDM. If the node in question is not reachable 
at the given moment, the table will not be replicated. Even though such a solution 
was good enough for the MIDAS prototype, it clearly has room for improvements. 
Improving the functionality of the DA sub-component is one of the main contribu-
tions of this thesis, presented in detail in Chapter 13 (i.e., Paper #7). 
Having multiple table replicas introduces the need for synchronization, to make 
sure that data are consistent as much as the situation allows it. MDS supports and 
implements two synchronization concepts, namely eager and lazy synchronization. 
Eager synchronization takes place whenever a change is done in the data space 
(by means of an INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE statement). The change is im-
mediately propagated to all replicas within reach, to ensure that the nodes in the 
network have a consistent view of the data. If a node or group of nodes were out of 
30 MIDAS Data Space 
reach at the moment a change occurred, lazy synchronization takes care of possible 
inconsistencies that might be present after the two network partitions have 
merged. 
Lazy synchronization of data is performed when CRT detects and reports a 
new node in the network. To be on the safe side, this is also performed periodi-
cally. The synchronization process between two nodes that have tables in common 
is performed by their respective DS sub-components. Synchronization is based on 
the records’ key field ID, which uniquely identifies a record and all its versions. In-
consistencies are detected when records with the same key field have differences 
within other MDS fields (i.e., multiple versions of a record exist), thus introducing 
need for conflict resolution. 
 
The synchronization process in the current implementation of MDS itself is 
simple and not scalable. It is divided into four phases, as shown in the message se-
quence diagram in Figure 4.3: 
1. Node 1 sends a request for synchronization. In the case Node 2 already has 
an ongoing synchronization process and cannot respond, it will queue the 
request. 
2. When Node 2 is ready for synchronization, it responds with a list of records 
it has for each table they have in common. Each record is identified by the 
field id. The field TS_Changed (the time when the record has been 
changed) is also sent for conflict resolution purposes. 
3. Node 1 responds with an equivalent list. 
4. Nodes 1 and 2 send each other records the other node does not have or has 
an old version of (see below for details); this is done by issuing remote que-
ries using QA. 
 Node 1 Node 2 
 
 sync_req Phase 1 
 
 
 ready, record_list2 Phase 2 
 
 record_list1 Phase 3 
 
 missing_records Phase 4 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Lazy synchronization process 
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In case of inconsistencies within a table after a network merging, a simple con-
flict resolution strategy is performed, and timestamps are being looked into. Pro-
vided that two nodes had a record in common (i.e., the same version of the record) 
before partitioning, the following cases can occur when two nodes compare a pair 
of records upon merging: 
1. One or both nodes updated the record in the meantime – only the newest 
VALID record is kept as such, while the others are marked as UPDATED. 
Each node sends over all the versions the other node does not have. 
2. One node has deleted the record – the version with the newest timestamp 
“wins”. 
a. If the deleted record has a newer timestamp, it will be deleted (i.e., 
marked as DELETED) on the other node as well. 
b. If the other node performed an update (and thus created a fresh 
VALID version) after the first node’s delete, the record will become 
VALID again.  
 
Even though the fact that a record is newer or older may not be correct due to 
unsynchronized clocks, it will be unambiguous. This is explained in detail in Sec-
tion 4.11. 
MDS does have knowledge of what an application considers to be a record key. 
If a record is inserted concerning the “same” data (as seen from the application’s 
point of view) on two different nodes, this will result in two separate records con-
cerning the “same” data. Therefore, the lazy synchronization process will not com-
pare these records, and conflict resolution will be done either by the application or 
by MDS if requested. This has to be done each time a query is performed on such 
records. 
By performing experiments in the emulation environment NEMAN (see 
Chapter 8), we were able to verify that the protocol indeed leads to consistent 
state where all nodes have the same view on the tables. 
4.7 MDS Schema 
The MDS Schema contains definitions of properties that MDS must relate to at 
startup, i.e., database table definitions. These definitions cannot be changed until 
MDS is terminated and restarted. The MDS Schema is described by one or more 
plain text files using a simplified XML. The default file is named mds-schema.xml, 
which must be present and unchanged. When MDS is started, all valid files are 
loaded into the memory to form one single schema. Therefore, it is important that 
tables have unique names and that there is only one definition for each table. 
MDS supports two different types of tables: tables that only can be accessed 
locally at a node (Local Table) and tables containing information for sharing be-
tween nodes (Shared Table). Local and shared tables have identical structure; the 
only difference is that data in shared tables is made available to all nodes and that 
shared tables potentially have multiple replicas. 
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The following properties apply to both local and shared tables: 
 Name: A unique name within the active MDS domain. 
 Scope: Specification whether the table shall be a Local Table or a 
Shared Table. 
 Fields: The names and types of all the fields that can hold data when the 
table is in use. Supported data types correspond to a subset of the types 
supported by the 3rd party DBMS to be used. Optionally, one field in each 
table can be set as an application defined key, used by MDS for conflict 
resolution. 
 Constraints: Possible additional constraints (e.g. secondary keys). 
There is a set of fields predefined for every table. The values in these fields are 
required for MDS internal “book-keeping” functionality and, in addition to that, 
they may be read by MDS users as any other field (but not modified). The follow-
ing default fields are defined: 
 Local_ID: The unique identifier of a certain row – this field is not shared 
with other nodes as it is automatically assigned by the database and might 
otherwise result in conflicts. 
 ID: Shared unique identifier of a record or different versions of the same re-
cord, consisting of NodeID_Created and TS_Created. This can be used by 
applications and is not dependent on location of data. This serves as the 
main key used for identifying records that might be out of sync on various 
nodes. 
 NodeID_Created: The ID of the node that created the record.  
 TS_Created: Timestamp, generated on the node on which the INSERT op-
eration was performed that resulted in creation of the record. 
 NodeID_Changed: The ID of the node that last changed the record.  
 TS_Changed: Timestamp, generated on the node on which the last 
UPDATE, DELETE or INSERT operation was performed that resulted in a 
change or creation of the record. This is used for conflict resolution if incon-
sistencies are detected. 
 Status: Indicates the status of the records, possible values are: VALID, 
UPDATED or DELETED (see Chapter 4.4 for details). 
 Record_Replaced: Used for book-keeping purposes, contains the Local_ID of 
the previous version of this record (or NULL, if this is the original version).  
An example of the MDS Schema can be seen in Figure 4.4. The first line is 
present for XML compatibility (although it is optional) in case some other XML 
parsers are used rather than the simplified parser developed for this particular im-
plementation of MDS. To reduce processing time and memory, this simplified 
parser does not take into account the content (value) within XML tags, i.e., every-
thing needs to be specified as attributes.  
The default scope of a table is Shared, unless specified otherwise. If it is speci-
fied as Local, no contact with GMDM is established when performing actions on 
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the table. For that reason, there cannot exist both a shared- and a local-scope ta-
ble with exactly the same name. 
Optionally, one field in each table can be set to be an application defined key 
(as the field description in table burek, in the above example), which does not 
guarantee that there will not be more than one record with the same key. This key 
is only looked into when MDS performs conflict resolution in the case when multi-
ple rows with the same key are returned as a result of a query using the parameter 
VERSION_LATEST. However, since the change on more than one version can 
happen at exactly the same time, applications should be able to handle receiving a 
response with more than one record. Due to versioning, it is not allowed to have 
additional database defined custom keys or unique-constraints. 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='iso-8859-1'?> 
<mds> 
  <table_definitions> 
    <table name="burek"> 
      <field name="description" type="text" key="yes"/> 
      <field name="price" type="int"/> 
    </table> 
    <table name="pita" scope="local"> 
      <field name="description" type="varchar(64)"/> 
      <constraint/> 
    </table> 
    <default_fields> 
      <field name="local_id"        type="int" constraints="auto_increment"/> 
      <field name="id"              type="varchar(128)"/> 
      <field name="nodeid_created"  type="varchar(64)"/> 
      <field name="nodeid_changed"  type="varchar(64)"/> 
      <field name="ts_created"      type="varchar(16)"/> 
      <field name="ts_changed"      type="varchar(16)"/> 
      <field name="record_status"   type="varchar(64)"/> 
      <field name="record_replaced" type="int null"/> 
      <constraint name="unique (nodeid_created, ts_created, ts_changed,  
                        record_status)"/> 
    </default_fields> 
  </table_definitions> 
  <type_conversion> 
    <database type="h2"> 
      <convert from="auto_increment" to="auto_increment(1, 1) primary key"/> 
    </database> 
    <database type="sqlite"> 
      <convert from="auto_increment" to="primary key autoincrement"/> 
      <convert from="varchar"        to="text"/> 
      <convert from="int"            to="integer"/> 
    </database> 
    <database type="hsql"> 
      <convert from="auto_increment" to="identity primary key"/> 
      <convert from="text"           to="varchar"/> 
      <convert from="number"         to="int"/> 
    </database> 
    <database type="mysql"> 
      <convert from="auto_increment" to="primary key auto_increment"/> 
    </database> 
  </type_conversion> 
</mds> 
Figure 4.4: Example of the MDS Schema 
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The default_fields are read from mds-schema.xml and are added to each table 
at the moment of its creation. The creation of the abovementioned table burek will 
result in the SQL statement towards the DBMS as shown in Figure 4.5. 
All the tables have a Local_ID field as the primary key which is an integer and 
is automatically incremented. The described syntax for auto_increment is specific 
for H2 DBMS and might differ if another DBMS is used. For that reason, MDS 
has methods to adjust the syntax of CREATE TABLE to fit other types of 
databases (details on how this is done are not described here as it is out of the 
scope for this document). The other field types and constraints are standard. 
The type_conversion section gives the possibility to define conversion rules for 
field types or other syntax that might be different in different databases, making it 
sure that a correct CREATE TABLE statement is generated. As an example 
(shown in Figure 4.4), the statement to create the table’s primary key, and make 
it automatically increment for each newly inserted record, is different in each of 
the abovementioned databases. 
4.8 Examples 
In this section, we show some concrete examples of how MDS uses versioning to 
cope with network partitions, as well as an example of what would happen in such 
a situation if versioning was not present. 
4.8.1 Example: Update While Network is Partitioned 
The table Patients is allocated on Node 1 and Node 2. At first the two nodes are 
in the same network partition. Then an application on Node 1 inserts data about 
patient John into the table. This is also stored on Node 2 by using eager synchro-
nization. Both nodes have the same view of the table, as seen in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Patient table on nodes 1 and 2, before partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 100 Valid John 80 
CREATE TABLE burek ( 
  description text, 
  price int, 
  local_id int auto_increment(1, 1) primary key, 
  id varchar(128), 
  nodeid_created varchar(64), 
  nodeid_changed varchar(64), 
  ts_created varchar(16), 
  ts_changed varchar(16), 
  record_status varchar(64), 
  record_replaced int references burek(local_id), 
  unique (nodeid_created, ts_created, ts_changed, record_status) 
) 
Figure 4.5: Automatically generated SQL statement for creating tables 
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Next, the two nodes end up being out of range of each other. 
A new record about a new patient, Paul, is inserted into the table on Node 1. 
Node 1 also has an update about the patient John. This results in that record #1 
changes the Status and TS_Changed fields accordingly, and there is an insert of a 
new record about John (see Table 4.2) 
Table 4.2: Patient table on Node 1, during partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 
1 
100 
102 
Valid 
Updated 
John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 101 Valid Paul 90 
3 1 100 1_100 1 102 Valid John 90 
On Node 2, there is an UPDATE about John at time 103, as well as an 
INSERT about patient Paul at time 104 (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Patient table on Node 2, during partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 
2 
100 
103 
Valid  
Updated 
John 80 
2 1 100 1_100 2 103 Valid John 95 
3 2 104 2_104 2 104 Valid Paul 92 
When the partitions merge at time 105, and these two nodes meet, lazy syn-
chronization of all records is performed. The results can be seen in Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5. 
 Record #1 is considered to be the same. 
 Record #3 at Node 1 and Record #2 on Node 2 have the same key (ID) 
and are both VALID. Node 1’s record is older and is therefore marked as 
UPDATED. Then, both records are exchanged. 
 Record #2 at Node 1 and Record #3 at Node 2 are from MDS’ point of 
view not the same record, even though it is about the same patient, so each 
node sends an INSERT statement to the other node, and there are therefore 
two records about Paul that are valid. The result is the following: 
Table 4.4: Patient table on Node 1, after the two partitions have merged 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 102 Updated John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 101 Valid Paul 90 
3 1 100 1_100 1 
1 
102  
105 
Valid  
Updated 
John 90 
4 1 100 1_100 2 103 Valid John 95 
5 2 104 2_104 2 104 Valid Paul 92 
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Table 4.5: Patient table on Node 2, after the two partitions have merged 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 103 Updated John 80 
2 1 100 1_100 2 103 Valid John 95 
3 2 104 2_104 2 104 Valid Paul 92 
4 1 100 1_100 1 105 Updated John 90 
5 1 101 1_101 1 101 Valid Paul 90 
4.8.2 Example: Query 
Here we present a few examples of queries performed with different version control 
parameters. The values in the table are as shown in the previous example, and the 
applications on both nodes get the same results. 
 Query: SELECT id, name, pulse, status FROM Patient  
Version Control:  LATEST 
Result: 1_100 John   95   Valid 
 2_104 Paul   92   Valid 
 
Discussion: 
Only the newest VALID records (as denoted by the TS_Changed field) are 
returned for each application defined key (in this case Name). In the case of 
Paul’s record, this means that the record with the ID 1_101 will not be re-
turned since the record 2_104 has a newer timestamp. 
 Query: SELECT id, name, pulse, status FROM Patient 
Version Control:  VALID 
Result: 1_100 John   95    Valid 
 2_104 Paul   92    Valid 
 1_101 Paul   90    Valid 
 
Discussion: 
All VALID records are returned, not only the newest ones. Thus, in the 
case of Paul’s record, this time both 1_101 and 1_104 are returned. 
 Query: SELECT id, name, pulse, status FROM Patient 
Version Control:  ALL 
Result: 1_100 John   80   Updated 
 1_100 John   95   Valid 
 2_104 Paul   92   Valid 
 1_100 John   90   Updated 
 1_101 Paul   90   Valid 
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Discussion: 
All non-DELETED records are returned. The example above does not con-
tain any deleted record, causing all five records to be returned. The applica-
tion should check the Status field to make sure it handles the records cor-
rectly. 
 
4.8.3 Example: Delete or Update While Network is Partitioned 
Again, we have a stable network with a situation where both nodes have the same 
data, as seen in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Patient table on nodes 1 and 2, before partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 100 Valid John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 101 Valid Paul 100 
 
After partitioning, the following events occur: 
 Node 1 deletes both the records (John and Paul) at time 105 (see Table 4.7) 
 Node 2 updates the record John at time 106 (see Table 4.8) 
 
Table 4.7: Patient table on Node 1, during partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 
1 
100 
105 
Valid 
Deleted 
John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 
1 
101 
105 
Valid 
Deleted 
Paul 100 
Table 4.8: Patient table on Node 2, during partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 
2 
100 
106 
Valid 
Updated 
John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 101 Valid Paul 100 
3 1 100 1_100 2 106 Valid John 81 
 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the situation at time 110, after merging has oc-
curred: 
 Record #1 on Node 1 and Record #3 on Node 2 are compared. Node 2 
made the change most recently, and the record is “reincarnated” on Node 1. 
 Record #2 on Node 1 and Record #2 on Node 2 are compared. Node 1 
made the change most recently, and the record on Node 2 is also marked as 
DELETED. 
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Table 4.9: Patient table on Node 1,after the two partitions have merged 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 100 
105 
110 
Valid 
Deleted 
Updated 
John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 101 
105 
Valid 
Deleted 
Paul 100 
3 1 100 1_100 2 106 Valid John 81 
Table 4.10: Patient table on Node 2, after the two partitions have merged 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 
2 
100 
106 
Valid 
Updated 
John 80 
2 1 101 1_101 1 
2 
101 
105 
Valid 
Deleted 
Paul 100 
3 1 100 1_100 2 106 Valid John 81 
4.8.4 Example: Problems When No Versioning 
The following simple example shows the importance of the versioning mechanism 
in dynamic scenarios, such as the ones targeted by this thesis. If versioning were 
not available, deleting a record in a table replicated on nodes in different partitions 
would create a (clearly undesirable) situation where this record would be inserted 
again after merging of two partitions.  
Initially, both nodes have the same view, as seen in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11: Patient table on nodes 1 and 2, before partitioning 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 100 n/a John 80 
 
While the network is being partitioned, the record is deleted at Node 1 (Table 
4.12), and the table becomes empty. 
Table 4.12: Patient table on Node 1, after the record has been deleted 
Local_ID NID_Created TS_Created ID NID_Changed TS_Changed Status Name Pulse 
1 1 100 1_100 1 100 Valid John 80 
 
Node 2 does not have knowledge of this and keeps the table unchanged. 
After the two partitions merge, synchronization takes place and the record gets 
“reincarnated” at Node 1 (again, as seen in Table 4.11), because no mechanism is 
in place that would make Node 1 remember it already had deleted that very re-
cord.  
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4.9 Subscription and Notification Mechanism 
MDS’ sub-component SM provides applications with a subscription and notifica-
tion mechanism. Subscriptions are stored in a shared table, which means that 
every node knows about every other node’s subscriptions.  
The main subscribe-method’s parameters are the table name and rules. For a 
subscription to be triggered, all the given rules must be satisfied. The operators 
supported are: “¡”, “>”, “=”, “¡=”, “>=” and the string contains operator, denoted 
by “~”. The subscriber application must implement a call-back method that is 
called when a notification is received. In the current implementation, subscriptions 
do not have specified time validity, and must therefore be unsubscribed from when 
there is no need for them any more. 
Since the subscriptions table is updated and synchronized by MDS, it is not 
needed to send subscriptions and un-subscriptions to specific nodes having specific 
tables, neither it is necessary to keep track of new nodes getting new replicas. This 
solution is however not very scalable. 
Having a fully replicated subscriptions table may result in multiple notifica-
tions as a notification is going to be sent from each node where a change of a table 
that satisfies a subscription is stored, thus increasing the probability that the ap-
plication will receive the notification. The SM component at the subscriber’s node 
makes sure that the subscriber only receives the notification once. 
4.10 Performance Experiments on the MDS Prototype 
Detailed performance experiments of the MDS prototype are presented later in this 
thesis, in Chapters 12 and 13 (Papers #6 and #7). A number of experiments, 
however, were omitted in those papers due to space limitation. In this chapter, we 
present some of these experiments.  
4.10.1 Memory Cards in Nokia Internet Tablets 
This set of experiments was performed to see whether the physical location of the 
database on the device is important, with regards to access times. The experiments 
were performed on three generations of the Nokia Internet tablet available at the 
time (770, N800 and N810), which were candidates for target devices in the 
MIDAS project. 
Table 4.13 shows the results for the sqlite database on each of the three de-
vices. The labels I, S, U, and D represent the INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE and 
DELETE statements respectively. The numbers represent access time (in millisec-
onds) per record when an SQL statement is run that affects 100 records (except for 
INSERT, which had to be run 100 times individually). Empty fields mean that the 
given device/memory combination is not supported due to hardware limitations. 
Experiments on other supported databases (HSQLDB, H2, and MySQL) followed 
the same pattern and are therefore omitted. Sqlite and HSQLDB are the only da-
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tabases that support keeping data in memory, instead of storing it on permanent 
storage. The reason why the UPDATE numbers are so high lies in the fact that 
each original UPDATE statement is, due to versioning, in reality executed as 1x 
SELECT, 1x UPDATE and Nx INSERT statements, where N denotes the number 
of records affected by the original statement. 
It can be seen that data location and type of memory (ram, internal or exter-
nal) can play a difference with regards to access times. If the database is expected 
to be large, however, the only practical option remains using an external memory 
card. We tested several memory cards (depending on each device’s support), and 
results between them did not indicate that the type or speed of external memory 
card would make a significant impact. 
Table 4.13: Access times for the sqlite database on Nokia Internet tablets 
Device Nokia N810  Nokia N800 Nokia 770 
Storage location INS SEL UPD DEL INS SEL UPD DEL INS SEL UPD DEL 
data stored in RAM 289 5 372 47 350 6 353 57 427 7 412 57 
Flash internal 462 6 618 37 402 6 411 58 481 7 504 56 
/dev/mmc2 (internal) 496 6 459 38 991 9 1112 55     
/dev/mmc1 (miniSD) 824 6 939 44 713 7 799 54     
/dev/mmc1 (1GB MMCM)     535 7 555 49 673 7 691 59 
 
4.10.2 Choice of Java Interpreter 
Only a few Java interpreters were available for the target devices, each with their 
own performance, features and issues. JamVM and Cacao were the ones supported 
by the Nokia Internet tablets, where Cacao proved to have a much shorter start-
up time than JamVM. However, both were used interchangeably during the pro-
ject’s duration, due to various issues and limitations encountered in each of them. 
On the Zypad device, also tested briefly, the J9 interpreter was the only one avail-
able at the time. 
4.10.3 Packet Loss as a Result of Route Changes 
In Section 12.4.4, we present results from experiments on an emulated mobile net-
work, with focus put on applications’ experience of packet loss, and ignoring 
packet loss at the synchronization components (GMDM and DS). Here, we show 
results experienced by the MDS component, which include synchronization mes-
sages as well. 
We ran a dynamic scenario having 10 nodes, each sending 1 query per second. 
There were 47 neighbor changes during the 60 s of the scenario, causing a total of 
342 route changes. The inertness of the underlying routing protocol to react to 
changes caused certain packet loss. Figure 4.6 shows that the percentage of lost 
packets is mostly influenced by the applications’ access pattern to the database 
(i.e., the write to read) ratio, while the amount of replicas in the network does not 
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play a big role. This is valid for each of the three ratios, although we can see that 
the percentage increases with the increase of read operations. This can be ex-
plained by the relatively low amount of original packets, and a more or less con-
stant amount of synchronization packets, and thus lost packets. 
In OLSR, Hello messages are used for neighbor detection. If a node fails to re-
ceive a certain number of consequent Hello messages (the proposed value is 3, i.e., 
6 seconds) from one of its neighbors, the neighboring node is removed from the list 
of neighbors. As a consequence, there might be stale routes towards this node in 
the given period causing loss of packets. We have tried to reduce the Hello mes-
sage interval from 2 to 1 second (and, consequently, the timeout period from 6 to 3 
seconds), to see the impact this would have on the number of lost messages. Con-
trary to our expectations, Figure 4.7 shows that no significant gain has been 
achieved in our scenario. The gain is minimal, and in the cases where 50 % or 
more nodes host a replica of the table, the results for both cases are virtually the 
same. 
4.11 Final Notes on MDS 
In this section, we briefly present some of the remaining features and issues ad-
dressed by the MDS. 
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Figure 4.6: Total number of packets vs. lost packets 
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Hello Message interval on packet loss 
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Clock Synchronization 
Clock synchronization and issues tied to it have been a hot topic in the MIDAS 
project. It is clear that in disruptive networks, such as the ones MIDAS is target-
ing, it is unreasonable to expect all nodes to have perfectly synchronized clocks. 
Thus, some other mechanisms need to be deployed to avoid this fact causing prob-
lems such as synchronization loops. 
In MDS, we do not rely on perfectly synchronized clocks, but we do assume that 
the clocks are synchronized before the event takes place, and that they will not 
skew noticeably by the end of the event. Under these assumptions, MDS can per-
form automatic conflict resolution by comparing record timestamps to determine 
which of the records is considered to be newest. Even though this might not be 
perfectly correct with respect to what is newest in reality, it will always give an 
unambiguous result at any of the nodes doing the comparison, which is needed to 
avoid endless loops that might be present if nodes were not able to agree. 
Another approach, presented in [10], introduces the notion of arrogant clocks to 
achieve a common notion of time between nodes in the same network. In this sys-
tem, each node thinks its own clock is perfect, and it monitors time differences be-
tween itself and other nodes. To achieve a common notion of time, timestamps on 
synchronized records are always updated to the local time on the node receiving 
the records. 
Storing Binary Objects 
To be able to store binary objects (so called blobs) into the database, applications 
must encode them into strings using an algorithm such as Base64 (and decode 
them afterwards to read the values). Such functionality is provided directly by 
MDS. It has to be noted that, by doing this, the size of such objects increases by a 
constant factor of 1.3x.  
Greylisting 
To try to reduce unnecessary timeouts due to nodes being temporarily unavailable, 
MDS implements a greylisting scheme. Nodes that fail to respond to remote que-
ries are greylisted locally. When MDS decides where a remote query should be 
sent, greylisted nodes will be put at the end of the list returned by GMDM, thus 
avoiding (if possible) timeouts from nodes that were detected to be out of reach. 
Optionally, it may be chosen on start that such nodes will be completely excluded 
from the list (i.e., they can be blacklisted instead). When an INSERT is issued, if 
there are no nodes within reach having a replica of a specific table, this will cause 
a local instance to be created. Whenever a message is received from a node that 
had been greylisted, they are removed from the greylist. 
Packet compression and fragmentation 
The proof-of-concept implementation of MDS includes automatic compression of 
packets. Since messages are sent as Java objects, which often include plain text, 
this allows for savings. Fragmentation of packets is also done automatically, to en-
sure that even large messages reach their destination. 
These features should ideally be available by the underlying CRT component, but 
were for practical reasons related to project development implemented in MDS in-
stead. 
  
5Chapter 5 
Overview of the Research 
Papers 
 
This thesis comprises seven research papers covering three different, yet strongly 
related categories within the main topic. Here we present a short synopsis of these 
research papers. 
In emergency and rescue operations, where human lives are at stake, the main 
focus must be put on fast, efficient and reliable data sharing. Mobile ad-hoc net-
works (MANETs) can provide a platform for efficient data sharing, but in order to 
ensure availability and reliability, special mechanisms need to be present. In addi-
tion, the broadcast nature of wireless networks poses security risks that would not 
be present (at least not to the same extent) if cables were used. 
The first research paper summarizes and describes the main security issues pre-
sent in the target scenario. Some of the issues include securing data exchange (au-
thentication, integrity, confidentiality), with special focus put on routing traffic 
which, if left unsecured, can lead to fatal network disruptions. The next research 
paper presents a concrete solution to the latter issue, a protocol used for securing 
the traffic at the network layer, thus providing the upper layers with a working 
network. 
For the purpose of developing and testing this protocol, as well as other proto-
cols described in later papers, we developed an emulation environment. This envi-
ronment, described in the third research paper, was a more practical (and cheaper) 
alternative to performing pure simulations on one side, or real world experiments 
on the other side. 
With a secured network in place, focus could be shifted to the main topic, 
namely data sharing in MANETs. In order to achieve a reliable service, which is 
resilient to network partitions or single nodes disappearing, there should be in the 
network more than one copy of each data entity. However, this comes with a price, 
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that of transferring copies of data to different locations, and keeping track of all 
the replicas. The fourth paper describes how topology information extracted from 
the routing protocol can be exploited to optimize various synchronization tech-
niques, while the fifth paper focuses on the metadata management used by the Mi-
das Data Space (MDS) to keep track of the actual location of table replicas is 
stored on each node. 
The sixth paper presents the first MDS prototype, including a basic evaluation. 
Finally, the last paper shows results of a detailed evaluation of different replica 
placement strategies that will be used as basis for our future work in optimizing 
MDS. 
5.1 Paper #1 
Title: Security and Privacy Issues in Middleware for Emergency and Rescue Appli-
cations 
Authors: Matija Pužar, Thomas Plagemann, Yves Roudier 
Publication: The 1st International Workshop on MObile and DIstributed ap-
proaches in Emergency Scenarios (MODIES 2008), Tampere, Finland, January 
2008 [43] 
Abstract: Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are a natural candidate for commu-
nication and information exchange in emergency and rescue operations. The per-
sonnel's movements, network disruptions and other system dynamics make it hard 
to implement robust applications for such environments. The MIDAS project aims 
at creating a middleware platform to simplify the task of developing and deploying 
mobile and robust services for events in which the network might be set-up at 
short notice. MANETs may be used because infrastructure is non-existing, and the 
number of users might be very high. One of the application domains addressed by 
MIDAS are emergency and rescue operations. To get a broad acceptance of the 
MIDAS solutions, security and privacy issues need also to be addressed. In this 
paper, we analyze the security threats and present a two-way approach to securing 
the MIDAS architecture. In the bottom-up approach, we use an efficient key man-
agement protocol to establish trust, and in the top-down approach we use dynamic 
role based access control to secure the system and provide privacy. 
5.2 Paper #2 
Title: SKiMPy: A Simple Key Management Protocol for MANETs in Emergency 
and Rescue Operations 
Authors: Matija Pužar, Jon Andersson, Thomas Plagemann, Yves Roudier 
Publication: The 2nd European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad hoc and 
Sensor Networks (ESAS 2005), Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3813, Visegrad, Hungary, 
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July 2005 (also published at UiO as Technical Report #319, ISBN 82-7368-272-2, 
February 2005) [10] 
Abstract. Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) can provide the technical platform 
for efficient information sharing in emergency and rescue operations. It is impor-
tant in such operations to prevent eavesdropping, because some the data present 
on the scene is highly confidential, and to prevent induction of false information. 
The latter is one of the main threats to a network and could easily lead to network 
disruption and wrong management decisions. This paper presents a simple and ef-
ficient key management protocol, called SKiMPy. SKiMPy allows devices carried 
by the rescue personnel to agree on a symmetric shared key, used primarily to es-
tablish a protected network infrastructure. The key can be used to ensure confi-
dentiality of the data as well. The protocol is designed and optimized for the high 
dynamicity and density of nodes present in such a scenario. The use of preinstalled 
certificates mirrors the organized structure of entities involved, and provides an ef-
ficient basis for authentication. We have implemented SKiMPy as a plugin for the 
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR). Our evaluation results show that 
SKiMPy scales linearly with the number of nodes in worst case scenarios. 
5.3 Paper #3 
Title: NEMAN: A Network Emulator for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
Authors: Matija Pužar, Thomas Plagemann 
Publication: The 8th International Conference on Telecommunications (ConTEL 
2005), Zagreb, Croatia, June 2005 (also published at UiO as Technical Report 
#321, ISBN 82-7368-274-9, March 2005) [42] 
Abstract: Development of applications and protocols for wireless ad-hoc networks 
has always been a challenge. Specific characteristics such as frequent topology 
changes due to nodes moving around, popping up or being turned off, need to be 
considered from the earliest stages of development. Since testing and evaluation 
using genuine wireless devices is both expensive and highly impractical, other tools 
need to be used in the development phase. Simulators give a very detailed model 
of lower layers’ behaviors, but code often needs to be completely rewritten in order 
to be used on actual physical devices. Emulators present a trade-off between real 
test beds and simulators, providing a virtual wireless network at the lowest layers, 
and yet allowing real code to be run on the higher layers. In this paper, we present 
such an emulation platform, called NEMAN, that allows us to run a virtual wire-
less network of hundreds of nodes on a single end-user machine. NEMAN has 
shown to be an important and very useful tool during development of different ap-
plications and protocols for our project, including a key management protocol and 
a distributed event notification service. 
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5.4 Paper #4 
Title: Cross-layer Overlay Synchronization in Sparse MANETs 
Authors: Thomas Plagemann, Katrine Stemland Skjelsvik, Matija Pužar, Aslak 
Johannessen, Ovidiu Valentin Drugan, Vera Goebel, Ellen Munthe-Kaas 
Publication: The 5th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis 
Response and Management (ISCRAM 2008), Washington DC, USA, May 2008 [38] 
Abstract: Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks maintain information in the routing table 
about reachable nodes. In emergency and rescue operations, human groups play an 
important role. This is visible at the network level as independent network parti-
tions which are for some time stable before their members change through merging 
or partitioning. We use the information from stable routing tables to optimize the 
synchronization of Mediators in a Distributed Event Notification System. In a sta-
ble partition each node has the same information, thus a single Mediator can effi-
ciently coordinate the synchronization, while all other Mediators just receive up-
dates. We show in our experiments that just a few seconds are needed until rout-
ing tables stabilize and all nodes have a common view of the partition. We present 
a heuristic to determine the proper time to synchronize. Furthermore, we show 
how exceptions, like disappearing coordinating Mediators and unexpected mes-
sages, can be efficiently handled. 
5.5 Paper #5 
Title: Information Sharing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Metadata Management in 
the MIDAS Dataspace 
Authors: Ellen Munthe-Kaas, Aslak Johannessen, Matija Pužar, Thomas Plage-
mann 
Publication: The 10th International Conference on Mobile Data Management: Sys-
tems, Services and Middleware, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2009 [32] 
Abstract: An approach to information sharing in mobile adhoc networks 
(MANETs) is to store on every node a small amount of metadata describing what 
information resources exist in the network and where they reside, allowing applica-
tions to first search locally for information about suitable resources, and next re-
quest relevant information from a node that contains the resource. The character-
istics of MANETs in general and sparse, delay-tolerant networks in particular, 
make the task of maintaining and disseminating metadata across all nodes diffi-
cult, particularly in the presence of scarce resources. We have designed and im-
plemented three protocols which use different approaches to metadata dissemina-
tion: epidemic one-to-one routing, one-to-many broadcasting that utilises the char-
acteristics of the shared radio medium of wireless networks, and a protocol where a 
group consisting of e.g. rescue team leaders is given priority in the dissemination 
process and afterwards serves as multiple starting points for further dissemination. 
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In the MIDAS project we aim to produce middleware that speeds up MANET ap-
plication development. By prototyping the metadata management component of 
MIDAS and testing the prototype with each of the three protocols in the network 
emulator environment NEMAN, we have measured bandwidth usage and perform-
ance. The implemented broadcast protocol is measured to use substantially less 
bandwidth than epidemic routing. The group protocol shows that the group indeed 
gets priority; it is comparable to the broadcast protocol in terms of bandwidth us-
age. The broadcast protocol has been used successfully in field tests of the MIDAS 
middleware. 
5.6 Paper #6 
Title: Information Sharing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Evaluation of the MIDAS 
Data Space Prototype 
Authors: Matija Pužar, Katrine Stemland Skjelsvik, Thomas Plagemann, Ellen 
Munthe-Kaas  
Publication: The 2nd International Workshop on Specialized Ad Hoc Networks and 
Systems (SAHNS 2009), Toronto, Canada, June 2009 [44] 
Abstract: Information sharing in dynamic mobile ad-hoc networks is a challenging 
task. High data availability in the presence of short and long term disconnections 
can be obtained by replicating shared data. The number of replicas must however 
be balanced against the cost of consistency management. In the MIDAS Data 
Space (MDS) we use optimistic replication together with internal versioning of 
data; this allows application-specific conflict resolution when reconciling replicas at 
network mergings. We have made a proof-of-concept implementation to perform 
experiments and to demonstrate through real-life field tests the usefulness of our 
design. In this paper we report our results. We have conducted a number of ex-
periments on a small network formed by real devices to obtain a detailed perform-
ance evaluation. Using an emulation environment we have analysed and quantified 
the cost of consistency management, the impact of MDS operations, and the rela-
tionship between data availability and replication. 
5.7 Paper #7 
Title: Evaluation of Replica Placement Strategies for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
Authors: Matija Pužar, Thomas Plagemann  
Publication: The 13th International Conference on Network-Based Information 
Systems (NBiS-2010), Takayama, Gifu, Japan, 2010 [41] 
Abstract: The dynamic nature of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) can easily 
lead to data being inaccessible due to constant route changes and network parti-
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tions. One method often used for increasing reliability and availability of data is 
replication. However, replication comes with costs, those of transferring and stor-
ing data and keeping track of consistency between replicas. For that reason, we 
have identified the core factors impacting the resulting network traffic. We have 
performed experimental studies with a real world prototype of a distributed data 
management system for MANETs. Furthermore, we have done an extensive simu-
lation study showing where table replicas should be placed in the network, in order 
to minimize network traffic generated by access to the databases and by the syn-
chronization data. The results of the experiments are consistent and show that by 
using clustering techniques we can achieve close-to-optimal traffic by placing repli-
cas on approximately 10 % of nodes. 
5.8 Other Publications 
In addition to the abovementioned papers, this thesis has also contributed to the 
following publications. 
 Thomas Plagemann, Ellen Munthe-Kaas, Katrine S. Skjelsvik, Matija 
Pužar, Vera Goebel, Ulrik Johansen, Joe Gorman, and Santiago Perez 
Marin, A Data Sharing Facility for Mobile Ad-Hoc Emergency and Rescue 
Applications, Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Special-
ized Ad Hoc Networks and Systems (SAHNS 2007), Toronto, Canada, June 
2007 [37]  
 Norun Christine Sanderson, Katrine Stemland Skjelsvik, Ovidiu Valentin 
Drugan, Matija Pužar, Vera Goebel, Ellen Munthe-Kaas, Thomas Plage-
mann, Developing Mobile Middleware - An Analysis of Rescue and Emer-
gency Operations, Research Report #358, ISBN 82-7368-316-8, ISSN 0806-
3036, June 2007 [48] 
 Erek Göktürk, Matija Pužar, Naci Akkøk, Distributing NEMAN Network 
Emulator Using MICA Component Architecture, Proceedings of the Inter-
national Modeling and Simulation Multiconference 2007 (IMSM07) AIS-
CMS, Buenos Aires, Argentina, February 2007 [13] 
 Munthe-Kaas et al., Mobile Middleware for Rescue and Emergency Scenar-
ios, The Handbook of Mobile Middleware (chapter), P. Bellavista and A. 
Corradi, Auerback Publications, 2006 [31] 
 Plagemann et al, Middleware services for information sharing in mobile ad-
hoc networks - challenges and approach, Workshop on Challenges of Mobil-
ity, IFIP TC6 World Computer Congress, Toulouse, France, August 2004 
[39] 
 
  
6Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this chapter, we present a short summary of the thesis, followed by a critical 
review of the claims presented in the introduction. Finally, we present some open 
problems and future work. 
6.1 Summary 
Due to the dynamic nature and unpredictable location of emergency and rescue 
operations, MANETs pose as a natural candidate for data sharing among people 
and organizations involved. The Ad-Hoc InfoWare [39] and MIDAS [9] projects 
look deeper into how MANETs can be used in such situation, and identify some 
important issues that would not be present if traditional static networks could 
have been used. In Chapter 3, we present a detailed requirements analysis of emer-
gency and rescue operations, including examples of three different scenarios, and a 
description of how MANETs can be used in these. 
The broadcast nature of wireless networks introduces specific challenges with 
respect to security, compared to wired networks. In wired networks, traffic can be 
sent through the wires without worrying about unauthorized access, as long as 
their physical access is strictly controlled. In wireless networks, however, anyone in 
the near vicinity can eavesdrop on traffic and, what is in some cases even more 
dangerous, anyone can generate traffic and induce it into the network. In emer-
gency and rescue operations, where human lives depend on the operation’s success, 
it is of outmost importance to make sure that only authorized devices can take 
part in the network, to prevent intruders from disrupting the network. In Chapter 
7, we present a general overview over security issues in MANETs for emergency 
and rescue operations, while Chapter 8 focuses on the particular issue of network 
access, and describes a key exchange protocol that can be used on the network 
layer to protect the traffic, and to ensure that intruders are being kept out. 
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The dynamic nature of wireless networks, especially mobile ones, introduces 
challenges with respect to data sharing. In MANETs, it is not uncommon that 
nodes constantly join and leave the network, or that routes between existing mem-
bers change. Frequent topology changes and disappearing nodes can have a nega-
tive impact on data availability. In emergency and rescue operations, where data 
availability is a critical factor, mechanisms must be present to cope with topology 
changes. In Chapters 4, 11 and 12, we present in detail the design and the first 
prototype of the MIDAS Data Space (MDS). MDS is a shared data space designed 
for such dynamic networks, ensuring data availability by means of replication, and 
eventual consistency by means of data versioning. In Chapter 13, we show how 
replication can be performed dynamically by monitoring both the applications’ us-
age of MDS, and the network topology. We present also an extensive study of rep-
lica placement in the cases where these two factors are unknown upfront. 
Developing applications and protocols requires extensive testing and evaluation 
procedures before they are ready to be deployed to target devices. When target 
devices are numerous and mobile, like the ones forming MANETs, the cost of using 
real devices during the development process is too high. One must have in mind 
the amount of people needed to participate, the time needed for test runs and de-
ployment, the fact that experiments need to be re-run when bugs are fixed or 
changes are made, etc. For that reason, simulators or emulators are the preferred 
method to be used during the initial phases of development. While simulators can 
give a more realistic networking layer and better reproducibility, they often require 
applications and protocols to be developed especially for the particular simulator 
being used. This in turn can induce new bugs when these are rewritten in order to 
be deployed on real devices. Emulation, on the other hand, allows for real code to 
be run on top of a simulated network, considerably reducing the time needed to 
implement an application or protocol, with the possibility to later install them to 
target devices with minor changes or no changes at all. As part of this thesis, we 
created an emulation platform (see Chapter 9 for details) to facilitate our study 
and development, testing and evaluation of various applications and protocols for 
MANETs. 
6.2 Critical Review of Claims 
In Section 1.3, we presented the main contributions of this thesis in form of four 
claims. This section revises these claims, each followed by a critical review. 
Claim 1: 
In emergency and rescue operations, security has to be present at the lowest lay-
ers, in order to prevent malicious nodes from disrupting the network. The hierar-
chical organization of the entities involved in these kinds of operations can provide 
a basis for trust establishment between rescue personnel’s devices. We provide a 
solution that exploits this fact in order to agree on a shared key. The solution can 
be used to ensure that intruders cannot disrupt the network by injecting false 
routing information. 
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Chapter 7 presents a detailed analysis of security requirements for MANETs in 
emergency and rescue operations. In Chapter 8, we present SKiMPy, a key ex-
change protocol designed and optimized especially for highly dynamic ad-hoc net-
works, such as MANETs used in emergency and rescue operations. The protocol 
uses to its advantage the fact that organizations participating in emergency and 
rescue operations are known upfront, making it possible to pre-install certificates 
for efficient off-line cross-authentication of nodes on the spot. By doing this, only 
trusted nodes are able to take part in the network, thus preventing non-authorized 
nodes from malicious actions such as injecting false routing information. Even 
though the protocol achieves its main purpose, in its current form it lacks impor-
tant features such as exclusion of compromised nodes, revocation of keys and cer-
tificates, duplicate key ID numbers, or protection from denial of service attacks. 
Since the protocols works above the physical layer, the protocol cannot protect 
from attacks such as signal jamming, where other methods need to be used. 
Claim 2: 
With a secured infrastructure, the system can be used for information sharing be-
tween the rescue personnel. A shared data space, such as MIDAS Data Space, can 
be used to efficiently and robustly distribute information, even on small resource-
limited devices. The strict requirement of accounting for such operations can be 
achieved by means of versioning. 
In Chapters 4 and 11, we present MDS, a shared data space designed to cope with 
dynamic environments, such as MANETs in emergency and rescue operations. In 
Chapter 12, we analyze the performance of MDS on resource-limited devices, fol-
lowed by a more extensive evaluation of replica placement strategies in Chapter 
13. By means of versioning, which allows for permanent storage of data and their 
change history, the rescue operation can in the post-processing phase be analyzed 
in detail. To achieve that, it is assumed that devices have enough storage place. 
One clear limitation of such a system is that it does not support real-time data, 
but rather only delay tolerant data. Also, the applications need to be aware that 
the system supports only eventual consistency, as strict consistency cannot be 
guaranteed (as explained in Section 2.1.3). 
Claim 3: 
It is possible to achieve a close-to-optimal placement of table replicas within the 
network, which works well for most scenarios where the applications’ access pat-
tern to the data space or the network topology are unknown a priori. At a later 
point, the system can adjust to the concrete situation by analyzing the applica-
tions’ access pattern and network topology.  
In Chapter 10, we show how synchronization protocols can benefit from a cross-
layer approach, such as using topology information from the networking layer to 
plan actions on the application layer. In Chapter 13, we investigate this possibility 
further and, by means of extensive measurements of clustering methods, we show 
how a close-to-optimal placement of table replicas can be achieved without having 
information on access pattern to the data space, and by only analyzing the current 
network topology. Gaining knowledge of network topology requires both a proac-
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tive protocol and a means to communicate with it, limiting the choice of the rout-
ing protocols that can be used. Like any centralized solution, there is a single point 
of failure that needs to be taken care of. In this case, it is possible for any node to 
take over the role of Traffic Controller within a few moments, and to start gather-
ing access statistics for future placement decisions. The overhead introduced by 
reporting access statistics to the Traffic Controller is minimal, but it does cause 
constant traffic as long as a table is being accessed. 
Claim 4: 
In order to develop and evaluate protocols, an adequate test-bed has to be in 
place. An emulation test-bed is the most flexible choice with respect to develop-
ment time and costs, as well as choice of programming languages. We have imple-
mented such an emulation test-bed and used it to develop, test and evaluate a va-
riety of protocols. 
Chapters 2 and 9 give an overview of what options one has for testing and evaluat-
ing protocols and applications for MANETs, and argue why emulation is our pre-
ferred method. The emulation test-bed NEMAN, described in Chapter 9, has been 
used actively in our research for the last few years, leading to numerous scientific 
papers (e.g., [12], [13], [32], [38], [40], to name a few). It has also been used in 
teaching courses, as well as part of several master’s theses and doctoral disserta-
tions (e.g., [11], [52], [2], [20], [22], [50]). The test-bed runs on a single PC, making 
the server’s resources a bottleneck when simulating larger networks. It is also a 
problem if several CPU and memory intensive processes (such as Java programs) 
are being run concurrently. Some physical layer issues (e.g., grey zones, packet col-
lisions) are supported, while others (most importantly bandwidth and delays) still 
need to be implemented. 
6.3 Open Problems and Future Work 
The Ad-Hoc InfoWare [39] and MIDAS [9] projects have identified and addressed a 
number of issues present when using MANETs in emergency and rescue opera-
tions. The projects resulted in four doctoral dissertations at the University of Oslo 
(i.e., [6], [49], [52], and the present one), each addressing a specific issue. 
This thesis addresses three of those issues, namely security, data sharing, and 
testing and evaluation of protocols in MANETs. Within these topics, several prob-
lems still remain unsolved. 
The protocol presented in Chapter 8 enables authorized nodes to establish a 
shared key. The protocol is based on the fact that devices have pre-installed cer-
tificates, allowing for a cross-authentication on the spot. However, if a device is 
lost or stolen (i.e., compromised), there must be a mechanism to ensure that such 
a device’s certificate is revoked and, consequently, that the device does not have 
access to the network any more. In its current state, the protocol lacks such a 
mechanism for revocation of certificates, a non-trivial issue given the assumption 
that an on-line certification authority cannot be counted on. Authentication of us-
ers towards the devices, which is sufficiently user-friendly to be applicable in such 
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a scenario (i.e., which does not hinder the rescue personnel in the rescue opera-
tion), is also a challenge. 
The MIDAS Data Space (MDS), presented in Chapter 4, includes a working 
implementation of all its sub-components. Some of them, however, either have 
trivial functionality, or they might not be scalable. Initial work on a dynamic Data 
Allocator (DA) sub-component is presented in Chapter 13. The paper presents 
methods for minimizing synchronization traffic in dynamic environments where 
replication is necessary or desirable. The paper includes some ideas that should be 
looked deeper into, e.g., what gain can be achieved by using the described combi-
nation of warm standby replicas and caching of query results and synchronization 
traffic. Designing and implementing an algorithm that includes all the methods 
and ideas from Chapter 13 is not a trivial task and is part of future work.  
Finally, it would be very interesting to verify all the results and ideas pre-
sented in this thesis on a large scale real world test-bed. 
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Abstract: Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are a natural candidate for commu-
nication and information exchange in emergency and rescue operations. The per-
sonnel’s movements, network disruptions and other system dynamics make it hard 
to implement robust applications for such environments. The MIDAS project aims 
at creating a middleware platform to simplify the task of developing and deploying 
mobile and robust services for events in which the network might be set-up at 
short notice. MANETs may be used because infrastructure is non-existing, and the 
number of users might be very high. One of the application domains addressed by 
MIDAS are emergency and rescue operations. To get a broad acceptance of the 
MIDAS solutions, security and privacy issues need also to be addressed. In this 
paper, we analyze the security threats and present a two-way approach to securing 
the MIDAS architecture. In the bottom-up approach, we use an efficient key man-
agement protocol to establish trust, and in the top-down approach we use dynamic 
role based access control to secure the system and provide privacy. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The MIDAS project [4] aims at developing a middleware platform to simplify and 
speed up the task of developing and deploying mobile services for events in which 
the network is set-up at short notice. MANETs may be used because infrastructure 
is non-existing, and the number of users might be very large. Besides large sports 
events like Tour de France, one of the main scenarios for applications developed 
using the MIDAS platform are emergency and rescue operations, where MANETs 
are used by the rescue personnel. Such operations are very dynamic and unpre-
dictable, both when it comes to personnel’s movements and membership, causing 
network disruptions and frequent changes of nodes within it. Therefore, the project 
has put special emphasis on the development of a data space for sharing informa-
tion and a context space for managing context data as reliably as possible, to en-
sure the high availability of services and data, and their graceful degradation in 
case of long term network partitioning. While these non-functional requirements 
are essential for emergency and rescue applications, security and privacy also need 
to be addressed in order to get a broad acceptance of the project results for the 
application domain of emergency and rescue. 
This paper presents a first conceptual study of how security and privacy can be 
supported within MIDAS and which security and privacy issues cannot be solved 
through middleware. These solutions are especially tailored for the emergency and 
rescue domain, but not necessarily for MIDAS only. Most of the concepts could 
also be applied to other distributed software of the same domain running over 
MANETs.  
The core idea of our design is to combine bottom-up and top-down approaches. 
The bottom-up approach is based on earlier research results, namely the design of 
an efficient key management protocol, which enables us to efficiently agree on a 
shared key to achieve trust among the devices of emergency and rescue personnel. 
The top-down approach relies on the fact that roles typically define the duties and 
rights of rescue personnel. Due to the dynamics of rescue operations, individuals 
might change roles during the operation, which highlights the need for a dynamic 
role based access control system. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 7.2 briefly de-
scribes the MIDAS architecture and Section 7.3 the basic assumptions for our solu-
tion. A summary of the key management protocol is given in Section 7.4. Section 
7.5 introduces dynamic role based access control. Section 7.6 describes how these 
two ingredients work together and provide security and privacy in the MIDAS 
middleware. Conclusions are given in Section 7.7. 
7.2 The MIDAS Architecture 
The MIDAS Architecture is shown n Figure 7.1. The main components in MIDAS 
are MIDAS Data Space (MDS), Context Space (CXS) and Communication and 
Routing (CRT). Access Control (AC) and Network Security (NS) are new security 
components that are the contribution of this paper. 
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MDS is a relational data space provided to applications and other MIDAS 
components, shared between all the nodes [9]. The users and applications do not 
know where exactly in the network data are stored and they only see one single 
large data space. The MDS component does this by hiding the physical location of 
data from the applications, as well as by taking care of replicating data when there 
might be possibility for network partitioning. Replication of data to other nodes 
having a replica of the same table is done either eagerly (i.e. as soon as a change is 
done) or lazily (for nodes joining the network partition at a later point). From the 
application developers’ point of view, only SQL queries have to be issued in order 
to use the shared data space; data are published to the data space from where they 
can later on be retrieved. 
The CXS component is responsible for defining and managing all context data 
in the context space. It provides middleware support for domains by implementing 
domain-related middleware services. As each MIDAS mobile service targets events 
of a specific domain (emergency operations, sports events), the support of domains 
helps the developers to create very focused applications within their domain. CXS 
allows for simple or complex (synthesized) queries and uses MDS to store and re-
trieve all context information. In addition, the component offers the applications 
services for the context addressable messaging, where message recipients are de-
fined as a context (for instance, “all nodes with role MEDIC that still do not have 
a patient assigned”). 
The CRT component is responsible for providing connectivity between nodes 
running the MIDAS middleware. Networks supported by CRT may be disruptive 
and even consist of different network technologies, which should all be seamless 
from the applications’ and other components’ point of view. CRT has mechanisms 
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Figure 7.1: MIDAS Architecture 
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to allow connectivity even in cases when nodes are not in direct range of each 
other. If two network partitions have each a connection to the Internet (for in-
stance through a GPRS connection), they can register at a pre-defined central 
node. As a consequence, they can merge into a single network by establishing a 
link between each other through the Internet. 
Applications connect to the middleware using the Java Remote Method Invo-
cation (RMI), in which the core middleware component acts as a façade towards 
its components, i.e., it internally performs calls to the requested methods in the re-
spective components. Internally, components use each other’s services either by di-
rect calls or through the core component. 
7.3 Basic Assumptions and Our Approach 
There are five basic assumptions that were taken into account when designing se-
curity solutions for the MIDAS Architecture. 
 Members of the rescue personnel (users) can be trusted. 
 Devices are preconfigured before coming to the scene; this includes installa-
tion of the necessary software, certificates, etc. 
 Users carry tokens with personal certificates containing their credentials 
(name, rank / role within the organization, etc.) and use them to authenti-
cate themselves towards the device. 
 The user-to-device authentication process is assumed to be secure enough 
 Software developed on top of the MIDAS platform is considered clean (that 
is, it is not vulnerable, there are no viruses, trojans, etc.) 
 
The overall security of the system depends on these assumptions to be satisfied 
beforehand.  
The wireless medium is especially vulnerable to attacks and intrusions by mali-
cious persons with the goal to either just disrupt the functionality of the network 
or to steal sensitive data, from health information about patients to possible police 
records. External attackers, however, are not the only issue. Not all the personnel 
are supposed to have access to all the data within the network. Policemen should, 
for example, not be able to access patients’ medical records (privacy). Following 
the development of the situation, the personnel’s roles and assignments might also 
change dynamically, providing additional challenges to the component enforcing 
access control (see Section 7.6 for details). Since accidents naturally happen where 
they are least expected or they might in severe cases cause existing communication 
infrastructure to collapse, nodes may be left with no reliable possibility of contact-
ing a central authority to, for instance, check a user’s credentials (authentication). 
Next, it must be ensured that unauthorized nodes cannot modify existing traffic or 
introduce new data into the network (integrity). Finally, it must be ensured that 
receipts of given orders cannot be denied at a later point (non-repudiation). 
We present a two-way design towards solving the abovementioned security is-
sues, consisting of a bottom-up and a top-down approach.  
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The bottom-up approach ensures that data coming from the network are au-
thenticated and that their content’s integrity is verified already at the network 
layer. The whole process is hidden from the users and no intervention is required 
from them. This is achieved by using a key management protocol such as SKiMPy 
[10] to ensure that only authorized nodes are allowed to participate in forming 
network. Failure to do so might result in a very small percent of misbehaving 
nodes being able to disrupt the whole network [5]. 
The top-down approach is used to determine what data, services and other re-
sources a certain user has access to. The access control component does this by 
taking into account the user’s identity and role when accessing the middleware.  
There are still a number of issues to be taken care of, in order for the security 
level to be satisfactory. Some of these issues (such as denial of service attacks on 
the physical layer, devices being lost or stolen, etc.) cannot be solved by the mid-
dleware and must be addressed separately. Other issues can be solved by the mid-
dleware and, as such, they will be looked into as part of current and future work, 
including issuing temporary certificates, revocation of certificates for nodes being 
lost or stolen. 
7.4 The Key Management Protocol 
SKiMPy is a self-organizing distributed key management protocol used at the net-
work layer to secure either all the data coming from and to the node, or only the 
routing protocol (such as OLSR [1]). SKiMPy uses certificates that are installed on 
the rescue personnel’s devices in advance of the emergency event, i.e. before com-
ing to the rescue scene. These authorized nodes can be called active members of 
the network. All the certificates are, at the top of the hierarchy, signed by the 
same Certificate Authority and can thus be cross-verified by any node without the 
need for contacting a central authority. That way, unauthorized nodes can be ex-
cluded from participation in all or some network activities, while trust can be 
achieved among arbitrary devices of rescue and emergency personnel without ac-
cess to the Internet. Not having contact with a central authority leads to problems 
in case it is necessary to revoke certificates of devices that have been lost or stolen. 
If anyone could issue a certificate revocation, this could also be done by the same 
device that is supposed to be cut out of the network, causing a network break-
down. On the other hand, a voting procedure might take place, where for example 
k out of n signatures would be necessary to issue a valid revocation. While one 
could argue that the authentication of the user to the device provides a certain 
level of security to assure that lost or stolen devices cannot be misused, this prob-
lem needs still to be solved to provide full security. 
Contrary to the main exclusion policy, it is sometimes useful to grant specta-
tors or media the ability to help at an accident scene. Such nodes might then be 
issued temporary certificates on the spot to be able to exchange non-critical data 
(i.e., become a passive member of the network, yet unable to influence the core 
network’s routing tables). Such temporary certificates are then used by the same 
68 Security and Privacy Issues in Middleware for Emergency and Rescue Applications 
key management protocol to establish a second shared key between the passive 
members. The certificates would be issued by authorized users, depending on the 
security policies. In addition to a much shorter validity time of credential, the 
abovementioned authorized users would become local authorities in charge of tem-
porary certificates’ revocation with much less likelihood of losing contact. 
It has to be noted that the shared key achieved by using SKiMPy can only be 
used to verify a message’s integrity, not its source. The same applies in the case 
when the key is used to encrypt data. That is, it can only be shown that a message 
has been sent by some authorized node, not which one exactly. 
7.5 Dynamic Role Based Access Control 
The distributed and shared nature of the MIDAS Data Space, explained in Section 
7.2, can cause specific issues with regards to access control. 
There exist several methods of implementing access control. In Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC [2]), users can grant or remove other users access to re-
sources they themselves have access to (a good example for a DAC system is the 
UNIX file system). Due to the shared nature of MDS and the number of organiza-
tions involved in emergency and rescue operations, this method is not expressive or 
flexible enough. In Mandatory Access Control (MAC [2]), in contrast, resources 
have security labels, while users have security clearances, which then must be high 
enough to be able to access a given resource. Organizational hierarchy can be the 
starting point for defining Role Based Access Control (RBAC [3]) rules used to de-
termine access privileges certain roles have towards certain objects. Having indeed 
hierarchical organizations involved in emergency and rescue scenarios, a RBAC so-
lution, such as OrBAC [6], is a clear candidate in our case. 
The users identify themselves towards the OS or towards the middleware di-
rectly, while their role or roles are, as a rule, predefined by a person’s rank in the 
organizational hierarchy. These a priori roles are defined in the user’s certificates. 
However, the users’ roles can be dynamically changed during the rescue operation, 
depending for instance on the order in which personnel come to the scene. It 
should be possible to reflect these changes in the roles used for access control to 
data and resources. Since roles are predefined and embedded within certificates, 
they cannot be changed. One step towards a solution might be to use the ideas 
from [8], where delegation and supervision are introduced. However, additional 
mechanisms might be necessary, e.g. roles issued in separate temporary certificates 
(similar to the ones described in Section 7.4) that can be either used in addition to 
the preinstalled ones, or they might supersede them. Removing certain roles, on 
the other hand, is in general a non-trivial issue, and it must be ensured that a user 
cannot choose to ignore a newly installed certificate giving them fewer rights. 
However, we assume that the rescue personnel can be trusted and will therefore 
also not take countermeasures against those certificates. 
In addition to the standard access control rules (e.g. “can read”), emergency 
and rescue operations might require a special type of rule, that is, “must read” 
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and/or “confirm receipt”). A typical example would be an order issued by the res-
cue scene leader, whose receipt must be confirmed. Being signed with the recipi-
ent’s certificate, this receipt cannot be repudiated at a later stage. Deontic logic 
introduces actions such as “permitted”, “obliged”, and “forbidden”. A RBAC 
mechanism based on deontic logic, such as the one described in [7], might be a 
possible solution for fulfilling both of the abovementioned needs. However, it might 
also be possible to implement it in a simpler way, for instance by moving some of 
the extra functionality towards the application. 
7.6 A Combined Solution 
In this section, we outline how certificates and access control are used to secure 
the MIDAS middleware (see Figure 7.1). Being just a conceptual analysis, and due 
to space limitations, some details on particular solutions are not specified as of yet. 
At the level of network interface to the operating system, all incoming and 
outgoing traffic must pass the Network Security Component (NS). NS should run 
separately from the middleware as it has to protect not only data going to and 
coming from not only the middleware, but also all signalling messages of the rout-
ing protocol. Outgoing traffic is signed with the shared key obtained through key 
management protocol. Incoming traffic is first checked for integrity with shared 
keys available at the recipient. With regards to the source’s and recipient’s type of 
membership, as described in Section 7.4, we have the following four cases: 
1. The recipient is an active member 
 a) The message is signed by an active member: all the traffic is let through 
 b) The message is signed by a passive member: only non-routing messages 
  selected according to the security policy are sent through 
2. The recipient is a passive member 
 a) The message is sent by an active member: all the traffic gets through 
 b) The message is sent by a passive member: all the traffic gets through 
In addition, the incoming traffic must be checked for replay-attacks, i.e. it 
must be ensured that a valid message cannot, at a later point, be re-sent by a ma-
licious node. For instance, routing messages that are re-sent at a later point may 
cause the whole network to collapse. 
The middleware’s application programming interface (API) is designed so that 
all calls issued from the applications towards the middleware are passed through 
the Access Control (AC) component. It must be noted that all the inter-
component calls must go through AC as well, since it could happen that a compo-
nent tries to perform an illegal action. It is the task of AC to verify whether the 
given user has the necessary credentials for that call. In case it is a query towards 
the data space, the user must have the necessary rights to perform that query on 
the specified table or tables in the data space.  
Remote queries have to be verified twice, first at the source node and then 
again at the destination node. This means that the issuer’s credentials (including 
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their public key) must be included in the message. The issuer’s public key may be 
used to encrypt the response to the query, but a more light-weight solution might 
be preferred if such queries are expected to be performed often. The underlying 
shared data space could be used to distribute the credentials of all the users pre-
sent at the scene, leaving up to MDS the task of keeping the information in the 
data space as consistent as possible. 
Access rights are defined by the personnel’s identities or roles, both of which 
are specified in their pre-installed certificates. To add or change roles dynamically, 
as a consequence of the rescue operation’s development, personnel can be issued 
temporary certificates on scene. Given the possible severity of the situation, the 
notion of access rights should include access duties as well, meaning that some 
messages must be read by the personnel they are addressed to. That way, the re-
ceipt of an order cannot be denied at a later point, making it known who had been 
in charge of what at any time in the operation. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Reliability and availability are important non-functional properties for emergency 
and rescue applications. The MIDAS middleware provides these properties through 
optimistic replication. In order to achieve also security and privacy for MIDAS in 
emergency and rescue applications, we propose in this paper a combined bottom-
up and top-down approach. The dynamic role based access control we propose 
comes very close to the way security levels and rights assigned to emergency and 
rescue personnel are assigned in the different organizations. Access control is en-
forced with the help of certificates. In addition to the misuse of middleware service, 
it is necessary to protect the network itself. Therefore, all traffic is screened at 
each node and all packets from non-trusted nodes are simply discarded to disable 
attacks on the network. 
While this approach provides a high level of security for the network and the 
middleware and enables to protect data, there are still certain attacks that cannot 
be handled, especially attacks at the link layer, like noise etc. 
Our ongoing and future work is concerned with two aspects. First, we aim to 
refine the proposed solution and prototype it to be able to perform evaluation test-
ing of the presented solution. Next, we extend the solution also for other applica-
tion domains, like large sports events, where existing infrastructure is an important 
part of the network. 
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Abstract. Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) can provide the technical platform 
for efficient information sharing in emergency and rescue operations. It is impor-
tant in such operations to prevent eavesdropping, because some the data present 
on the scene is highly confidential, and to prevent induction of false information. 
The latter is one of the main threats to a network and could easily lead to network 
disruption and wrong management decisions. This paper presents a simple and ef-
ficient key management protocol, called SKiMPy. SKiMPy allows devices carried 
by the rescue personnel to agree on a symmetric shared key, used primarily to es-
tablish a protected network infrastructure. The key can be used to ensure confi-
dentiality of the data as well. The protocol is designed and optimized for the high 
dynamicity and density of nodes present in such a scenario. The use of preinstalled 
certificates mirrors the organized structure of entities involved, and provides an ef-
ficient basis for authentication. We have implemented SKiMPy as a plugin for the 
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR). Our evaluation results show that 
SKiMPy scales linearly with the number of nodes in worst case scenarios. 
74 SKiMPy: A Simple Key Mgmt Protocol for MANETs in Emergency and Rescue Ops 
8.1 Introduction 
Efficient collaboration between rescue personnel from different organizations is a 
mission critical element for a successful operation in emergency and rescue situa-
tions. There are two central requirements for efficient collaboration, the incentive 
to collaborate, which is naturally given for rescue personnel, and the ability to effi-
ciently communicate and share information. Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) 
can provide the technical platform for efficient information sharing in such scenar-
ios, if the rescue personnel is carrying and using mobile computing devices with 
wireless network interfaces. 
Wireless communication needs to be protected to prevent eavesdropping. The 
data involved should not be available to any third parties, for neither publication 
or malicious actions. Another important requirement is to prevent inducing of false 
data. At the application layer this might for example lead to wrong management 
decisions. At the network layer it has been shown that a very few percent of mis-
behaving nodes easily can lead to network disruption and partitioning [17]. In both 
cases, efficiency of the rescue operation will be drastically reduced and might ulti-
mately cause loss of human lives. In order to prevent such a disaster, all data traf-
fic should be protected, allowing only authorized nodes access to the data. Given 
that devices carried by the rescue personnel will mostly have limited resources, any 
security scheme based solemnly on asymmetric cryptography will be too costly in 
terms of computing power, speed and battery consumption. Therefore, the use of 
symmetric encryption with shared keys is preferable for MANETs in emergency 
and rescue scenarios. Agreeing on a shared key in a highly dynamic and infrastruc-
ture-less MANET is a non-trivial problem and requires establishing trust relations 
between all devices. It is important for emergency and rescue scenarios that corre-
sponding solutions are simple, efficient, robust, and autonomous. User interactions 
should be kept at an absolute minimum. 
This paper describes a simple key management protocol, called SKiMPy, that 
can be used to establish a symmetric shared key between the rescue personnel’s 
devices. By this, SKiMPy will set up a secure network infrastructure between au-
thorized nodes, while keeping out unauthorized ones. It may be decided at the ap-
plication layer whether the established shared key is robust enough for achieving 
some degree of data confidentiality as well. The basis for this simple and efficient 
solution is the fact that rescue personnel are members of public organizations with 
strict, well defined hierarchies. This hierarchy can be mirrored into a certificate 
structure installed a priori on their devices, i.e., before the accident or disaster ac-
tually happens. As a result, it is possible for the nodes during the rescue activity to 
authenticate each other on a peer-to-peer basis, without need for contacting a cen-
tralized server or establishing trust in a distributed approach. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 8.2 gives a detailed descrip-
tion of our protocol. In Section 8.3 we show some design considerations and respec-
tive solutions. Section 8.4 describes an implementation of the protocol together 
with evaluation results. In Section 8.5 we present related work. Finally, conclusion 
and future work are given in Section 8.6. 
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8.2 Protocol Description 
SKiMPy makes use of the existing traffic in the network to trigger key exchange. 
Periodic routing beacons (HELLO), sent by proactive routing protocols, are such 
an example. The following two messages are specific to SKiMPy: 
 Authentication Request (AUTH_REQ): sent by a node after it detects traf-
fic from a node having a key that is worse than its own one. The message is 
used to inform the remote node that the sending node is willing to transfer 
its key. 
 Authentication Response (AUTH_RESP): sent by a node, as a result of a 
re-ceived AUTH_REQ message. The message is used to inform the remote 
party that the node is willing to perform the authentication and receive the 
remote and better key. 
 
The protocol consists of three phases, namely (I) Neighborhood Discovery, (II) 
Batching and (III) Key Exchange. 
During phase I, a node listens to all traffic sent by its immediate neighbors. If 
it detects a node using a worse key (explained in detail in Section 8.3.2), it will 
send an Authentication Request message to it, saying it is willing to pass on its 
key. Upon receiving such a message, the other node enters the phase II, waiting for 
possible other authentication requests before sending a response. This batching pe-
riod is used for optimization - a node will only perform authentication with the 
best of all neighbors. All the other keys will, due to the transitiveness property of 
the better than relation, at some point get overruled and therefore there is no 
point in getting them. After the node has chosen its peer, it sends an Authentica-
secure tunnel
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Figure 8.1: Message Flow Diagram 
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tion Response after which its peer initializes the actual authentication procedure, 
that is, exchange of certificates, establishing a secure tunnel, and finally transfer of 
the key. The reason for having such a hand-shake procedure is to ensure that the 
nodes can indeed communicate. In some standards, such as 802.11b [19], traffic like 
broadcast messages can be sent on a lower transmitting rate with larger transmis-
sion range than data messages. Thus, broadcast messages might reach a remote 
node and trigger a key exchange, even though the nodes cannot directly exchange 
data packets.  
Figure 8.1 shows an example of the key exchange between three nodes (A, B 
and C) and indicates the different phases of the key exchange for node A. Node A 
enters phase I when turned on. Nodes B and C do not directly hear each other’s 
traffic and are only able to communicate through node A, once the shared key is 
fully deployed. 
The initial states of the three nodes are as follows: A has the key KA, B has KB 
and C has KC. In this example, KC is the best key, whereas KA is the worst key.  
Phase I: 
1. Node A is turned on. All nodes send periodic HELLO messages which are 
part of the routing protocol. 
2. A receives a HELLO message from B, notices a key mismatch, but ignores 
it because KA is worse than KB. 
3. A receives HELLO from C, notices a key mismatch, but ignores it because 
KA is worse than KC. 
4. B and C receive HELLO from A, they both notice they have a better key 
than KA, and after a random time delay (to prevent traffic collisions), send 
an AUTH_REQ message to A. 
Phase II: 
1. A receives AUTH_REQ from B notices that B has a better key and sched-
ules authentication with B. The authentication is to be performed after a 
certain waiting period, in order to hear if some of the neighbors has an even 
better key. 
2. A receives AUTH_REQ from C as well, sees that C has a key better than 
KB, and therefore decides to perform authentication with C instead. 
Phase III: 
1. A sends an AUTH_RESP message to C, telling it is ready for the authenti-
cation process  
2. C initiates the authentication procedure with A, they exchange and verify 
certificates; the secure tunnel is established. 
3. C sends its key KC to A through the secure tunnel. 
4. A receives the key and saves it locally; the old key KA is saved in the key 
repository for eventual later use; A sends the new key further, encrypted 
with KA. 
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In the next round, that is, after it hears traffic from node B signed with KB, 
node A will use the same procedure to deliver the new key KC to node B, hence es-
tablishing a common shared key in the whole cell. 
There are two important parameters which influence the performance of the 
protocol and therefore have to be chosen carefully. The delays used before sending 
AUTH_REQ are random, to minimize the possibility of collisions in the case when 
more nodes react to the same message. On the other hand, the delay from the 
moment a node receives AUTH_REQ to the moment it chooses to answer with 
AUTH_RESP is a fixed interval and should be tuned so that it manages to hear as 
many neighbors as possible within a reasonable time limit. By this, all nodes that 
have been heard during the waiting period can be efficiently handled in the same 
batch. 
8.3 Design Considerations 
Our protocol is designed for highly dynamic networks, where nodes may appear, 
disappear and move in an arbitrary manner. Topology changes are inevitable. The 
key management protocol must have low impact on the available resources, i.e. 
battery, bandwidth and CPU time. Here, we analyze the different security and 
performance issues that had to be considered while designing the protocol, as well 
as respective solutions integrated into SKiMPy. 
8.3.1 Authentication 
An important characteristic of an emergency and rescue operation is that the or-
ganizations involved (police, fire department, paramedics, etc.) are often well 
structured, public entities. Before the rescue personnel comes to the disaster scene, 
all devices are prepared for their tasks. One task in the preparation phase, which 
we call a priori phase [33], is the installation of valid certificates. The certificates 
are signed by a commonly trusted authority, such as the ministry of internal af-
fairs, ministry of defense, etc., on the top of the trust chain. This gives nodes the 
possibility to authenticate each other without need for contacting a third party.  
Certificates on the nodes can identify devices, users handling them, or even 
both. The users would then present their certificate to the device by means of a 
token, i.e. smartcard. The decision for this does not impact the key management in 
SKiMPy, but it impacts the way how lost and stolen nodes are handled, i.e., re-
voking certificates and/or blacklisting of such nodes. We explain this issue later, in 
Section 8.3.5. 
8.3.2 Choosing Keys 
The main task of SKiMPy is to make sure that all the nodes agree on a shared 
key. When a node is turned on, it generates a random key with a random ID num-
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ber. The uniqueness of the key IDs must be ensured by e.g. using the hash value of 
the key itself as part of the ID, by including the nodes MAC address, etc. The fi-
nal shared key is always chosen from nodes’ initial keys. To achieve this, we intro-
duce the notions of better and worse keys, together with the relation “>” represent-
ing better than. There are several possible schemes for deciding which of the keys 
is better or worse and all schemes can be equally valid, as long as they cannot 
cause key exchange loops, are unambiguous and transitive: (A > B and B > C) => 
A > C. The necessary control information, which depends on the scheme chosen, is 
always sent with the message signature. 
We briefly describe two schemes and their advantages and drawbacks. 
The first scheme uses arithmetic comparison of two numbers, i.e. the key hav-
ing a higher or lower ID number, timestamp or a similar parameter, is considered 
to be better. The advantage of this scheme is that it is unambiguous, transitive 
and easy to implement. In addition, it can be “tweaked” in a way that would pre-
vent a single node to cause re-keying of an already established network cell. For 
example, if the scheme defines that the lower ID number means a better key, the 
highest bit of the ID number can be always set to “1” when the node is turned on, 
and cleared once two nodes merge. Assuming that nodes in a certain area will in 
most cases pop up independently, this simple and yet efficient method might pre-
vent a lot of unnecessary re-keying traffic. If we use the keys’ timestamps instead 
of the ID numbers, choosing a lower timestamp could imply that the key is older 
and that more nodes have it already. SKiMPy does not require the clocks of differ-
ent devices to be synchronized and therefore, the given assumption might not nec-
essarily be true, especially if the key creator’s clock was heavily out of sync. One 
major drawback of the presented scheme is that a small cell (consisting of, for ex-
ample, 2 nodes) could easily cause re-keying of a much bigger cell (having, for ex-
ample, 100 nodes), which would be a waste of resources. 
The second scheme takes care of this problem by using the number of nodes in 
each network cell as the decisive factor. The simple rule for this scheme is to al-
ways re-key the smaller cell, i.e. the one with the lower number of nodes, thus 
minimizing resource consumption for the necessary re-keying. The approximate 
number of nodes can be either retrieved from the routing protocol state informa-
tion (if, for example, the OLSR routing protocol [17] is used) or maintained at a 
higher protocol layer, as it is done in our project. However, if not all of the nodes 
have exactly the same information (which is to be expected in a dynamic scenario), 
and for some obscure reason we have more simultaneous merging processes be-
tween the same two cells, a key exchange loop may occur. One approach to this 
problem is to adjust in each node the state information of the number of nodes in 
its cell, always increasing it when new nodes join, but never decreasing it upon 
partitioning of the cell.  
At the present, we use the first scheme, choosing always a key with a lower ID 
number. An in-depth study of both schemes and their variations is subject to on-
going and future work. 
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8.3.3 Key Distribution 
Once a node gets a new key as a result of network merging, the key should be de-
ployed within its previous network cell. There are several ways to achieve this: 
 Proactively - each node receiving the key immediately forwards it to the 
others. This approach ensures prompt delivery of the key to all nodes, but it 
also generates a lot of unnecessary network traffic. 
 Reactively - when a node receives a key, it does nothing. Only after detect-
ing a message sent by a neighbor and signed with the old key, the node 
sends the new key further. This approach uses less resources, but it takes 
more time for the whole cell to get a stable key. 
 Combination - the first node getting the new key (that is, the node which 
performed the merge) immediately forwards the key to its one-hop 
neighbors, since it knows that no other node in its previous cell has it yet. 
The other nodes do not distribute it right away, but rather when (if) they 
notice that a node still uses an old key. This approach keeps the number of 
necessary broadcast messages containing the key at a minimum.  
In any of the given cases, the new key is encrypted using the old one before 
sending, giving all the other nodes the possibility to immediately start using it. 
The old key is saved for a short period of time, for possible latecomers. This can be 
done because in this particular case the key change was not performed explicitly 
for the purpose of preventing traffic analysis attacks. 
In our implementation, described in Section 8.4.1, we use the combination ap-
proach. 
8.3.4 Key Update 
When created, each key has a companion key (called update key) used to periodi-
cally update it. The update key is never used on traffic that goes onto the network 
and therefore it is not prone to traffic-analysis attacks. The nodes must periodi-
cally update the main key. The new key can be computed using one-way hash 
functions such as SHA-1 [25] or MD5 [35], ensuring backward secrecy in the case 
the key gets broken at some stage. In addition to the ID of the key used to sign it, 
a message contains also the update-number saying how many times the key on the 
sender-node has been updated. That way, the receiver can easily compute the new 
key if it notices a mismatch, which could happen since we can’t expect all the 
nodes to perform the update at exactly the same time. The local update will not 
take place if the received message has an invalid signature. 
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8.3.5 Exclusion of Nodes 
Once authenticated, a node is a fully trusted member of the network. This poses 
the evident problem of how to exclude such a node once the device has been lost 
or, even worse, stolen by a malicious third party. At the present, exclusion of al-
ready authenticated nodes is not solved in SKiMPy and is part of ongoing and fu-
ture work. Here, we describe some ideas on measures to be taken in order to ensure 
that such a node stays out of the network. 
First, the node’s certificate must be revoked, preventing the node from re-
authenticating later at some stage. Since there is no central authority, a decision is 
reached on which node or person can perform the task of revoking certificates. If 
the certificates contain also additional attributes such as rank or role of the per-
sons (assuming that the certificates do in fact represent persons, not devices), it 
can be decided that only certain roles/ranks (such as leader) can perform revoca-
tion and blacklisting. In theory, the leaders’ devices might also be stolen, but in 
practice they should normally be physically well protected. It is important to en-
sure that the compromised node itself does not revoke and blacklist legitimate ones 
or, even worse, the whole network.  
Next, the node’s IP address should be put on a common blacklist. Assuming 
that IP addresses are bound to the certificates (as presented in e.g. [32]), the nodes 
would be unable to change their IP address. However, relying on fixed IP ad-
dresses might introduce new issues and should be considered carefully. Traffic com-
ing from blacklisted nodes must be discarded at the lowest possible layer and, in 
case legally signed traffic coming from a blacklisted node is detected, the compro-
mised key must be removed. 
Additional methods might be used to ensure that devices cannot be used by 
unauthorized persons. One such example is a system relying on short range wire-
less authentication tokens. A token is installed into the personnel’s vests or 
watches, ensuring confidentiality of the data and denying unauthorized access to 
the devices when they get out of their token’s range [18]. 
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Figure 8.2: Traffic analysis of the first, 
non-optimized protocol implementation  
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Figure 8.3: Results for the same scenario, 
after introducing the batching process  
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8.3.6 Batching 
To save resources as much as possible, our protocol makes the nodes learn about 
their neighborhood before acting, reducing the number of performed authentica-
tions and thus reducing directly CPU and bandwidth consumption. This is possible 
due to the fact that all nodes directly trust the same certificate authority and, 
therefore, if a node has been successfully authenticated before and has received the 
shared secret, we implicitly trust it. 
Emphasis has been put on optimization with regards to number of messages 
sent out in the air. We measured the number of certificates and key management 
messages exchanged, and compared these figures to the number of routing mes-
sages needed from the moment when the nodes were turned on, up to the moment 
when a stable shared key was established. To perform these measurements, we 
used a static, wired test bed with 16 nodes. 
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show that introducing neighborhood awareness approxi-
mately halved the total number of messages and, proportionally, the time needed 
to reach a stable state. Moreover, the number of messages carrying certificates, 
whose size is much larger than other key management messages, has been reduced 
to approximately 23% of the initial number. The authentication was considered to 
be done after the exchange of certificates. Therefore, the results shown here are 
only an approximation, and might be slightly different when an actual authentica-
tion algorithm is used. 
8.3.7 Additional Issues 
The protocol’s goal is to establish a secure network infrastructure. SKiMPy makes 
it impossible for a misbehaving node to induce a key that has either expired, or 
that would not have been selected in a normal operation. Such keys will be imme-
diately discarded. 
Timeouts are used during the Key Exchange phase (explained in Section 8.2) 
to ensure that a node does not end up in indefinite wait states or deadlocks as a 
result of possible link failures. Care must be taken for possible Denial-of-Service at-
tacks in any of these cases. 
In the closing phase of the rescue operation [33], the keys must be removed to 
prevent them from being possibly reused afterwards on a different rescue site. 
8.4 Protocol Implementation and Evaluation 
8.4.1 Implementation 
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [17] is a proactive routing protocol 
for ad-hoc networks which is one of the candidates to be used in our solution for 
the emergency and rescue operations. The olsr.org OLSR daemon [38] is the im-
plementation we decided to test, since it is portable and expandable by means of 
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loadable plugins. One example of such a plugin, present in the main distribution, is 
the Secure OLSR plugin [26]. The plugin is used to add signature messages to 
OLSR traffic, only allowing nodes that possess the correct shared (pre-installed) 
key to be part of the OLSR routing domain. One important functionality this 
plugin lacks is a key management protocol. Even though SKiMPy is mainly de-
signed to protect all traffic and not only routing, it is still a good opportunity to 
test and analyze it in a realistic environment with a real routing protocol.  
The key management protocol has been coded directly into the security plugin, al-
though the plans are to make it as a separate one. X.509 certificates [28] and 
OpenSSL [37] are currently used to perform node authentication. 
8.4.2 Evaluation Results 
To facilitate development of this and other protocols, we created an emulation test 
bed, called NEMAN [34]. Routing daemons run independently, each attached to a 
different virtual Ethernet device. We use the monitoring channel of the emulator 
to analyze the keys used by each of the routing daemons. In order to test perform-
ance and scalability the protocol, we have made measurements from 2 to 100 
nodes, with two very different kinds of scenario: chain and mesh. Figures 8.4 and 
8.5 show example screenshots taken from the GUI, representing the two different 
scenarios. 
 
In a chain scenario, the nodes are lined up in a single chain and the distance 
between all nodes in the chain is such that only the direct neighbors can communi-
cate in a single hop with each other. We consider this to be the worst case scenario 
still giving full network connectivity. Given that all the nodes have to perform au-
thentication with both their neighbors, this leaves no place for optimization, i.e. 
batching during the waiting period.  
In a mesh scenario, however, nodes have multiple, randomly scattered 
neighbors, as it is natural in ad-hoc networks. Having multiple neighbors allows 
the protocol to exploit the batching phase, reducing traffic and resource consump-
tion.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Example of a chain scenario  
 
Figure 8.5: Example of a mesh scenario  
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Ten independent runs were performed for each number of nodes and each sce-
nario. All the nodes were started simultaneously (which we assume is the worst 
case for our protocol), with a random key and key ID. To be able to meaningfully 
compare the results, the nodes were static and the density was constant. The delay 
in the batching period was set to be 1 second, i.e. half of the interval used by 
OLSR to send HELLO messages. 
One important fact that the results on Figure 8.6 immediately show is that the 
protocol scales linearly with linear increase of the number of nodes and physical 
network area accordingly (thus giving the same density of nodes). After approxi-
mately 10 nodes, the total time became almost independent on the network size. 
By the fourth second, most authentications have already been performed and the 
key distribution process came into place. In some additional measurements, we in-
troduced node movement using the random waypoint mobility model. As long as 
all of the nodes remained reachable and the density was constant, movement did 
not induce a notable delay. 
We also proved that having multiple neighbors does in fact lower the time nec-
essary to reach a stable state. This scenario gives less deviation as well, which is 
understandable since in the case of chain there is more fluctuation of keys, nicely 
seen in the GUI. 
8.5 Related Work 
Different authentication schemes are available as a starting point for key manage-
ment. 
Devices can exchange a secret or pre-authentication data through a physical 
contact or directed infrared link between them [3, 26]. Another way is for the users 
to compare strings displayed on their devices (a representation of their public key, 
distance between them, etc. as presented in [19]). Since user interaction in a rescue 
operation should be kept as minimum, we need a different approach. 
Threshold cryptography schemes, such as [30] and [41] require all nodes that 
are going to perform signatures to carry a share of the group private key. The full 
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signature is acquired by a certain, predefined number of nodes who present partial 
signatures computed using their shares. These schemes allow a small number of 
nodes to be compromised and still not to present a threat for the network. How-
ever, since we do not know the number of nodes that can be expected at the rescue 
scene and small partitions might always be present, this approach is not suited for 
our scenario. 
apkun et al. [20] present a fully self-organized public-key management system 
that does not rely on trusted authorities, developed mainly for networks where us-
ers can join and leave without any centralized control. This is not applicable to 
networks used in rescue operations, where only authorized nodes are allowed to 
participate. In [21], they present a solution similar to ours, explained in Section 
8.3.1, allowing nodes to authenticate each other by means of pre-installed certifi-
cates with a common authority. The advantages of such a system are twofold: 
first, the data in the network is more secure. Second, establishing trust and agree-
ing on a shared key is much more efficient, i.e., faster and less resources are con-
sumed. 
Related key management protocols can be roughly divided into the following 
three categories [16]. 
The first one relies on a fixed infrastructure and servers that are always reach-
able. Since we never know where accidents will happen, we should expect them to 
happen at places where we cannot rely on the fact that fixed infrastructure will be 
present. 
The next category comprises contributory key agreement protocols, which are 
not suited for our scenario for several reasons. Such protocols ([1, 5, 12, 29, 30], to 
name a few) are based on Diffie-Hellman two-party key exchange [23] where all the 
nodes give their contribution to the final shared key, causing re-keying every time 
a new node joins or an existing node leaves the group. In an emergency and rescue 
operation, we can expect nodes to pop up and disappear all the time, often causing 
network partitioning and merging. Therefore, using contributory protocols would 
cause a lot of computational and bandwidth costs which cannot be afforded. Be-
sides, most of these protocols rely on some kind of hierarchy (chain, binary tree, 
etc.) and a group manager to deploy and maintain shared keys. In a highly dy-
namic scenario this approach would be quite ineffective. Another reason why such 
protocols are not suited for us, is that in order for the nodes to be able to exchange 
keys, a fully working routing infrastructure has to be established prior to that. 
Since the routing protocol is one of the main things we need to protect, this is a 
major drawback. Asokan and Ginzboorg [12] present a password-based authenti-
cated key exchange system. A weak password is known to every member and it is 
used by each of them to compute a part of the final shared key. This approach 
shares some already mentioned drawbacks and introduces new ones which conflict 
with our scenario and requirements. User interaction is needed and it is assumed 
that all the members are present when creating the key. 
The last category are protocols based on key pre-distribution. The main char-
acteristic of such protocols is that a pair or group of nodes can compute a shared 
key out of pre-distributed sets of keys present on each node. These sets of keys are 
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either given by a trusted entity before the nodes come to the scene [4, 14, 21], or 
chosen and managed by the nodes themselves, as it is done in DKPS [16].  
SKiMPy is different in the sense that it uses pre-installed certificates to per-
form direct authentication between two nodes. This makes it more simple and effi-
cient. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a simple and efficient key management protocol, called 
SKiMPy, developed and optimized especially for highly dynamic ad-hoc networks. 
The protocol relies on the fact that there will be an a priori phase of rescue and 
emergency operations, within which certificates will be deployed on rescue person-
nel’s devices. Pre-installed certificates are necessary due to the fact that highly 
sensitive data may be exchanged between the rescue personnel. The certificates 
make it possible for the nodes to authenticate each other without need for a third 
party present on the scene. 
We described a proof-of-concept implementation, as well as evaluation results. The 
results show that SKiMPy performs very well and it scales linearly with the num-
ber of nodes. As part of further work we will analyze more in-depth different key 
selection and distribution schemes, authentication protocols, and fine tune certain 
protocol parameters, like the delays described in Section 8.2. Open issues like ex-
clusion of compromised nodes, duplicate key ID numbers, denial of service attacks, 
etc. are also subject of further investigation. 
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Abstract: Development of applications and protocols for wireless ad-hoc networks 
has always been a challenge. Specific characteristics such as frequent topology 
changes due to nodes moving around, popping up or being turned off, need to be 
considered from the earliest stages of development. Since testing and evaluation 
using genuine wireless devices is both expensive and highly impractical, other tools 
need to be used in the development phase. Simulators give a very detailed model 
of lower layers’ behaviors, but code often needs to be completely rewritten in order 
to be used on actual physical devices. Emulators present a trade-off between real 
test beds and simulators, providing a virtual wireless network at the lowest layers, 
and yet allowing real code to be run on the higher layers. In this paper, we present 
such an emulation platform, called NEMAN, that allows us to run a virtual wire-
less network of hundreds of nodes on a single end-user machine. NEMAN has 
shown to be an important and very useful tool during development of different ap-
plications and protocols for our project, including a key management protocol and 
a distributed event notification service. 
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9.1 Introduction 
Information sharing is a mission critical element in rescue and emergency opera-
tions. Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) could provide a useful infrastructure to 
support information sharing, but appropriate applications are needed. In addition, 
middleware support has to be present to facilitate efficient application develop-
ment for this type of infrastructure. In the Ad-Hoc InfoWare project [9], we are 
addressing these needs by developing middleware services for information sharing. 
The core building blocks of these services are knowledge management, a local and 
a distributed event notification service, resource management, and security and 
privacy management. As part of the development process, it is necessary to ana-
lyze and compare design and implementation alternatives for the building blocks, 
understand qualitatively and quantitatively the design trade-offs, to test whether 
the protocols and algorithms actually work, and to evaluate their efficiency and 
compare them with related solutions from others. Basically, there are three kinds 
of development environments that support these tasks: simulation, emulation, as 
well as implementation and field tests.  
The development environment that comes closest to real live deployment are 
field tests of MANETs. However, field tests of wireless scenarios are expensive with 
respect to the number of devices and persons needed to perform them as well as 
the time it takes to prepare them. Furthermore, it is very hard to entirely control 
all parameters in a field test and to perform repeatable experiments. Field tests are 
clearly not perfectly suited to support the development of middleware protocols, 
services and applications for MANETs. On the other hand, both simulation and 
emulation provide controlled environments which enable repeatable experiments 
and are generally much cheaper than field tests. To facilitate the development and 
testing of such applications and protocols, it is important to carefully choose a 
suitable simulation or emulation tool. 
Simulators, such as GloMoSim [15] and ns-2 [12], have long been used in the 
ad-hoc field and make it possible to experience very diverse communication situa-
tions and a large scale of deployment. One of the goals of these simulators is to 
give a detailed representation of the physical layer. A major drawback is that 
learning how to use and program a simulator like ns-2 takes a substantial amount 
of time. Furthermore, the code that has been developed for these simulators needs 
to be rewritten for later deployment on real systems. By using an emulating plat-
form, however, real processes run in real time and one can immediately start writ-
ing the very same code that will be later used on wireless devices. 
 In particular, we have the following requirements on a simulation or emulation 
environment for the development of protocols, middleware services and applica-
tions in the Ad-Hoc InfoWare project: 
 Minimal initial effort: installing and learning to use a particular simulation 
or emulation environment should not consume too much time and effort, so 
that it can also be efficiently used from novices in shorter projects, like mas-
ter theses. 
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 Costs: we need an affordable solution, with regards to hardware and soft-
ware costs, as well as human resources. Thus, the environment should be 
able to run on a single standard PC. 
 Scalability: the chosen platform should be able to run a high number of 
nodes without severe performance loss.  
 Portability: the code developed for the applications and protocols should be 
portable to genuine wireless devices with minor or no changes at all.  
 Realistic network layer: our protocols are supposed to utilize existing ad-hoc 
routing protocols, therefore, a real routing protocol should run in the simu-
lation or emulation environment. During the development process, our main 
concern is connectivity and loss of connectivity between nodes. Quality of 
service and specific lower layer issues such as collisions in the air, hidden 
terminals, etc. are of lower importance for us. We mainly need to reflect the 
effects of mobility in MANETs on connectivity. 
 Possible comparability: much work in the area is being done using ns-2 and 
we want to be able to compare our solutions with those from others without 
re-implementing them in our simulation or emulation environment. Using 
standard formats for scenario files, such as those from ns-2, would enable us 
to perform experiments with the same scenarios and to compare our results 
with results obtained with other tools. 
 
Many researchers are aware of the need for appropriate development environ-
ments of MANET protocols, but the majority is being focused on link layer and 
network layer issues. Therefore, we could not find existing simulation or emulation 
environments that completely fulfill our requirements. Inspired by the approach of 
the network emulator MobiEmu [16], we have developed an emulation platform 
called NEMAN. To the best of our knowledge, NEMAN is the only platform able 
to emulate MANETs consisting of hundreds of nodes on a single PC. Based on 
scenario descriptions from ns-2, NEMAN controls the physical connectivity be-
tween the virtual mobile nodes. Currently, we use the Open Link State Routing 
Protocol (OLSR) [1] with NEMAN to establish and maintain the IP layer of the 
emulated network. The processes in these virtual mobile nodes bind to virtual 
network interfaces, i.e., TAP interfaces, available in the Linux kernel. By this, the 
code developed for NEMAN can be used in real wireless nodes with a minimal ef-
fort. It is the aim of this paper to describe the design, implementation and first 
evaluation of NEMAN, and to analyze its strength and weaknesses. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 9.2 shows some of the 
most important related network emulators. In Section 9.3, we present the architec-
ture of NEMAN. Implementation details are described in Section 9.4, while in the 
following sections we explain the application development process (Section 9.5) 
and describe our experiences in using NEMAN for the development of a key man-
agement protocols and a distributed event notification service in the Ad-Hoc 
InfoWare project (Section 9.6). Performance and scalability are described in Sec-
tion 9.7. Finally, Section 9.8 gives a conclusion and ideas for the future work. 
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9.2 Related Work 
A common way to perform emulations is to have a single machine for each emu-
lated node. In such cases, filtering at the MAC layer is used to achieve the notion 
of wireless topology, often by means of iptables.  
MobiEmu consists of several slave nodes, as well as one master node. As the 
master gives instructions on topology changes, the slaves set local iptables-rules 
preventing them from hearing traffic from those nodes they have no physical con-
nectivity with. However, the concept of having separate physical or virtual ma-
chines for each emulated node, made MobiEmu very impractical for us to use it as 
such.  
MNE (Mobile Network Emulator [6]) uses a static network infrastructure to in-
terconnect devices. Each device has two interfaces, where one acts as a mobile 
emulation control channel while the other is used for the emulated wireless net-
work. The latter can be an actual wireless interface, allowing for some lower layer 
effects (such as collisions) to be taken into account as well. Information about to-
pology changes is sent through the control channel, causing the nodes to set or re-
move iptables-rules accordingly, as it is done in MobiEmu. The main problem of 
this approach is that it still needs a separate device for each emulated wireless 
host. 
EMWIN [17] improves the issue with the number of physical machines by al-
lowing each node to have several network interfaces, each acting as a separate 
wireless node. EMWIN intends to provide emulation of some MAC layer effects by 
introducing an additional emulated MAC (eMAC) layer. Again, due to a relatively 
high number of machines required, this approach is still impractical for our needs. 
MobiNet [7] consists of core nodes, used to emulate topology-specific and hop-
by-hop network characteristics, and edge nodes. It is able to emulate a much larger 
number of virtual wireless devices by having multiple Virtual Edge Nodes (VNs), 
with different IP addresses, on each edge node. MobiNet has a built-in routing pro-
tocol (DSR) and emulates MAC layer effects as well. Although the number of 
physical devices required to run MobiNet is drastically reduced, and the platform 
seems to be very well developed, its setup is still somehow complicated, with re-
gards to our requirements. 
JEmu [3] was developed by the Networks & Telecommunications Research 
Group (NTRG) to emulate the radio components of their particular communica-
tion stack. To represent nodes in the emulation, JEmu uses genuine wireless de-
Table 9.1: Properties of Various Emulators for Mobile Networks 
 MobiEmu MNE EMWIN MobiNet JEmu 
Usage      
Low costs      
Scalability      
Portability      
Network layer      
Comparability      
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vices with different types of wireless communication links, as well as stationary 
machines. JEmu has a somehow different approach when it comes to topology 
simulation. Every packet is first sent to the emulation engine which then decides 
whether certain nodes are able to receive it or whether there should be a collision, 
in which case it depends on the specific configuration what should be done. 
Table 9.1 summarizes roughly the properties of these related works with re-
spect to our particular requirements. As it can be seen from the table, none of 
them fulfills all the requirements. 
A different platform, designed for wired networks, is IMUNES [14]. It provides 
virtualization of the complete network stack functionality, allowing for simultane-
ous operation of multiple independent network stack instances, i.e. virtual nodes, 
within a single FreeBSD kernel. In contrast, NEMAN is implemented in user space 
and uses a single network stack of the Linux kernel. Another difference is that 
IMUNES provides no support for mobile scenarios. 
9.3 Architecture 
NEMAN is designed to emulate a relatively large scale wireless network, consisting 
of up to hundreds of nodes, within a single physical machine. With that respect, 
NEMAN is closest to MobiNet. The NEMAN architecture comprises the following 
three elements, as shown on Figure 9.1: 
 the user processes represent actual applications and protocols that are being 
tested, including routing daemons, 
 the topology manager manages virtual network interfaces and performs 
packet switching according to the topology information at a certain moment 
in time, and 
 the graphical user interface (GUI), used to visualize the emulated network 
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Figure 9.1: NEMAN architecture  
 
Figure 9.2: Example screenshot taken from the GUI 
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and to induce the topology information to the topology manager 
All the components, including the topology manager, run in the user space of 
the Linux operating system. Root-privilege is needed to configure the virtual net-
work interfaces (standard ifconfig command) and to be able to use the required 
socket option SO_BINDTODEVICE. 
User processes communicate through this basic network infrastructure by hook-
ing to virtual Ethernet network devices, called TAP devices. TAP devices are 
available in the Linux kernel and provide low level support for Ethernet tunneling. 
User processes can send and receive data via TAP interfaces using the classical 
socket API, thus achieving portability of code. The only requirement for the sock-
ets is to use the specific socket option SO_BINDTODEVICE. This is an important 
requirement as it ensures that a process’ socket will listen and send only to the 
specified interface, and thus not interfere with traffic addressed to other process 
running on the same machine. By this, we introduce the notion of virtual nodes, 
comprising all processes hooked to a certain TAP interface.  
NEMAN by itself operates on the link layer, with minor interventions to the 
network layer as well, such as internal hop-by-hop routing. This is necessary be-
cause it is not possible for multiple routing daemons to correctly use the same ker-
nel’s routing table (as explained in Section 9.4). Routing daemons are an example 
of standard user level processes that are hooked to the TAP interfaces. They are 
needed to provide a working IP infrastructure to all other user level processes that 
are communicating via IP based protocols through the TAP interfaces. Thus, rout-
ing daemons are an important prerequisite to implement and test middleware and 
application layer protocols, which was exactly our goal. 
The topology manager is the core of NEMAN. It is the user-space application 
creating and maintaining the TAP devices. Since TAP devices provide Ethernet 
tunneling, we ensured the possibility of running any network layer protocol on top. 
Every frame received on a TAP interface is available to the topology manager, and 
every frame forwarded by the topology manager to a TAP interface is available to 
the processes hooked to it. In other words, when the topology manager gets a 
frame sent to one of its TAP interfaces, it can then decide to forward it to some of 
the other interfaces (or none), according to the topology information it has at the 
moment. One TAP interface (in our case, tap0) is reserved as the monitoring 
channel, having an open bidirectional connection to all the other TAP interfaces, 
independent from the topology. This is a very important feature, allowing us to 
perform analysis of the network traffic using standard tools such as tcpdump or 
ethereal. Moreover, having in mind that the monitoring channel works both ways, 
we are able to use the same channel to induce traffic into the virtual network from 
the “outside world”. This feature comes useful when applications or services need 
to be triggered at a specific moment of time. An example of such a service is 
shown in Section 9.6.2. 
The implementation of the GUI is currently based on MobiEmu’s GUI. It is a 
Tcl/Tk script, independent from the topology manager and can run on a separate 
machine. The GUI shows the current position of nodes, their transmission ranges 
and links between nodes that can directly communicate with each other (Figure 
9.2). Topology and node movement data are acquired from standard ns-2 scenario 
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files, created by, for example, ns-2’s setdest program. Scenario files are interpreted 
sequentially, allowing us to introduce some application-specific events at specific 
moments in the emulation, thus achieving repeatable results. Information about 
topology changes is sent to the topology manager through the control channel, in 
form of UDP packets. The GUI allows also any user process to give it some feed-
back, so that important state changes in a user process can be visualized as e.g. 
color changes in the GUI. An example, where this has proved to be a very useful 
feature, is described in Section 9.6.1. 
The current implementation of the emulator provides us a working network in-
frastructure, essential for the development process of higher layer applications. In 
the conclusion, we discuss some possible future extensions, including the emulation 
of characteristics typical for wireless networks, such as collisions in the air, hidden 
terminals, obstacles, etc. 
9.4 Implementation Details 
One of the major problems we noticed was that the Linux kernel gracefully ignores 
all incoming packets that have been sent from one of its own interfaces. Although 
in most situations this is a reasonable thing to do, with respect to security issues 
and prevention from possible message loops, it was not an option in our case, 
where local interfaces were the only ones communicating between themselves. The 
solution was to implement the send-to-self (STS) patch developed by Ben Greear, 
which fixed the problem, allowing for local traffic to be received as well. 
The next problem emerged when the first ARP packets started coming from 
our test-applications. For any ARP packet coming to the machine, independent on 
the IP address being queried, all local interfaces that hear the query answer with 
their own MAC address. Again, this might be a useful feature in most of the stan-
dard situations where an IP address represents a physical machine, but in our case 
the amount of unnecessary traffic generated (with false information) was unaccept-
able. There are two possibilities to solve this problem. The first one is to imple-
ment a kernel patch, called hidden, developed by Julian Anastasov. This patch al-
lows for certain devices to be hidden from other devices (hence the name), when it 
comes to ARP requests. The second possibility is to let topology manager directly 
answer all ARP requests between its TAP interfaces. Although the second ap-
proach might reduce a bit on realism at the lower layers, for our case, where we 
are mainly concerned about connectivity and topology changes, it is acceptable. 
Furthermore, it turned out that the multi-hop routing problem can be solved in a 
corresponding way. 
The multi-hop routing problem is caused by the fact that IP addresses of “re-
mote” virtual nodes are tied to local TAP interfaces. This contradiction prevents 
the routing protocols to set routes towards such addresses, which is the case for all 
our emulated nodes. Therefore, the use of the kernel’s routing table is impossible 
in our case. Using dynamically created iptables-rules to perform routing on a single 
machine proved not to work either. We decided to solve the problem on a higher 
layer, without introducing additional patches into the kernel. The implementation 
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of the OLSR routing protocol we are currently using in NEMAN, the olsr.org 
OLSR daemon [13], writes every route change to the standard output. This enables 
us to induce that information directly into the topology manager, through a parser 
developed especially for that purpose. The parser serves as a bridge between the 
routing daemons and the topology manager, translating their outputs to control 
messages. The topology manager keeps an internal routing table for each virtual 
node, which is then used for hop-by-hop forwarding of packets. In the network, 
this forwarding appears as if every intermediate node had retransmitted the packet 
until its final destination. By solving the routing issue in the described way, no 
changes were needed to the routing daemon and the kernel. Depending on an im-
plementation, this approach might allow us to use other routing protocols as well, 
with either no changes at all or just minor changes to the routing daemon’s output 
and/or to our parser. Reactive routing protocols, such as AODV [8], present a case 
where some code must reside in the kernel. This is necessary since such protocols 
need to intercept and hold outgoing packets used to trigger route discovery. Port-
ing such code to NEMAN might prove to be much more difficult than in the case 
of OLSR. 
9.5 Application Development 
One of the main points of using an emulator is to be able to port applications from 
the emulating platform to genuine wireless devices without need having to change 
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Figure 9.3: Workflow diagram of using NEMAN  
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the code. Any application able to use e.g. Ethernet (eth*), 802.11 (wlan*) or simi-
lar devices can be used directly with TAP devices as well. The only precondition is 
that, in order not to mix with other applications’ data, an application has to listen 
and send only to the specified devices, which is accomplished by using the previ-
ously mentioned SO_BINDTODEVICE option when creating the socket. 
Figure 9.3 shows the typical process of using NEMAN. The process is roughly 
divided into three phases. In the preparation phase, the scenario files and initial 
user process’ code are developed, and the emulator core is initiated. In the next 
phase, user processes are started. The analysis phase can overlap with the run-
phase, since traffic can be monitored on the fly through the monitoring channel. 
The last two phases are then iterated until the wanted functionality is achieved. 
Apart from the applications being tested, additional helper applications might 
be needed to, for example, restart routing daemons on demand or to listen to mes-
sages triggered by custom events in the scenario file. The monitoring channel pro-
vides the means to perform analysis on what is going on in the network on the fly, 
by hooking to tap0 with e.g. standard tools like tcpdump. In addition, all the traf-
fic can be saved for a later, more detailed analysis. 
9.6 Experiences 
NEMAN was developed primarily to test and evaluate applications and protocols 
for the Ad-Hoc InfoWare project. Here, we present our experiences with some of 
the applications and protocols we tested and which already benefit from the emu-
lation platform. 
The olsr.org OLSR daemon was the first example showing that already existing 
applications might need no modifications to be able to work with NEMAN. Indeed, 
at each moment the output from a certain daemon, showing its 1-hop and 2-hops 
neighbors, would fully match what was displayed in the GUI. 
9.6.1 A Simple Key Management Protocol for MANETs 
The SKiMPy key management protocol [10] is used to establish a symmetric 
shared key between the rescue personnel’s devices. The key provides the means for 
establishing a secure network infrastructure between authorized nodes, while keep-
ing out unauthorized ones. SKiMPy is designed and optimized for highly dynamic 
ad-hoc networks and it is completely autonomous, requiring no user interaction at 
all. In the current implementation, the key management protocol has been coded 
directly into the security plugin [5] of the OLSR routing daemon.  
The emulator was an essential tool to test the performance and scalability of 
SKiMPy. We tested it for two different static scenarios, namely chain and mesh. 
In a chain scenario, all nodes are lined up in a single chain and the distance 
between the nodes in the chain is such that only the direct neighbors can commu-
nicate in a single hop with each other. We consider this to be the worst case sce-
nario for SKiMPy, since its performance benefits from having more neighbors. 
98 NEMAN: A Network Emulator for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
In a mesh scenario, nodes have multiple, randomly scattered neighbors, as it is 
natural in ad-hoc networks. Having multiple neighbors allows the protocol to re-
duce traffic and resource consumption. 
We have measured the time needed for the whole network to agree on a shared 
key. Two different platforms have been used, a Pentium 4 2.4GHz running Linux 
2.4.21 (a) and a dual Xeon 2.80GHz running Linux 2.6.10 (b). 
Ten independent runs were performed for each number of nodes and each sce-
nario. The results on Figure 9.4 show that the key management protocol scales 
linearly with linear increase of the number of nodes and physical network area ac-
cordingly (thus giving the same density of nodes). It can also be seen that in the 
first case the machine presented a bottleneck with regards to the ability to deliver 
packets in real time (see discussion in Section 9.7). In the second case, the total 
time became almost independent on the network size with networks consisting of 
10 or more nodes.  
One of the useful features of MobiEmu’s original GUI is that it accepts certain 
feedback messages. A special application constantly monitors all traffic on the 
monitoring channel (tap0) and analyzes signed OLSR packets, containing the ID 
number of the key used to perform the signature. When a change is noticed, the 
ID number is converted to a 24-bit RGB color code and sent as feedback to the 
GUI, which then colors the node on the screen accordingly. That way, we got a 
simple and yet effective way to see in real time how the protocol works and how 
the keys are spread through the network. 
To conclude, NEMAN has played an important role in the process of develop-
ing, testing and evaluating SKiMPy. It presented us both numerical and graphical 
proofs that the protocol indeed worked as expected. 
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9.6.2 Distributed Event Notification Service (DENS) 
DENS [11] is a communication tool in our architecture, providing an asynchronous 
communication mechanism using the publish/subscribe model which is well suited 
for a highly dynamic environment such as our scenario. Some of the nodes in the 
network are chosen as so called DENS-nodes. These nodes have the role of media-
tors or brokers between the subscribers and publishers, so both subscriptions and 
notifications are sent to them. In a MANET, disconnections causing partitioning 
are frequent and the DENS-nodes may therefore get disconnected as well. We want 
the service to be highly available so our solution should survive such network par-
titions. This is achieved by replicating information about subscriptions among the 
DENS-nodes. However, the replication of state information together with network 
partitions can easily lead to inconsistent replicas. One important tasks for DENS-
nodes is therefore to regain a consistent state as fast as possible. Scalability is also 
an issue since having too many DENS-nodes would create a lot of traffic when 
synchronizing and replicating information about subscriptions and notifications, so 
we need to run tests to find the right trade-off between availability of the service 
and scalability. 
The first implementation of the DENS protocol is currently under development 
and NEMAN has proven to be an essential tool for analyzing and debugging the 
protocol. To trigger DENS-nodes to perform subscriptions and notifications, which 
in the real scenario will be done at the application layer, we use the monitoring 
channel for its other purpose, i.e. inducing messages. Control messages are sent 
through the monitoring channel to DENS nodes either directly from the shell, or 
from the GUI. Special lines can be added to the scenario file, causing the GUI to 
forward them at the specified time, through a proxy application, into the monitor-
ing channel. 
9.7 Performance and Scalability 
We have already seen in Section 9.6.1 that the hardware configuration on which 
NEMAN is running can present a bottleneck. This bottleneck can have impact on 
the accuracy of time related results, because NEMAN is no longer able to deliver 
packets in real time. There are several factors that need to be taken into the per-
formance analysis, including CPU time slicing, packet queues, data copying when 
forwarding packets, context switching, control messages from the GUI and the 
routing parser, quantity of traffic in the network, other external processes running, 
etc. All of these factors play an important role in the performance degradation 
which is inevitable having many virtual nodes. A detailed analysis is part of ongo-
ing and future work.  
One of the main places for performance improvement is the GUI. Although it 
is easy to use and to be extended with new functionalities, its ability to accurately 
visualize the movements in the scenario is reduced as the number of nodes and ac-
tive links is increased, even with the minimal smoothness factor. To avoid this 
problem, the graphical display can be temporarily turned off in cases where results 
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are needed quickly and they do not depend on time. This can be done either by 
closing the application or by simply minimizing the window. Another problem with 
large scenarios (either with regards to the time domain or number of nodes) is that 
the GUI loads the whole scenario in memory before starting to interpret it. Assum-
ing that reading the scenario file on the fly would not impose a new bottleneck, 
this might be a point to investigate. 
9.8 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we described the requirements, design, implementation, and experi-
ences with our emulation platform for MANETs, called NEMAN. Development of 
middleware services for emergency and rescue operations is the main focus of Ad-
Hoc InfoWare project. In this context, NEMAN has already proven to be an im-
portant and very useful tool for the development of our key management protocol 
SKiMPy and the distributed event notification service. 
There are several other simulation and emulation environments of MANETs, 
however, to the best of our knowledge, NEMAN is the only emulation platform al-
lowing to perform MANET emulations of up to hundreds of nodes on a single ma-
chine. By this, NEMAN is a cheap and efficient environment to develop middle-
ware protocols, services, and applications. Furthermore, the code that has been de-
veloped on NEMAN can be easily ported and deployed on genuine wireless devices. 
Obviously, this facilitates considerably the step from development in an emulation 
environment to “real life” field trials and deployment. We hope that this will also 
contribute in the future to increase the number of research results that are not 
only developed and evaluated within a simulation or emulation environment, but 
are also tested with real devices in field trials. 
While the current implementation of NEMAN has already proven to be very 
useful, there are still some aspects of NEMAN we would like to improve, respec-
tively to extend. We envisage three possible threads of future work. First, we are 
interested to increase the number of nodes that can be efficiently emulated. To 
overcome the resource limitations of a single PC, we are looking into design and 
implementing a NEMAN version that can run concurrently on multiple PCs. We 
might even include heterogeneous computing platforms into the simulation to emu-
late the software where it actually should be running. For creating such a distrib-
uted simulation for ad-hoc networks, we are investigating distributed simulation, 
component, and multi-agent architectures and technologies such as the High Level 
Architecture (HLA) [2] and Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) ar-
chitecture [4] for multi-agent systems. 
Second, we would like to extend the functionality of the topology manager to 
not only emulate the connectivity between nodes according to a scenario descrip-
tion, but also to emulate some other link layer properties, like Quality-of-Service, 
hidden terminals, etc. The emulation of these aspects will require much more re-
sources than just deciding whether a virtual device should receive a packet or not. 
Thus, the availability of a distributed NEMAN version might be necessary to per-
form such emulations with larger number of nodes. 
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The third thread of possible future work is concerned with the GUI. The GUI 
is currently the performance bottleneck in NEMAN with regards to the graphical 
visualization of the mobility. This bottleneck is caused by the fact that the GUI is 
implemented in Tcl/Tk. A re-implementation with a language that can be com-
piled should lead to substantial performance improvements. Furthermore, we are 
interested to extend the functionality of the GUI. We would like to use the GUI to 
turn on and off nodes at any stage of the emulation by just clicking on them with, 
be able to create new nodes on the fly, and even influence the link layer properties 
by clicking on them. 
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Abstract: Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks maintain information in the routing table 
about reachable nodes. In emergency and rescue operations, human groups play an 
important role. This is visible at the network level as independent network parti-
tions which are for some time stable before their members change through merging 
or partitioning. We use the information from stable routing tables to optimize the 
synchronization of Mediators in a Distributed Event Notification System. In a sta-
ble partition each node has the same information, thus a single Mediator can effi-
ciently coordinate the synchronization, while all other Mediators just receive up-
dates. We show in our experiments that just a few seconds are needed until rout-
ing tables stabilize and all nodes have a common view of the partition. We present 
a heuristic to determine the proper time to synchronize. Furthermore, we show 
how exceptions, like disappearing coordinating Mediators and unexpected mes-
sages, can be efficiently handled. 
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10.1 Introduction 
In order to efficiently handle crises and emergencies, emergency and rescue (ER) 
teams benefit from well working communication infrastructures for command, con-
trol and coordination. However, first responders are typically confronted with an 
environment where no communication infrastructure is available, either because it 
was nonexisting, or the earlier existing ones have been destroyed. Therefore, wire-
less Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) formed by devices carried by ER per-
sonnel are often the only means to establish a communication infrastructure. How-
ever, the mobility of the ER personnel combined with the size of the emergency 
area (which is typically multiple times larger than the coverage of individual IEEE 
802.11 radios) and obstacles in the area reflecting radio waves, leads to the situa-
tion that there is often not one single MANET connecting all ER personnel. In-
stead, multiple partitions might exist and change over time through merging and 
partitioning. Typically, these partitions correspond to groups of ER personnel that 
have a common task to fulfill. Due to the dynamics of ER operations, groups 
might need to change their locations, and group memberships might change. This  
is reflected at the network level through changes in the routing table. Evidence for 
such group mobility is not only given by our study of ER operations, but also con-
firmed by recent studies of social mobility [2] and community detection [6] in op-
portunistic networks. 
We have developed a Distributed Event Notification Service (DENS) [10] to 
support remote patient monitoring. DENS uses Mediators to replicate subscrip-
tions, to enable graceful degradation in case of network partitions, and to convey 
subscriptions and notifications from source to destination. If there is connectivity 
to the destination the Mediator uses the OLSR MANET routing protocol [4] and 
IP to transport the packets to their destination. However, if a destination node is 
turned off or in a different partition, OLSR and any other MANET routing 
protocol fails. Therefore, the Mediators form an overlay on top of the MANET to 
perform delay tolerant transport through so-called “store-carry-forward” operations 
[10]. The replication of undelivered subscriptions and notifications increases the 
probability that one of the Mediators at a later point in time can join a partition 
with formerly unreachable destinations. The number of Mediators can be 
dynamically adapted to the particular ER operation and by this trade availability 
of DENS against resource consumption, i.e., the more Mediators the higher the 
availability and the higher the resource consumption. 
The message ferry approach [12] is determining the mobility, including speed 
and trajectory of special nodes called ferries, to make sure that a previously 
unreachable destination and the ferry are coming into communication range. This 
is not in general possible in ER operations. Therefore, we replicate undelivered 
subscriptions and notifications to all Mediators, similar to the approach in 
epidemic routing [11] where packets are forwarded to neighbors and then spreads 
through the network, hence the name. However, we make use of a proactive 
routing protocol and do not depend on the event that two nodes meet, to enable 
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exchange of undelivered messages. Instead, we can synchronize Mediators 
immediately after they join a common network partition, which are typically 
formed by different ER teams.  
There exist various works related to routing in intermittently connected 
networks, or sparse MANETs. In [13] Zhang gives an overview of different 
approaches for the store-carry-forward routing. They differ in how they select the 
next-hop-node, e.g. random selection, using knowledge about the whereabouts of 
nodes, or predict future location. Other approaches assume some knowledge such 
as last known location of the destination, and therefore only forward packets in the 
same area. There exist some cross-layer approaches such as EMMA [9] where 
synchronous communication is used if possible; in case of no end-to-end 
connection, epidemic routing is used instead.  
Synchronization of Mediators seems to be simple, but several complicating 
factors have to be considered: First, each node has its own view of “its” network 
partition which does not necessarily correspond to the view of the other nodes in 
this partition. Second, merging of partitions is not an atomic action, the routing 
daemon in each node discovers new nodes iteratively over several time steps. 
Third, nodes are mobile and there might never be a globally correct definition 
whether partition merging has finished or not. Fourth, propagation of messages 
from source to destination through epidemic routing might take quite a long time 
depending on the network topology and the movement of the nodes; however, 
certain messages in ER applications have stringent timing requirements, like an 
alarm from a patient monitoring application. Finally, bandwidth is a scarce 
resource and synchronization among multiple Mediators should be as efficient as 
possible. 
We propose in this paper to leverage the existing information about the 
network topology from the OLSR routing protocol. By this each Mediator can 
establish its own view of the network without putting any additional load onto the 
network. Furthermore, we use the fact that ER operations are performed in 
groups, resulting in partitions that are stable for some time (with respect to the 
nodes that form the partition) before new mergings or partitionings occur. We 
show through simulation studies that the time it takes to merge network partitions 
and the time it takes until all nodes in the new partition have updated routing 
tables, is rather short. By assuming a common view among the Mediators in each 
partition, we can for each partition immediately identify a coordinator that acts on 
behalf of all Mediators in its partition. This in turn enables us to minimize the 
number of exchanged messages in the synchronization process. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we briefly describe DENS in Section 10.2. In 
Section 10.3, we analyze how useful information from the IP layer, i.e., the OLSR 
routing table is. In Section 10.4, we outline the basic idea of the synchronization 
protocol and describe how exceptions are handled, followed by some conclusions in 
Section 10.5. 
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10.2 DENS 
In publish-subscribe systems, subscribers express their interest in events through 
subscriptions, and publishers publish events of interest. DENS is designed to sup-
port information exchange even in the presence of network partitions. Subscription 
information is therefore replicated in the network. There is a trade-off between of-
fering a reliable service, but at the same time not saturate the network by replicat-
ing too much information. Filtering of events is therefore performed as close to the 
source as possible. DENS supports different subscription languages, both simple 
subject-based languages, and content-based languages where the subscriber can 
specify the content of the notification it wants to receive information on, e.g., a 
value range of health sensor data.   
DENS has the following components: (1) Subscriber, (2) Publisher and (3) Me-
diator. Subscriber and Publisher run in every node, and the Mediator runs on some 
of the nodes. The number of Mediators is dependent on the network size, density 
and dynamicity. The Subscriber Component sends subscriptions to a Mediator 
running on the same or another node. The Mediator parses received subscriptions 
to find keywords that are used to locate potential publisher nodes. The subscrip-
tions are then sent to these publisher nodes. The Publisher filters events according 
to the subscriptions. When an event of interest occurs, it sends a notification to a 
Mediator. The notifications are matched with the subscriptions, and then delivered 
to interested subscribers. Thus, Mediators decouple Subscribers and Publishers. 
DENS keeps track of Mediators by listening to beacons sent by such nodes in 
its partition. The Mediators form a DENS overlay. In addition to forwarding sub-
scriptions and notifications, Mediators replicate subscriptions and possibly notifica-
tions to obtain a higher degree of reliability in the presence of partitionings caused 
by disconnections or that a node is turned off. The task of the overlay formed by 
the Mediators is to enhance reliability and support delay-tolerant routing of sub-
scriptions and notifications in case of partitions.  
Subscribers and publishers send their subscriptions and notifications to a Me-
diator in their own partition using end-to-end paths set by the network routing 
protocol. This means that the Mediator is an indirection. Delivering subscriptions 
and notifications, and replicating subscriptions and undelivered notifications, are 
done by using the underlying routing protocol and the synchronization protocol. 
The synchronization protocol is initiated when there are new nodes in the parti-
tion. The presence of new nodes provides the means for delivering undelivered 
stored subscriptions and notifications to the newly connected nodes, and replicat-
ing subscriptions and undelivered notifications to newly arrived Mediators. Be-
cause of the network partitionings, the Mediators can have an inconsistent view of 
subscriptions. In the next section, we describe how we can use information from 
the routing table to detect topology changes and initiate the synchronization proc-
ess among Mediators. 
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10.3 Routing Table Information 
One important key element to enable efficient design of middleware protocols over 
Sparse MANETs, is information about nodes that can be reached through a multi-
hop route at a given point in time and the prediction of future connectivity. Parts 
of this information might be gathered from external sources, like GPS satellites or 
base stations, but we aim to design our solutions such that they work also when no 
external information is available. The other possibility to gather this information is 
that the middleware components periodically broadcast messages, like in Hyper-
gossiping [7], to detect partition mergings, etc. Since bandwidth is a scarce re-
source, we aim to minimize the number of broadcast messages.  
In order to gather at the middleware layer information about network parti-
tions, mergings, and partition membership information in a non-intrusive manner, 
we leverage the information that is already available at the network layer in the 
routing table. In our previous studies [5] we have observed that the routing proto-
col holds updated information about the neighborhood of a node if the node is ac-
tively involved in communication. This claim holds for both proactive and reactive 
routing protocols. However, proactive routing protocols maintain topology infor-
mation also if there is no (or not sufficient) communication. The proactive routing 
protocol OLSR periodically sends beacons (HELLO messages) to inform other 
nodes of its presence. In addition, OLSR tries to maintain at each node a consis-
tent view of the network by exchanging topology information with the other nodes 
in the network. Whenever there is a change in the topology, the routing table is 
recalculated. Each entry in the routing table contains information on the destina-
tion node, the next hop node, the estimated number of hops to the destination, 
and the interface used for communication. 
In order to optimize the synchronization of Mediators after partition mergings, 
we need to understand the dynamics of both the merging process and the parti-
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tioning process and how it is reflected in the routing tables of the individual nodes. 
We have performed a number of experiments with the emulation tool NEMAN [8] 
to analyze how often the local routing table changes over time, whether the change 
frequency allows us to deduce that a merging or partitioning has finished, and how 
long it takes until all nodes in one partition have the same view of their partition. 
We instrumented the code of the OLSR daemon to extract and log all changes of 
membership information, which enables us to identify how many neighbors each 
node's routing protocol reported at any point in time. The OLSR's interval for 
sending HELLO messages is set to 1 second in all experiments. 
In order to verify our hypothesis that groups which move in larger areas result 
in stable membership information for a substantial amount of time, we performed 
experiments with non-static groups, moving according to the reference point group 
mobility pattern. The nodes were moving at 2 units/s in an area of 600x600 units. 
Figure 10.1 illustrates a representative case in which two groups of 10 nodes came 
in contact approximately after 11 seconds and remained in contact for approxi-
mately 77 seconds. For each node there is one line in the graph that shows how 
many partition members this node has registered. Overlapping lines indicate a con-
sistent view among multiple nodes. The figure shows on each group subgraph a 
single line for most of the time, meaning that both groups have a stable view of 
the network. Occasionally, due to the mobility of nodes a few nodes have a differ-
ent view. 
Table 10.1 shows the results for a selected set of experiments, including two 
static groups of 1, 10, or 20 nodes each. Merging and partitioning events were in-
troduced artificially by creating or removing contact between the two groups at a 
certain number of merging points. The merging time and partitioning time were 
measured on a global basis, i.e. from the moment the first node noticed the change 
to the moment when all the nodes in the partition had the same view. 
Table 10.1: Resulting times for merging and partitioning 
Topology Merging points Groups Merg. time Part. time 
Chain 1 20+20 10,97s 8,73s 
Mesh 1 20+20 8,47s 6,79s 
Mesh 5 20+20 7,40s 7,80s 
Full mesh full mesh 20+1 0,28s 2,41s 
Full mesh full mesh 10+10 1,17s 1,32s 
 
In addition to experiments with group mobility models and especially designed 
topologies, we have also performed experiments with the random waypoint model 
as a worst case analysis. We have simulated results for 20 nodes in areas of size 
500x500, 1000x1000 and 1500x1500, and 250 units radio range. As expected mem-
bership changes in routing tables for very dense networks are rare, i.e., member-
ship does not change during the entire run. In larger areas there are also longer pe-
riods in which the individual routing tables do not change. In the studied case 
where the area size was 1000x1000, this was often more than 10 seconds, while in 
larger areas this stable period was often several times longer. When a merging 
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takes place, the routing daemons recalculate old routes and add new routes to-
wards the new nodes. This takes approximately 5 seconds on each node. This is 
dependent on the location of the node and the number of new nodes. 
10.4 Synchronization Protocol 
The basic idea for the synchronization protocol is to use information from the 
routing table to initiate synchronizing of data after a merging of two or more par-
titions. The protocol is initiated in a node when it detects a routing protocol 
change that indicates a partition merge, but only after it assumes that the routing 
table has stabilized. During the synchronization process some of the Mediators re-
sume specialized roles as  partition_representatives. A partition_representative is 
responsible for synchronizing data in its old partition. The role of being a parti-
tion_representative for an old partition is taken by the Mediator with the highest 
node ID. Since we assume that each Mediator keeps a record of all other Mediators 
in its partition, the partition_representative’s identity is implicitly known without 
any message exchange. Among the partition_representatives one takes the role as 
coordinator. The coordinator has the responsibility of coordinating the synchroni-
zation process among the partition_representatives. The coordinator is the parti-
tion_representative having the highest node ID. After the partition_representatives 
have synchronized data among themselves, they send updates to the Mediators of 
their old partitions.  
We first describe the heuristic used to determine when the synchronization 
should be initiated, before we explain the basic protocol without exception han-
dling and what kind of conditions we assume. Then we describe how exceptions are 
handled if these conditions do not hold.  
10.4.1 Synchronization Initialization 
The heuristic to determine when to initiate the synchronization uses two time-
stamps and three threshold values: 
 Timestamp tstart records the time a new node is registered in the routing 
table after a stable period. 
 Timestamp tlast records the time the last change of membership 
information in the routing table was detected. 
 Threshold value Ts is an estimate whether the routing table is stable, i.e., 
there are no membership changes during the period [tlast, tlast + Ts]. 
 Threshold value TGV estimates the time it takes for all nodes in a partition 
to have the same membership information after the last membership change 
in the local table was detected. 
 Threshold value TE is used to ensure that the heuristic is able to start the 
synchronization process from time to time even if there is never a stable 
routing table. 
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The heuristic is started when a new node is registered in the routing table. 
Both tstart and tlast are assigned the current time. Each time a change of the mem-
bership information occurs, tlast is updated with the current time. Normally, the 
synchronization process is started if the routing table is stable and all nodes have 
the same membership information. If the exception occurs that the routing table 
changes continuously for a too long time, synchronization is enforced even if the 
routing tables are not stable. The pseudo code of the heuristic is given below. 
 
   tstart, tlast := tcurrent; 
   repeat { 
      if (membership_change) {tlast:=tcurrent;} 
   until (tlast + max(TS,TGV) < tcurrent || tstart + TE < tlast) } 
   Start_Synch; 
 
Based on our experiments, we are currently using 5 seconds for TS and TGV. TE 
has to be adapted to the application requirements to balance between resource 
consumption and availability. 
10.4.2 Basic Protocol 
For each node the protocol has three phases: the Mediator Discovery phase, where 
Mediators from merging partitions are discovered and one Mediator from each old 
partition takes the role of a partition_representative; the Global Synchronization 
phase where the coordinator is selected and the partition_representatives exchange 
information; and the Local Update phase where the partition_representatives send 
updates to the Mediators in their old partition. In each phase timers are set to en-
sure that the phase always completes. The events triggering the different phases 
are shown in Figure 10.2. 
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The Basic Protocol runs under these assumptions: 
 each node knows about every other node in the new (merged) partition, 
 each Mediator knows about every other Mediator in its old partition, 
 all Mediators in an old partition are synchronized, and 
 during the synchronization process no new nodes arrive, no nodes disappear, 
and no new subscriptions or notifications are sent. 
 
In the following we describe the phases, roles, and messages. 
Mediator Discovery 
A Mediator enters this phase when it receives a START_SYNCH message. The 
Mediator starts a timer. Each Mediator examines its set of known Mediators and 
decides whether it is a partition_representative. The Mediators taking the role of a 
partition_representative, floods a REP_BROADCAST message. This message in-
cludes a list of the Mediators it represents. When a Mediator receives a 
REP_BROADCAST from its own partition_representative, it enters the Local Up-
date phase and cancels the timer. The partition_representative listens for  
REP_BROADCASTs from the other partitions and waits until there is a timeout. 
It then enters the Global Synchronization phase. 
Global Synchronization 
All Mediators that enter this phase are partition_representatives, in addition one 
of them takes the role of being a coordinator. Again, this role is taken by the Me-
diator having the highest node ID. The messages used in this phase are: 
SYNCH_C, SYNCH_REP, and SYNCH_TOTAL.  A timer is started when the 
Mediators enter the phase.  
The coordinator sends SYNCH_C containing a summary of its subscriptions to 
the other partition_representatives. The other partition_representatives compare 
the summary with their own content and reply with the message SYNCH_REP 
containing data the coordinator is lacking, in addition to a summary of its own 
data. When the coordinator has received replies from all the parti-
tion_representatives, it sends SYNCH_TOTAL updates to the parti-
tion_representatives, i.e., its own subscriptions in addition to subscriptions re-
ceived from the other partition_representatives. The coordinator  cancels its timer, 
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resumes status as an ordinary partition_representative, and enters the Local Up-
date phase. When the partition_representatives receive the SYNCH_TOTAL mes-
sage from the coordinator, they cancel the timer and enter the Local Update 
phase. 
Local Update 
In the last step of the protocol, the partition_representatives send 
LOCAL_UPDATE messages to the Mediators in their old partition. This includes 
information about subscriptions, but also about new Mediators. Each ordinary 
Mediator in this phase starts a timer, then it awaits the arrival of a 
LOCAL_UPDATE message from its partition_representative. When the 
LOCAL_UPDATE message arrives, the timer is cancelled and the Mediator re-
sumes ordinary activity. 
We have implemented the basic protocol. Figure 10.6 shows the number of 
known Mediators from one Mediator’s perspective when testing it in a scenario 
where there are two merging events; one at 90 seconds and the second merging at 
195 seconds. The increasing number of known Mediators shows that the nodes in 
the network have detected a partition merging, the routing tables are stabilized, 
and the Mediator Discovery phase is started. 
10.4.3 Exception Handling 
We now discuss how exceptions are handled in the different phases. Examples of 
exceptions are that the Mediators do not have the same view of the partition 
membership, that Mediators may appear or disappear during the synchronization 
process, and that Mediators in the old partition may not be fully synchronized 
when the synchronization protocol starts. It is important to notice that we cannot 
assume at any stage that the nodes have the exact same view of where they are in 
the synchronization process, and what the members of a partition are. The proto-
col therefore needs to be robust enough to manage these situations. In the follow-
ing, we discuss the different phases of the protocol from one Mediator’s point of 
view. The notable exceptions are shown in the Tables 2-5. The handling of the ex-
ceptions is dependent on the phase and the role of the Mediator. 
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Table 10.2. Exception Handling when Idle 
Role Exception Handling 
M REP_BROADCAST Start synchronization  
 Table 10.3. Exception Handling in Mediator Discovery phase  
Role Exception Handling 
M + R START_SYNCH Stack request 
 LOCAL_UPDATE Receive data 
R timeout without any re-
ceived 
REP_BROADCAST 
Proceed to L_Update 
M REP_BROADCAST 
from an unexpected R in 
its old partition 
Reconsider the identity of 
R for its old partition 
 timeout,  no received 
REP_BROADCASTs 
from nodes in its  old 
partition 
Reconsider role to R 
Table 10.4. Exception Handling in the Global Synch phase 
Role Exception Handling 
C+ R START_SYNCH  Stack request 
 REP_BROADCAST Stack request 
 LOCAL_UPDATE Receive data 
C timeout without having 
received any 
SYNCH_REPs 
Proceed to L_Update 
 timeout but has only re-
ceived some of the ex-
pected SYNCH_REPs 
Proceed with reduced set 
of recipient Rs 
R timeout without having 
received SYNCH_C 
Reconsider role to C 
 timeout without having 
received 
SYNCH_TOTAL 
Proceed to L_Update 
 SYNCH_C from wrong 
C 
Respond with 
SYNCH_REP but con-
tinue to wait for 
SYNCH_C from true C   
Table 10.5. Exception Handling in the Local Update phase 
Role Exception Handling 
M +R  START_SYNCH Stack request 
 REP_BROADCAST Stack request 
M timeout, has not re-
ceived 
LOCAL_UPDATE 
Proceed 
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A Mediator enters the Mediator Discovery phase when it receives a 
START_SYNCH or a REP_BROADCAST message. It then starts a timer. If a 
Mediator receives a new START_SYNCH message during this phase, it will just 
stack the request and enter the Mediator Discovery phase again after it has fin-
ished its current synchronization process. If it receives a LOCAL_UPDATE mes-
sage out of order, it receives data that can be handled locally immediately. It may 
be the case that the Mediators in the old partition do not have exactly the same 
view of the partition membership, so a Mediator can receive a 
REP_BROADCAST from a node that it is aware of but did not consider being the 
partition_representative. In this case, the Mediator reports to the new parti-
tion_representative. If the timer fires for a node that is assumed not to be a parti-
tion_representative, it will reconsider which Mediator should be parti-
tion_representative. If it is the next Mediator having the highest ID, it sends a 
REP_BROADCAST, if not it will restart the timer. If the timer fires for the parti-
tion_representative, it sees if it has received any REP_BROADCAST messages, if 
not, it goes directly to Local Update phase.  
In the Global Synchronization phase only partition_representatives participate, 
and one of them takes the coordinator role. In this phase both START_SYNCH 
messages and REP_BROADCAST messages are stacked and handled when the 
process is finished. LOCAL_UPDATE messages are just received but not handled. 
If the coordinator disappears, the remaining partition_representatives will at time-
out reconsider their roles, and the one with the next highest id becomes the new 
coordinator. If all partition_representatives but the coordinator disappear, the co-
ordinator will at timeout enter the Local Update phase. It may happen that none, 
two or more elect themselves as a coordinator. If none starts as a coordinator, then 
there will be a timeout where the partition_representatives reconsider their role. If 
there is a SYNCH_C from a non-assumed coordinator, the parti-
tion_representatives will respond to it but await a SYNCH_C from its true coordi-
nator before proceeding to the Local Update phase. 
As in the previous phase, both START_SYNCH messages and 
REP_BROADCAST messages received during the Local Update phase are stacked 
and handled when the process is finished. If a timeout fires, this indicates that 
something went wrong, i.e., the partition_representative is gone.  
If subscriptions or notifications are received by a partition_representative at 
any phase, it will send it as LOCAL_UPDATE messages. If a Mediator is not a 
partition_representative or a coordinator, it will replicate it to the other Mediators. 
10.4.4 Complexity 
In order to compare the complexity of our synchronization protocol with a simple 
gossiping style synchronization, we use a simple analytic model. We assume two 
merging network partitions with x respectively y mediators that are synchronized 
within their partition. We measure the complexity in terms of number of Mediator 
to Mediator update processes. In our synchronization protocol, first the parti-
tion_representatives update each other, and afterwards they update the Mediators 
in their old partition, leading to 1 + (x -1) + (y - 1) updates. If instead all Media-
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tors exchange information with all other Mediators, in the best case each Mediator 
from partition 1 updates all Mediators from partition 2 or vice versa. This leads us 
to x*y updates. The complexity is therefore O(x + y) for our synchronization pro-
tocol and O(x*y) for gossiping style protocols. The synchronization protocol in ad-
dition is deterministic since all Mediators are updated after a merging, and not 
only when e.g. Mediators become direct neighbors and initiate synchronization 
10.5 Conclusions 
One fundamental decision for the design of DENS is to use the proactive MANET 
routing protocol OLSR at the IP layer and to establish an overlay of Mediators 
that (1) increase availability of DENS through replication, and (2) perform delay 
tolerant transport of destinations in different partitions. Beside the advantage that 
a standardized routing protocol can be used to forward messages to the destina-
tions if there is a route, we use the routing table information to optimize the Me-
diator synchronization in the overlay. OLSR maintains continuously at each node 
membership and topology information about its partition. Changes in the member-
ship indicate a network merging or partitioning. If the set of member nodes in a 
partition is for some time unchanged, all nodes in the partition have the same 
view. Through simulations we have demonstrated that this assumption is correct, 
and we have quantified for different scenarios how long it takes until partitions are 
stable and all nodes have the same membership information. By observing the 
routing table, we can identify partition mergings and estimate when the merging 
has finished without exchanging any additional messages. The fact that all nodes 
have the same membership information, enables us to optimize the synchronization 
of Mediators since a single Mediator can act on behalf of the others in its partition. 
Since all nodes in a partition are known, the “election” of a representative is based 
on the node ID and no messages need to be sent. Additionally, all non-
representative Mediators act as hot-standbys in case the representative disappears 
unexpectedly.  
Different optimizations can be done to improve the efficiency of the protocol. 
These include to prevent too frequent synchronizing among Mediators in case of 
frequent topology changes; to use a compact representation of the subscriptions in 
the summaries sent in the Global Synchronization phase; and to use information 
about disappeared nodes from the Mediator’s local routing table. To prevent Me-
diators from repeatedly synchronizing with the same Mediators, the Mediators can 
remember when and with which Mediators they have synchronized. Bloom filters 
[1] can be used to summarize data. If a node detects disappeared nodes, some of 
the timers might be cancelled and the Mediators resume the protocol quicker, e.g., 
if a Mediator is waiting for a REP_BROADCAST from its assumed parti-
tion_representative and it detects that this node is gone, it can resume the proto-
col as if the timer has fired. 
However, even without optimizations, the number of messages exchanged in-
creases only linearly with the number of Mediators in the absence of exceptions. 
We argue that even in the worst case, our synchronization protocol does not per-
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form worse than an approach based on Epidemic Routing in terms of bandwidth 
consumption and delivery delay since we are not depending on the fact that two 
nodes meet and we in most cases synchronize more than two nodes. We will con-
tinue to work on the implementation of the protocol and evaluate it with real 
world traces and compare its performance with Epidemic Routing. 
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Abstract: An approach to information sharing in mobile adhoc networks 
(MANETs) is to store on every node a small amount of metadata describing what 
information resources exist in the network and where they reside, allowing applica-
tions to first search locally for information about suitable resources, and next re-
quest relevant information from a node that contains the resource. The character-
istics of MANETs in general and sparse, delay-tolerant networks in particular, 
make the task of maintaining and disseminating metadata across all nodes diffi-
cult, particularly in the presence of scarce resources. We have designed and im-
plemented three protocols which use different approaches to metadata dissemina-
tion: epidemic one-to-one routing, one-to-many broadcasting that utilises the char-
acteristics of the shared radio medium of wireless networks, and a protocol where a 
group consisting of e.g. rescue team leaders is given priority in the dissemination 
process and afterwards serves as multiple starting points for further dissemination. 
In the MIDAS project we aim to produce middleware that speeds up MANET ap-
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plication development. By prototyping the metadata management component of 
MIDAS and testing the prototype with each of the three protocols in the network 
emulator environment NEMAN, we have measured bandwidth usage and perform-
ance. The implemented broadcast protocol is measured to use substantially less 
bandwidth than epidemic routing. The group protocol shows that the group indeed 
gets priority; it is comparable to the broadcast protocol in terms of bandwidth us-
age. The broadcast protocol has been used successfully in field tests of the MIDAS 
middleware. 
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11.1 Introduction 
Efficient information sharing is vital in rescue and emergency operations. Due to 
strict requirements in this domain we need information sharing services that work 
in environments where no communication infrastructure exists or where it has been 
destroyed. Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET) is a promising technology to be 
leveraged for generic information sharing services. However, in MANETs band-
width is strictly limited by the physical characteristics of the shared radio medium. 
In our application domain we must expect frequent network partitions and re-
merges due to the possible low density and high mobility of the involved nodes. 
The number and type of devices on the site may change substantially over time 
during the incident, as rescue team members go to and fro. In addition the devices 
may have limited computing and storage capabilities; rescue teams cannot be ex-
pected to carry more than a modern mobile telephone and/or a hand-held device, 
e.g. a PDA. Still the devices should be able to set up and partake in the MANET. 
Since information sharing is vital, information sharing services in the MANET 
must survive short or long term network partitions and function properly also 
when networks (re)merge. On the other hand, the duration of such scenarios is 
fairly short, from a few hours to a few days.  
When density in a MANET increases, the network degrades drastically due to 
an increase in packet collisions, thus in a realistic setup the MANET is limited to 
less than a hundred nodes. In the presence of heterogeneous storage capabilities 
and unpredictable and frequent network topology changes, one should place data 
replicas on well-chosen nodes to enhance data availability. The rest of the nodes 
then needs to know which nodes keep which data replicas. Such “yellow-page” in-
formation constitutes metadata about available resources. 
Due to the small size of MANETs and the typically short duration of a sce-
nario, the amount of globally shared metadata can be kept small, thus it is feasible 
to store all globally shared metadata information at all nodes. If the metadata is 
kept up to date, an application can query locally what kind of data items exists 
and where to find a replica. This does not require any communication and not 
much processing. When the application knows where to locate a resource, it can 
fetch or update the data item in question. 
The focus of this paper is when and how to propagate metadata information, 
given that all nodes store all available globally shared metadata items locally and 
cooperate to disseminate metadata updates quickly enough to maintain a suffi-
ciently up-to-date view of available resources. Metadata at each node must be kept 
consistent in the presence of metadata updates and network topology changes. Any 
solutions must take into account that bandwidth is a scarce commodity, and stor-
age space and processing power likewise.  
The work of this paper was performed in the context of the MIDAS project [1], 
in which we produce middleware that speeds up MANET application development. 
As part of the MIDAS prototype we have designed and implemented the Global 
Metadata Manager (GMDM) component whose task is metadata maintenance. We 
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present three protocols for metadata propagation: (i) a basic epidemic routing pro-
tocol, (ii) a broadcast protocol using one-to-many communication, and (iii) a pro-
tocol where a group of nodes consisting of e.g. rescue team leaders is given first 
priority, and afterwards serves as multiple starting points for further dissemina-
tion. All three protocols are robust to network partitioning and merging. The 
MIDAS prototype with the GMDM component has been tested extensively with 
each of the three protocols in the network emulator environment NEMAN [2] to 
measure their bandwidth usage and performance. In addition proof-of-concept ap-
plications using the broadcast protocol have been successfully exposed to field tests 
under the 32nd international super prestige cyclocross race of Gieten in 2007, and 
the four day walking event in Nijmegen 2008.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 11.2 the relevant 
parts of the MIDAS architecture are presented. Relevant characteristics of 
MANETs and MANET routing techniques are reviewed in Section 11.3. In Sec-
tion 11.4 we explain the metadata propagation protocols in detail. We describe the 
test setup and test results in Sections 11.5 and 11.6 respectively, and conclude in 
Section 11.7. 
11.2 MIDAS Architecture 
From the MIDAS architecture we primarily present the main ideas behind the 
MIDAS Data Space (MDS) component [3, 4], which is responsible for transparent 
information sharing. In MDS relational-style tables form the unit of shareable 
data. Ideally, if the same unit is accessed simultaneously by different applications 
using MDS, it is available for all and with identical contents. In practice however, 
data may be unavailable or users perceive different contents due to e.g. network 
disruption and propagation delays.  
The main components of the MDS architecture are the following: A local stor-
age stores the table replicas, while the Global MetaData Manager (GMDM) keeps 
track of on which nodes which replicas are stored. The original decision of where to 
store table replicas is made by the Data Allocator. The Data Synchroniser makes 
sure that modifications of a table are propagated to all replicas. The Query Ana-
lyser forwards application requests to the local storage or a remote node.  
GMDM maintains information about tables and the location of their replicas. 
The functionality of GMDM bears some resemblance to the data dictionary in da-
tabase systems, by its maintaining data about (shared) data, i.e., metadata. We 
need to keep the amount of metadata and the frequency of metadata updates at a 
reasonable level. The total amount of metadata is kept at a minimum by distin-
guishing between two kinds of metadata:  
1. Metadata detailed descriptions: Each node that stores a table replica, main-
tains its full metadata description.  
2. Globally shared metadata: For each table, the identities of remote nodes 
that store replicas of it.  
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In MANETs it is impossible to keep a complete global view of all table replicas 
at every node at all times, due to frequent network partitions and merges. Our de-
sign choice is still to let every node maintain locally as complete an overview as 
possible. That is, the local overview should comprise information about all table 
replicas residing in the node’s own network partition (with a possible propagation 
delay), but obviously the local overview is not required to be the same on two 
nodes in different partitions unless and until the two partitions are merged. Thus, 
if an application requests information about a table, it can consult its local 
GMDM. If a replica is stored locally, the application can locally obtain the rep-
lica’s full metadata description, query its contents, and perform updates. If not, 
GMDM can furnish the application with a list of nodes that store a replica. It is 
thus sufficient to keep at all nodes metadata of the second kind. A more sophisti-
cated classification and utilisation of metadata can be found in [5]. 
The MDS component relies on the MIDAS Communication and Routing 
(CRT) component to provide network services. In MIDAS we have chosen OLSR 
[6] as our routing protocol for the case of mobile ad-hoc networks. OLSR maintains 
at each node information about the topology of the whole network. A main feature 
of OLSR is that it is proactive, i.e., it regularly exchanges topology information 
with the other nodes in the network; this is essential since the proper functioning 
of MDS requires the routing protocol to maintain at all times a fairly updated view 
of the topology.  
There are two main situations where the globally shared metadata of a net-
work partition may change:  
 When a new table replica is created locally: In this case the Data Allocator 
informs GMDM.  
 When two networks merge: Whenever CRT registers a topology change, it 
reports the change to MDS. If the change implies the arrival of a new 
neighbour node, GMDM contacts the new neighbour and exchanges globally 
shared metadata information with it.  
In both cases GMDM should in a second phase cooperate with GMDM at 
other nodes in the network on propagating its new metadata items. Finally, in case 
new metadata is received from other nodes, either as a result of the encountering 
of new neighbours or as part of the metadata propagation phase, GMDM is re-
sponsible for doing local metadata updates.  
In our application domain the size of the globally shared metadata will remain 
quite small. As a typical example, consider a MANET of 50 nodes. Each globally 
shared metadata item consists of a nodeid and a table name, say a total of 10+40 
characters. A few (say 5) administrative tables will have replicas on all nodes. In 
addition there might be around 30 shared tables with an average of 5 replicas each. 
With a little bit of clever encoding this adds up to a few Kbytes of globally shared 
metadata per node. 
Our main concern is how and when to perform the exchange and propagation 
of the globally shared metadata. In the rest of the paper we for short use the term 
“metadata” to mean what is named “globally shared metadata” in the above. 
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11.3 Routing in MANETs 
Our main idea for the choice of metadata propagation protocols, is to reuse known 
techniques. For this purpose we have looked into routing protocols of dense 
MANETs and routing in delay-tolerant networks. Before presenting our design 
choices, we give a short recapitulation of the main physical characteristics of and 
relevant routing techniques in MANETs since these are both crucial for our 
choices. 
11.3.1 MANET Characteristics 
When using MANETs it is important to be aware of the limitations of the Wi-Fi 
IEEE 802.11 [7] standard which makes up the connections. The standard has a 
maximum bandwidth of 54 Mbit/s and is suffering from collisions with other stan-
dards and appliances like Bluetooth, cordless phones and microwave ovens. This 
becomes an even bigger problem when there are many nodes running in the same 
sending area. Since Wi-Fi shares the same restrictions as any other radio technol-
ogy that sends and receives on the same frequency, it is physically required to op-
erate in simplex. This implies a strict control of who is sending and how the radio 
frequency is used. The standard provides collision avoidance techniques through 
the use of coordination messages. 
11.3.2 MANET Routing Techniques and Challenges 
Routing protocols in general deliver two important services: The establishing of 
routes for transferring packets between nodes in the same network partition, and 
topology information, i.e., how nodes in a network partition are connected. Both 
these services are concerned with the establishing of space paths. OLSR [6] is an 
example of a space path routing protocol. OLSR uses an overlay network to speed 
up dissemination; nodes in the overlay gather local topology and distribute it.  
In space/time path routing protocols a node A can pass a message to a node B 
belonging to a different partition if the system can retain the message for a while, 
and later, when A gets within reach of B, forward it to B. An interesting class of 
space/time path protocols is message ferrying [8, 9], where some nodes act as fer-
ries that carry messages between different network partitions. However, since this 
requires the ferries to follow a preplanned movement scheme, the approach is not 
applicable to MANETs in general. In case of the rescue operation application do-
main we must provide solutions that do not rely on pre-planned movement 
schemes. 
Another class of space/time path protocols is epidemic routing [10]. Epidemic 
routing provides a controlled flooding of packets and can e.g. be used for sending a 
message to a recipient without known address. A message is spread throughout the 
network until the message reaches its destination or a time-to-live counter becomes 
zero and the message is dropped. It relies on intermediate nodes to provide large 
enough message buffer space to carry all required messages. In general the over-
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head from wrongly directed or misguided messages consumes both buffer space and 
network capacity. In the case of metadata propagation, however, all nodes are pos-
sible addressees. The use of epidemic routing for this purpose has some definite 
advantages to more basic flooding algorithms: Since the message buffer is exam-
ined at node encounters, the node state is factually taken into account before re-
transmission. In our case aggregated metadata plays the role of the message buffer. 
The propagation protocol can take into account the node state when deciding how 
to proceed the propagation, like halting further propagation because the metadata 
did not change.  
Other space/time path techniques include probabilistic routing and location-
aided routing. Probabilistic routing techniques [11] are more relevant for the Data 
Synchroniser component than for GMDM’s metadata propagation. In location-
aided routing [12] route discovery is optimised by utilising the nodes’ GPS posi-
tions. Since we cannot in general rely on the use of GPS, e.g., inside buildings and 
in train tunnels, we have to base our core solutions on the absence of such services.  
11.4 Metadata Propagation 
For the design of metadata propagation protocols we use ideas from epidemic rout-
ing. To propagate metadata throughout a network partition, each node is required 
to act in a router-like fashion and pass on metadata to other nodes. This can be 
done by repeatedly synchronising metadata contents of pairs of neighbour nodes, 
which has the side effect that the nodes in addition to routing metadata informa-
tion, also listen in and can gather metadata for their own purpose. In this section 
we present three metadata propagation protocols. They all share the same node 
synchronisation mechanism and make use of the same kind of triggers for invoking 
the protocol; we therefore first present these elements before proceeding with the 
ideas and details of each protocol. 
11.4.1 Synchronisation 
A core element common to all epidemic routing algorithms, is how pairs of nodes 
synchronize their message buffers, or in our case, metadata contents. A basic pro-
tocol that is used in e.g. [10], works as follows: (i) Node A makes an overview (a 
hash) of its metadata items. A sends the hash to node B. (ii) Node B sends back 
the metadata items that B has, but that are not mentioned in the hash from A, 
plus a list of the items that B requires from A to get a complete set. (iii) Node A 
responds with the items required by B. This protocol works well when there are 
differences between the nodes. At rediscovery of an already synchronised node, 
some communication is needed to identify this situation.  
11.4.2 Triggers 
We use local triggers at a node to invoke appropriate sub-protocol instances. Trig-
gers are needed (1) on the event of a new table replica being created locally, (2) 
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when a new one-hop neighbour appears, and (3) when new metadata is received 
from another node as a part of follow-up actions on events (1) and (2) elsewhere in 
the network. The Data Allocator sub-component fires a trigger of type (1) when it 
creates a new table replica locally. As a result a new instance of the metadata 
propagation protocol will be invoked; the actual actions taken depend on the pro-
tocol. Triggers of type (2) allow metadata to propagate further at network merges. 
The CRT component is responsible for reporting the encountering of new 
neighbours. When the trigger is fired, the node will contact the new neighbour and 
synchronise its metadata contents with it. GMDM will itself fire a trigger of type 
(3) when new metadata is received as part of the synchronisation with another 
node. Here too the actual actions taken depend on the protocol. 
11.4.3 Metadata Propagation Protocols 
We now proceed with a description of the three protocols. Further details can be 
found in [13]. 
The Simple Protocol 
Our first protocol is a fairly straight-forward implementation of epidemic routing. 
The protocol will try to pass a node’s metadata items to neighbour nodes in a uni-
cast fashion. The protocol is initiated each time one of the triggers are fired, i.e., at 
the creation of new table replicas locally, at the event of a new neighbour, and at 
the reception of new metadata items from a neighbour. The node in the first case 
approaches all its neighbours, in the second case only its new neighbours, and in 
the third case all neighbours except the one that provided the metadata item. 
The node initiating the protocol (the ’initiator’) starts by sending to each tar-
geted neighbour (the ’listener’) an overview message containing a synopsis of its 
metadata items. The listener responds with a message containing those of its 
metadata items that are not mentioned in the synopsis and that are thus not 
known to the initiator node, and a shortlist of the synopsis indicating which meta-
data items are needed to make its own metadata storage consistent with the initia-
tor’s. If the message is not received by the initiator within a timeout period, the 
protocol logs the result and terminates gracefully. This happens e.g. if the initiator 
moves out of reach before a return message is sent. The initiator concludes by 
sending the requested metadata items. When the requested metadata items are re-
ceived or no message is received within a timeout period, the protocol terminates. 
If no metadata items are requested, this last step is skipped and the protocol is 
terminated directly.  
The Broadcast Protocol 
Epidemic routing uses one-to-one communication between synchronising parties. 
However, in radio networks every node eavesdrops on every message sent within 
its communication range, and then discards messages for which it is not an ad-
dressee. This can be utilised by sending one one-to-many message for getting in 
touch with all neighbours at once, thus reducing the number of messages eaves-
dropped on at non-addressee nodes. In the Broadcast Protocol the initiator node 
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therefore initially broadcasts an overview message. Only those listeners that re-
ceive the overview message and either have additional metadata items or need 
some of the elements, will respond. The initiator will treat each response sepa-
rately and send requested metadata items. If these do not arrive at the listener 
within a time frame, a timeout occurs and the protocol terminates. 
If there are more than one responder to a broadcast message, the reduction on 
the network load is equivalent to n1 of the Simple Protocol’s overview messages 
both in size and transfer time, where n is the number of responders. 
The Semantic Protocol 
The Broadcast Protocol tends to give a propagation pattern similar to that of a 
stone thrown into a pond with islands (nodes). In general the outskirts of the net-
work partition get new metadata last. Thus, if the network tends to be brittle at 
the edges, nodes breaking away from the partition may not get new metadata in 
time to carry it with them to other partitions. To break this propagation pattern 
we have developed the Semantic Protocol, where the idea is to do a broadcast 
propagation from multiple points in the network simultaneously. These points can 
be chosen in different ways, e.g., nodes that have few connections to other nodes in 
the network, or hot spot nodes. A more general approach is to construct the group 
of such nodes from information about semantically related nodes, e.g. the group 
consisting of all rescue team leaders. Theoretically this will give group members 
higher dissemination priority. As a side effect it gives multiple starting points for 
the remaining dissemination process and potentially faster overall dissemination; 
for instance, if the network is about to partition, the dissemination may reach 
some of the partitioning nodes in time to allow the dissemination to spread into 
other partitions. 
The two phases of the Semantic Protocol propagation are (i) group synchroni-
sation and (ii) neighbour synchronisation. In the first phase the initiator node syn-
chronises with each of the group members by using multi-hop routing. In the sec-
ond phase each of the group members independently starts up the Broadcast Pro-
tocol, and the group members consequently work in parallel on propagating 
changes.  
11.5 Test Setup 
Proof-of-concept applications that use the MIDAS prototype furnished with the 
broadcast protocol have been successfully exposed to field tests. In this paper, 
however, we present quantitative, reproducible results from tests using NEMAN 
[2], an environment that emulates the communication layers of the network stack 
in MANETs.  
11.5.1 Metrics 
We need suitable metrics to measure (i) correctness, i.e., that the protocol dis-
seminates metadata to all nodes, and (ii) communication cost, i.e., the network 
load. 
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To test the correctness of the protocols we set up scenarios that each act out a 
well-defined dissemination phase which will be the subject of post analysis of each 
protocol. The number of table replicas that will be created in each scenario, is 
known in advance. Also known a priori is which metadata items should be stored 
at each node when the dissemination phase is completed. Thus, one measure is the 
metadata count, the accumulated number of metadata items stored throughout the 
network. To see how propagation proceeds, we can look at how the metadata 
count evolves over time. Since the number of propagated metadata items at each 
node is well-defined for stable states, we can use the metadata count to detect 
when a dissemination phase begins and completes. 
Possible metrics for evaluating the strain that the protocols put on the net-
work, are the message count—the number of protocol messages sent, and the mes-
sage size—the accumulated number of bytes in messages sent. For measuring 
bandwidth, the message size is a more accurate measure than the message count. 
We shall see in Subsection 11.6.1 that the message count reflects fairly well the 
message size. Since the message count is much simpler to record than the message 
size, we use the message count throughout our measurements. 
11.5.2 Test Scenarios 
To expose the behaviour of the protocols we employ four test scenarios, two 
static—the Chain and Grid scenarios—where the network’s connectivity remains 
unchanged after a start-up phase, to test basic functionality and behaviour of the 
protocols, and two dynamic—the Merge and Message Ferry scenarios—to test 
network partitioning and merge. At start-up every MIDAS node contains a table 
replica used for bookkeeping purposes. Since metadata about these initial replicas 
will spread throughout a network partition as part of the ordinary metadata 
propagation, after a start-up phase the metadata count will be m2 where m is the 
number of nodes in the partition. Likewise, a table replica creation at a node will 
in time cause the number of metadata items to increase by one at every node in 
the partition, giving a total of m(m+1) metadata items. For the static test scenar-
ios we inject a new table replica into one node in the network to trigger such a dis-
semination phase. For the dynamic scenarios it is sufficient to study the dissemina-
tion phase triggered by network merge and consisting of further propagation of the 
initial metadata items as a result of the merge. The four test scenarios are:  
[Chain] The chain protocol represents a worst case scenario wrt. connectivity 
and number of hops. During the start-up phase 10 nodes form a chain where all in-
ternal nodes have exactly two neighbours within direct communication range. Ini-
tial metadata information is then exchanged throughout the chain. After 35s the 
leftmost node creates a new table replica. Metadata for this replica is then propa-
gated throughout the chain according to the protocols. In the Semantic Protocol 
the second and next to last nodes form a group.  
[Grid] The grid scenario exposes scalability properties of the protocols. In this 
scenario 54 nodes form a grid where each inner node has exactly four neighbours 
within direct communication range. After 60s node 1 creates a new table replica. 
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In the Semantic Protocol two of the nodes neighbouring the main diagonal’s corner 
nodes, form a group.  
[Merge] The purpose of this scenario is to stress the message trigger load. It 
consists of two network partitions that move towards each other, get in contact at 
60s, and continue to move until they totally overlap. At the end of the scenario all 
nodes have new neighbours. Each partition consists of a 33 grid where all nodes 
in a partition are within direct communication range of each other. In the Seman-
tic Protocol the two nodes forming the group initially belong to different partitions 
and are not the ones that meet at the first encounter during the merge. Each of 
the partitions keep their original intra-node formation throughout the merge.  
[Message ferry] This scenario introduces a network partition followed by a 
merge. It consists of two static partitions of 7 and 10 nodes respectively, and a 
ferry node moving from within the 7-node to the 10-node partition. After an initial 
phase the ferry starts moving, collecting metadata from the first partition as it 
moves. It loses connectivity with the 7-node partition at 40s and connects with the 
10-node partition at 47s, stopping only after reaching the opposite side of its entry 
point. In the Semantic Protocol the ferry and the centre of the 10-node partition 
form a group. 
11.6 Test Results 
Table 11.1 shows for each test scenario and protocol the average number of proto-
col-related messages sent from a node during the dissemination phase of the sce-
nario. Also, for comparison we include the average number of messages addressed 
to and received by each node, i.e., messages actually received by the CRT compo-
nent and forwarded by it to the MDS component. We will comment on the results 
in Table 11.1 as part of the discussion in Subsection 11.6.2. 
Table 11.1: Message count during the dissemination phase 
Test Protocol Avg. no. of Avg. no. of 
scenario  msgs sent msgs received 
 Simple 29,1  25,3 
Chain Broadcast  4,6   2,8 
 Semantic  3,1   4,7 
 Simple 62,5  57,0 
Grid Broadcast  3,1   6,2 
 Semantic  3,7   6,8 
 Simple 48,1  48,1 
Merge Broadcast 18,6 185,9 
 Semantic 29,0  44,5 
 Simple 21,8  21,8 
Ferry Broadcast  3,8  17,7 
 Semantic  6,6  12,1 
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11.6.1 Comparison of Metrics 
Since the message count obviously at best is an approximation to the message size, 
we have performed a comparison of the message count and message size to see how 
well the former reflects the latter. 
We have obtained message sizes during the dissemination phases of each sce-
nario by doing post analysis on TCP dumps. The start of the dissemination phase 
is identified by looking for control packets from the emulator GUI in NEMAN, to 
find for the static scenarios when the new table replica was introduced during the 
scenario, and for the dynamic scenarios when the first message is sent between the 
two first nodes that encounter each other during the network merge. We have then 
added up all packet lengths, excluding routing daemon traffic and control packets. 
Table 11.2 displays the results. 
Table 11.2: Traffic measured during the dissemination phase 
Test 
scenario 
Protocol Bytes sent 
 Simple 563727 
Chain Broadcast 22115 
 Semantic 30188 
 Simple 2693948 
Grid Broadcast 53895 
 Semantic 76641 
 Simple 731260 
Merge Broadcast 360067 
 Semantic 494226 
 Simple 359102 
Ferry Broadcast 68983 
 Semantic 71226 
 
 
Figure 11.1 shows the relationship between message count and message size, 
with message size and message count on the left and right y-axes respectively. In 
general the numbers indicate that the message count is a fair measure of the num-
ber of bytes transferred. Two notable exceptions are in the chain scenario, where 
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Figure 11.1: Relationship between message count and message size 
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the Broadcast Protocol sends more bytes and fewer messages than the Semantic 
Protocol, and in the merge scenario, where the Broadcast and Semantic Protocols 
have about the same byte count, but the Broadcast Protocol uses less messages 
than the Semantic protocol. In both cases the Broadcast protocol tends to send 
fewer but larger messages than the Semantic Protocol. Thus a comparison of the 
Broadcast and Semantic protocols based merely on message count is in general 
slightly misleading. Still the message count gives an indication of the active use of 
bandwidth, thus a reduction in the message count tends to correspond to a reduc-
tion in the message size. 
11.6.2 Dissemination Results 
Figures 11.2-11.5 show how the metadata counts and message counts evolve 
throughout the scenarios for the different protocols. The x-axes show the number 
of seconds from the start of the protocol. The y-axes display the counts. As the 
graphs show, each scenario has an initial phase after which the two counts stabi-
lise. This is followed by the dissemination phase, after which the counts again sta-
bilise. In the discussions below we analyse only the dissemination phase. 
We have included in the graphs the metadata counts for all protocols even 
though they are not easily distinguishable from each other in the figures. Still they 
show that the metadata counts in each case reach the predicted level, demonstrat-
ing that the metadata is disseminated properly. The metadata counts reach their 
final level before the message counts do, i.e., the actual dissemination phases end 
before the message exchange completes. 
In the chain scenario (Figure 11.2) the Simple Protocol during the dissemina-
tion phase sends 9 times more messages than the Semantic Protocol and more than 
6 times more than the Broadcast Protocol (cf. Table 11.1). These numbers are 
supported by the number of bytes transferred (Table 11.2). The Broadcast Proto-
col sends more messages but uses less bandwidth than the Semantic Protocol. The 
reason might be that the Broadcast Protocol requires the use of more overview 
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
chain
broadcast message count
broadcast metadata count
simple message count
simple metadata count
semantic message count
semantic metadata count
 
Figure 11.2: Chain scenario 
message and metadata count 
 0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
 5000
 6000
 7000
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140
grid
broadcast message count
broadcast metadata count
simple message count
simple metadata count
semantic message count
semantic metadata count
 
Figure 11.3: Grid scenario 
message and metadata count 
132 Information Sharing in MANETs: Metadata Management in the MDS 
messages than the Semantic protocol, which means that the Semantic Protocol’s 
multiple starting points for broadcasting in this case is more efficient than plain 
broadcast wrt. redundant overview messages. We expected the Semantic Protocol 
to use more bandwidth than the Broadcast protocol; the chain scenario confirms 
this.  
In the grid scenario (Figure 11.3) the Simple Protocol displays its worst per-
formance of all scenarios, both in terms of absolute numbers and relatively to the 
other two protocols. This is supported by the byte count in Table 11.2. The 
Broadcast and Semantic protocols display almost the same message counts, the 
Semantic Protocol being slightly higher. They show almost the same ratio as in the 
chain scenario wrt. the number of bytes transferred. The differences in the message 
counts reflect how the protocols handle high connectivity. In this scenario the av-
erage connectivity is 3.2 neighbours, thus the broadcasting of overview messages in 
the Broadcast and Semantic protocols shows its advantage. We had expected the 
Semantic Protocol to show a gain over the Broadcast Protocol in terms of message 
count, this was not confirmed; to reveal such a gain we may need a scenario with a 
larger distance between the group members. It is however difficult to obtain larger 
scenarios in NEMAN due to the use of Java in the project, which puts a limit on 
the number of nodes to 30–50.  
Figure 11.4 displays the results of the merge scenario. This is the scenario with 
the highest neighbour ratio; during the merge phase the massive connection 
changes stress the triggers. It is also the scenario where the difference between the 
Simple Protocol and the others is lowest. Another noticeable result is the high 
number of messages received in the Broadcast protocol (cf. Table 11.1). This is a 
direct effect of the high neighbour ratio, which causes each broadcast message to 
contribute to a high received message count. It also causes an increase in dissemi-
nation paths, and as a consequence, an increase in redundant overview messages. 
We had expected the Broadcast Protocol to display relatively lower bandwidth 
than the others, instead the differences are less than in the other scenarios. 
The ferry scenario (Figure 11.5) is actually a three-phase scenario consisting of 
an initial phase where each partition stabilises, a disconnection phase where the 
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ferry leaves the smaller partition (this phase does not affect the counts), and a 
merge phase when the ferry enters the larger partition. In this scenario the Seman-
tic Protocol sends almost twice as many messages as the Broadcast protocol; this 
is a difference not seen equally well in the other scenarios. The byte costs are how-
ever almost the same for the two protocols. 
11.6.3 Group Dissemination Results 
The Semantic Protocol does in general not show an improvement to the Broadcast 
Protocol. However, it is still of interest whether the Semantic Protocol gives a dis-
semination priority to the group members. For this purpose we have investigated 
the relative dissemination speeds of the nodes in each scenario for the Semantic 
Protocol. In Figure 11.6 we provide the results in case of the merge and ferry sce-
narios. The y-axes show the message count on a per node basis during the dissemi-
nation phase. In the merge scenario the two group members (nodes 1 and 10) 
originally belong to different partitions and are not the first to be involved in the 
merge process. They receive all new metadata from one message, which explains 
the direct jump from metadata count 9 to 18. Node 10 (shown with a bold line) is 
the last of the group to reach its new metadata count, but does so well before most 
of the other nodes. In the ferry scenario the ferry (represented by the line that 
jumps from count 8 to count 18) is part of the group; the other group member 
(node 2, shown with a bold line) belongs to the partition into which the ferry 
merges. Even though the ferry carries all new metadata, it still does no reach its 
new metadata count until the other group member does, and only slightly before 
the rest of the nodes complete. The reason is that the ferry completes all of the 
protocol, including the broadcasting phase, before it performs any local updates. 
The figure confirms that inter-group dissemination gives a priority to the group 
members in the merge and ferry scenarios. In the two static protocols the group 
members show no improvement over the other nodes (graphs are not included). 
11.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
We have designed, implemented and performed some initial measurements of three 
protocols for metadata propagation in MANETs. The protocols were designed un-
der the assumption that all nodes store and maintain all globally shared metadata; 
the choice of metadata is however made carefully to keep the amount small. In 
general the Broadcast Protocol shows the best performance results. The Semantic 
Protocol is comparable to the Broadcast protocol, but in addition provides dis-
semination priority to a group of nodes. The Simple Protocol, a straight-forward 
implementation of epidemic routing, scales considerably worse than the other two. 
The correlation between network topology characteristics and dissemination pat-
terns has to be analysed further to see how the dissemination pattern changes with 
the protocol and topology.  
An issue that remains to be studied, is the impact of broadcast storms [14]. 
Some redundant broadcasts are avoided because each node considers its already 
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stored metadata before deciding whether to broadcast received metadata to further 
nodes. Even so the protocols perform a number of redundant messaging, thus 
techniques that enhance performance, like back-off timers, distance from the origi-
nal broadcaster, and cluster-based techniques, should be considered. In addition, 
contention and collisions remain a problem. The protocols are also not fail-proof in 
the presence of message loss. We might introduce an additional trigger that occa-
sionally floods metadata; on the other hand, allowing a certain amount of redun-
dant metadata propagation might be sufficient to cover for lost messages. Thus 
one should balance between optimizing on redundant rebroadcasts and robustness 
against lost messages. 
All protocols have been implemented in the middleware layer. Moving some of 
the functionality into OLSR might prove an advantage, for instance to utilise 
OLSR’s overlay network to speed up dissemination. 
A major factor in determining the size of the metadata storage at each node is 
the number of shared table replicas. The size of each metadata item is small; in 
average the size at each node will be in the range of only a few kilobytes and thus 
remains manageable even on resource-weak devices. 
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Abstract: Information sharing in dynamic mobile ad-hoc networks is a challenging 
task. High data availability in the presence of short and long term disconnections 
can be obtained by replicating shared data. The number of replicas must however 
be balanced against the cost of consistency management. In the MIDAS Data 
Space (MDS) we use optimistic replication together with internal versioning of 
data; this allows application-specific conflict resolution when reconciling replicas at 
network mergings. We have made a proof-of-concept implementation to perform 
experiments and to demonstrate through real-life field tests the usefulness of our 
design. In this paper we report our results. We have conducted a number of ex-
periments on a small network formed by real devices to obtain a detailed perform-
ance evaluation. Using an emulation environment we have analysed and quantified 
the cost of consistency management, the impact of MDS operations, and the rela-
tionship between data availability and replication. 
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12.1 Introduction 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) can provide a useful basis for data sharing in 
dynamic scenarios such as emergency operations or larger sports events. The main 
objective of the MIDAS project [2] is to define and implement a platform to sim-
plify and speed up the task of developing and deploying highly specialised mobile 
services for such scenarios, where networks may consist of a variety of devices with 
regards to available resources. One central element of this platform is MIDAS 
Data Space (MDS [4]) for asynchronous information sharing. MDS is designed to 
work on mobile devices that together form potentially highly dynamic and unsta-
ble MANETs. MDS provides to its users a programming interface that allows the 
applications to use SQL operations towards the data space. MDS users can create 
tables, insert data, update data, delete data, and retrieve data without caring 
where the data is physically stored. As such it resembles a distributed relational 
database over MANETs. Internally, MDS addresses the various challenges that 
arise from the need to realise this transparency over dynamic MANETs. Especially 
the possibility of short term and long term disconnections (i.e., network partitions) 
introduces hard problems, like guaranteeing high availability of data through op-
timistic replication and managing the consistency of replicas. In order to enable 
application-specific conflict resolution, a major design decision for MDS is to per-
form internally versioning of data instead of updating data. 
One important result of the MIDAS project is the proof-of-concept (POC) im-
plementation of the MIDAS platform and of two demo applications that demon-
strate through real-life field tests the usefulness of these results. Therefore, the 
main goal of the MDS POC implementation is to provide a stable working plat-
form for higher level MIDAS components and applications. All MDS core concepts, 
including metadata management, optimistic replication, versioning etc., are im-
plemented in this prototype. To keep the necessary implementation effort at an 
acceptable level, we have chosen to implement simplified solutions for some design 
alternatives; this clearly leaves some space for improvement. 
On the conceptual level, systems related to MDS include information systems 
for disruptive environments, like Bayou [8], ROAM [7] and DHTR [9]. All of these 
also use optimistic replication. A detailed comparison of these related systems and 
MDS can be found in our earlier work describing the MDS architecture [4] and the 
MDS approach of versioning and consistency management [5]. The purpose of this 
paper is to report on the use of the MDS POC implementation for a detailed per-
formance evaluation of a real system. This evaluation comprises experiments with 
real devices forming smaller networks, in order to gain real performance numbers, 
such as response times of local and remote MDS operations, the impact of different 
devices on the performance, and the overhead introduced by the versioning ap-
proach. Furthermore, we use an emulation environment to analyse the efficiency of 
MDS operations and to study and quantify the relationship between availability of 
data, number of replications, and costs of consistency management. These experi-
ments are performed with different MANET topologies to also understand the im-
pact of mobility, number of neighbours, and connection loss. 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 12.2, we briefly de-
scribe the main parts of the MDS design and provide some concrete examples of 
how versioning and synchronisation are carried out. The MDS prototype imple-
mentation is described in Section 12.3. In Section 12.4 we present our testing ap-
proach, scenarios and metrics, and present and discuss the results. Concluding re-
marks are given in Section 12.5. 
12.2 MDS Design 
From the point of view of the applications, MDS has been designed to resemble as 
much as possible a relational database. However, due to the nature of sparse 
MANETs, MDS imposes some distinctive differences compared to a traditional re-
lational database system. 
The data in the MDS data space is physically distributed across the network. 
Ideally, every application, regardless of the node it resides on and where the data 
is actually stored, should have the same view of the data. However, in the presence 
of disruptive and unstable networks, not all nodes might be available all the time. 
To obtain higher data availability, MDS can replicate existing tables, which means 
that replicas must be kept synchronised in order to provide the same view to all 
applications. Applications in different network partitions may however experience 
different data if each partition contains a replica and updates its contents inde-
pendently. If two partitions later merge, it is not always obvious if and how data 
can be synchronised. To allow application-specific conflict resolution, MDS sup-
ports versioning. Versioning implies that no data is actually updated. Instead, a 
new version is created and the previous version is marked as updated. Likewise, no 
data is actually deleted, but instead only marked as deleted. Applications can 
choose whether or not to have a transparent view on data versioning: unless ex-
plicitly stated otherwise, only the currently valid versions are returned within a re-
sult set (see Section 12.2.2 for details on record types). When MDS receives a 
query from an application, it first rewrites the query to support versioning, and 
then sends it to the appropriate location(s), either directly to the database on the 
local node, or as a remote query if the table in question is stored remotely. 
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12.2.1 Architecture 
The MDS architecture, including the interaction between its sub-components, is 
shown in Figure 12.1. The Query Analyser (QA) is the façade component of MDS 
and receives queries from the applications or from other MIDAS components (col-
lectively referred to as MDS users). In the network, there may exist one or more 
replicas of a certain table. The Data Allocator (DA) initiates the allocation and de-
allocation of table replicas. Information about the whereabouts of these replicas is 
stored in a shared metadata table which is maintained at every node. It is the task 
of the Global MetaData Manager (GMDM) to keep this table up-to-date by 
propagating new metadata information and synchronising metadata tables after a 
network merging [3]. The Data Synchroniser (DS) makes sure that data in repli-
cated tables is also synchronised. Additionally, MDS has a subscription-notification 
functionality taken care of by the Subscription Manager (SM). SM alerts MDS us-
ers via registered callback functions when some change in data matches a stored 
subscription. 
12.2.2 Versioning 
When an application wants to update a record already present in the database, say 
of a patient, instead of altering the data of the original record, MDS inserts a new 
version of the record, and the original record is marked as Updated. The automati-
cally generated ID field is used to find versions of the same record and is kept un-
changed when new versions are created. However, it could happen that two 
INSERT operations concerning the same patient are performed independently at 
two different nodes if the nodes are not within reach of each other at that moment. 
These records are then assigned different values in their ID field and are from the 
MDS’ point of view two unrelated records. An application that wants to supersede 
this can define a query that allows MDS to perform a simple conflict resolution on 
its behalf, e.g., for a patient with a given name to choose the valid record with the 
latest timestamp. Most applications will only be interested in valid record versions, 
in such cases the other versions are preserved for auditing purposes. Applications 
can however choose to have invalid versions included in the result sets from que-
ries, for instance to do conflict resolution themselves. 
Versioning requires a rewriting of queries and execution of additional queries to 
the database. In the current implementation, rewriting is done in the following 
manner: 
INSERT   SELECTM + SELECTS + INSERT 
SELECTn   SELECTM + SELECTn 
UPDATEn   SELECTM + SELECTn+ UPDATEn + n*(INSERT + SELECTS) 
DELETEn  SELECTM + UPDATEn 
An index “M” denotes a query on the metadata table (to find the IDs of nodes 
that store replicas of the table), an index “S” is a query on the subscription table 
(to check for any subscriptions on data changes), while “n” denotes the actual 
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number of processed data records (i.e., records in the result set in case of a 
SELECT statement, or records updated in case of an UPDATE). 
As an example, an UPDATE statement where 100 records are updated, will 
within the MDS produce the following set of queries: 
 one SELECT operation on the metadata table, to find the location(s) of the 
table replica 
 one SELECT finding and returning the 100 records 
 one UPDATE operation marking the 100 records as invalid (i.e. “Updated”) 
 100 INSERT operations, one for each of the new versions to be inserted 
 100 SELECT operations on the subscription table, one for each newly in-
serted record 
12.2.3 Synchronization 
Synchronisation of replicated tables is done using two mechanisms: eager synchro-
nisation and lazy synchronisation. An INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE request to-
wards a replicated table is instantly (eagerly) sent to all nodes having a replica of 
the table after first consulting the metadata table to find the IDs of all such nodes. 
However, this may not be sufficient due to: a) network partitions, b) lost messages, 
and c) not entirely up-to-date information in the metadata table, e.g. due to a re-
cent network merging whose effects have not yet reached this node. Therefore, lazy 
synchronisation is performed periodically among neighbours, and it is also trig-
gered by the presence of new nodes in the network. 
12.3 Prototype Implementation 
The MIDAS middleware has been realised as a proof-of-concept implementation in 
two versions: POC 0.5 and POC 1.0. Implementation decisions about software us-
age, hardware platform and implementation environment were done based on the 
application domain and scenarios, but also more pragmatic considerations related 
to the fact that the development was carried out by different European partners. 
The software platform used is Linux and Java. For some of the MIDAS com-
ponents C++ code is also used. The hardware platforms we target are small, port-
able devices running Linux, although more powerful devices might be present as 
well. In our experiments, both laptops and various handheld devices were used. 
A third party database is used within the Local Storage component. In order 
to choose a database, we made a list of requirement and picked candidates that 
fulfilled these for further experiments; a) small footprint, b) relational, c) support 
for standard SQL, and d) must be able to run on small devices. We tested the fol-
lowing databases: H2, Sqlite, HSQLDB and MySQL. The most interesting metrics 
for us are the time to load/start the database and the time to perform the different 
queries. The testing of the four databases was performed among others on three 
generations of Nokia Internet tablets, namely Nokia 770 (252 MHz), N800 (330 
MHz), and N810 (400 MHz). 
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The experiment consisted of running respectively 1 or 100 single INSERT 
statements, followed by 1 SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE statement that processed 
the newly inserted row(s). 
Figure 12.2 shows that HSQLDB and MySQL in general have the lowest re-
sponse time. Having a very small footprint, and without need for compiling (which 
is an important factor when deploying on resource-weak devices), HSQLDB was 
chosen as the underlying database when evaluating the MDS prototype. Even 
though these measurements were not strictly measurements of MDS itself, we in-
clude them in this paper as they might be of interest to others in search for a da-
tabase to be run on resource-weak devices. 
12.4 Evaluation 
In this section, we present an in-depth evaluation of the MDS prototype. The pri-
mary goal for this implementation is to serve as a stable working prototype for 
real-life demonstrations. To keep the development efforts at a feasible level, some 
MDS components are implemented in a simplified way and leave space for later 
improvements. For example, MDS sends whole Java objects to remote nodes in-
stead of just the relevant data. To compensate for the higher bandwidth consump-
tion in our evaluation, we compress the Java object before sending, and decom-
press it at the recipient. The secondary goal for the MDS prototype is to enable a 
detailed performance analysis of a real implementation with real devices, to iden-
tify bottlenecks and options for improvements. The insights of this evaluation are 
not only interesting for MDS developers, but also for middleware designers in gen-
eral that focus on solutions for mobile networks. 
Methodology 
The dynamic nature of MANETs and the heterogeneity of devices represent a high 
complexity for the performance evaluation of MDS and the analysis of its results. 
We briefly describe the main factors of complexity and our general approach to 
considering them in the evaluation. The main factors we focus on here are: a) 
nodes, b) network, c) workload, and d) application requirements. 
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Figure 12.2: Start-up times on Nokia N800 and N810, and query times on N810 
12.4 Evaluation 143 
Using multiple nodes in experiments obviously increases the efforts needed for 
start-up, coordination, and post-gathering of results. In addition, the project as-
sumes a variety of devices present in the network, often with different physical ca-
pabilities, resources and configurations. In our experiments, we varied both the 
number of nodes and the types of devices. 
The assumed network is characterised through different mobility scenarios, 
stable and unstable connectivity, network partitions, and message loss. Therefore, 
we ran experiments on static networks, mobile networks without partitions, and 
mobile networks with partitions. To model static networks we used two topologies, 
first a mesh network with nodes randomly distributed in an area, and second an 
artificial worst case scenario for message propagation, i.e., a chain network where 
all nodes are lined up in a chain with a distance between the nodes such that each 
node has at most two neighbours (which is much less than the average number of 
neighbours in the mesh network). 
All applications running on the nodes, including the MIDAS demo applica-
tions, produce a certain workload which in most cases varies and depends on the 
situation. In order to systematically study the MDS properties, in our experiments 
we use a synthetic workload. Two types of queries that span out the basic func-
tionality, and thus workload, are INSERT (putting data into the database) and 
SELECT (retrieving data from the database), performed in different ratios. An-
other issue that is closely tied to the mix of applications used and their require-
ments, is the trade-off between performance and resource utilisation on one hand, 
and availability of information and reliability of the whole system on the other 
hand. By changing the above-mentioned parameters, we aim to get some insight 
into how they could be tuned to meet certain application requirements and at 
what cost. 
There are three main options for performing experiments to evaluate the per-
formance of the MDS prototype. These are simulation, emulation and real-life test 
beds. Simulation is often used because it allows running larger scale networks in 
non-real-time, repeating experiments, and reproducing results. The downside of 
simulation is that code needs to be written specifically for the chosen simulator. 
Emulation, in contrast to simulation, makes it possible to use the very same code 
that runs on real devices, in a simulated and reproducible network environment. 
Processes run in real time, making the server or servers’ resources an important 
factor, and limiting the size of tested networks. Still, emulation gives a good in-
sight into whether the written code would work as expected in a real network. 
Moving the code onto target devices and running in a real network is the type of 
experiment giving the most realistic results. However, the person efforts and hard-
ware costs involved in performing such field tests are very high. In addition, nei-
ther the network movements nor results can be easily reproduced. 
In order to benefit from the different advantages of these options, we use the 
two approaches of emulation and real-life test beds, and use in both of them the 
same MDS code. For studies of how the implementation behaves locally, as well as 
for smaller static networks consisting of up to 3 nodes, we use real devices. For 
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networks of 10 nodes, both static and with introduced mobility, we use the net-
work emulator NEMAN [6]. In this particular environment, all nodes run on a sin-
gle machine, as separate processes each connected to its own virtual network inter-
face. The processes themselves run the very same implementation as on the real 
devices. While being a good choice for testing functionality and behaviour in a 
network, it would not make sense to measure response time in such an environ-
ment as it is very dependent on the server’s resources. 
 
The experiments described in the remainder of this section are each designed to 
answer one of the following questions: 
1. What is the general overhead introduced by MDS, and more specifically, in-
troduced by data versioning? 
2. How does MDS perform on different devices/platforms, locally and in a real 
network? 
3. How do network and distribution affect the overall performance of the ser-
vice? 
4. How do different network topologies and network disruptions influence the 
availability of the service? 
To answer these questions, the metrics we use in this performance evaluation 
are: 1) overhead that MDS introduces by being a layer between the applications 
and the local database, quantified by relating response times of MDS operations to 
direct operations in HSQLDB, 2) response time for operations (both local and re-
mote), 3) resource consumption in the network, measured in number of packets 
and bandwidth usage, and 4) availability of the service, measured in the number of 
successful application queries. 
 
One metric that has not been taken into account, is the disk usage. It is as-
sumed that the devices’ storage is not a bottleneck. The rationale for this assump-
tion is the expected amount of data that can be generated within the limited time 
spans imposed by the targeted scenarios. A fact that supports this is that the size 
of available memory cards constantly increases while they at the same time be-
come less expensive. 
 
Table 12.1: Results of the MDS overhead experiments 
 
Command F 1 F 2 
INSERT 5.4 26.8 
SELECT1 5.9 8.0 
SELECT1000 5.4 5.8 
UPDATE1 5.5 15.5 
UPDATE1000 5.0 145.5 
DELETE1 9.8 25.2 
DELETE1000 1.2 10.7 
Average 5.5 33.9 
)_(_
)_(_1
setrewrittentimeHSQLDB
setrewrittentimeMDSF   
 
)_(_
)_(_2
operationoriginaltimeHSQLDB
setrewrittentimeMDSF 
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12.4.1 MDS overhead 
To answer the first question, we performed experiments on a single Nokia N810 
Internet tablet and compared time needed for a single local database query to 
HSQLDB directly and through MDS. Table 12.1 shows the results for 1000 re-
cords. An index “1” or “1000” denotes how many records were processed by the 
particular operation. The difference between the two cases is caused by the initial 
overhead for each query, which is negligible for queries that process a large amount 
of records. 
12.4.2 Performance experiments on physical devices 
The next set of experiments aimed at answering the second question concerning 
MDS’ performance on different types of physical devices, both locally and over the 
network. This due to the fact that in both case scenarios for the MIDAS project (a 
sports event and an emergency operation) it is assumed that the network will con-
sist of a variety of devices with regards to available resources. In these experiments 
we used three different devices: a) Nokia N810, an Internet tablet running Linux 
and the Cacao JVM (400 MHz, 128 MB RAM, 2 GB Flash), b) Zypad WL1100, a 
wrist wearable device running Linux and J9 JVM (400MHz, 64 MB RAM, miniSD 
card), and c) a portable PC running Windows and J2SE JVM, (1.66 GHz, 2 GB 
RAM, hard disk).  
First, we run local queries to see how the devices perform independently. Table 
12.3 shows the average times when querying the database for 1 and 100 records re-
spectively. 
Next, we run queries over a network consisting of the same three devices, using 
802.11 in infrastructure mode for easier access. Table 12.2 shows the average times 
for each source/destination combination. The four numbers in each cell represent 
the times for INSERT / SELECT1 / UPDATE1 / DELETE1 respectively.  
In general, N810 performed worst whenever network communication was in-
volved, while for local queries it outperformed Zypad. The results show that in this 
particular mixed environment, the average time for a single remote query lies 
around 240 ms.  
As it can be seen, the cost of performing remote operations is very high com-
pared to local operations, giving an increase factor from 5 to 15, thus the applica-
Table 12.2: Results for network queries 
(in milliseconds) 
Dst  
Src  
N810 Zypad PC 
N810 - 391, 173, 505, 191 166, 120, 287, 91 
Zypad 358, 122, 616, 151 - 174, 91, 263, 121 
PC 371, 94, 475, 277 188, 94, 319, 89 - 
 
Table 12.3: Results for local que-
ries (in milliseconds) 
Command N810 Zypad PC 
INSERT 146 74 2 
SELECT1 27 35 11 
SELECT100 44 49 11 
UPDATE1 60 142 23 
UPDATE100 4500 3600 300 
DELETE1 14 67 12 
DELETE100 47 117 0 
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tions’ usage pattern should be carefully monitored when deciding on which node or 
nodes table replicas should be placed. 
12.4.3 Emulation experiments on a static network 
All emulation experiments were performed on networks consisting of 10 nodes. All 
queries target a single table. We varied the number of available replicas of this ta-
ble from 1 to 10. In addition, there is one shared subscription table always present 
on all nodes. When no nodes have a replica at the beginning, the results are un-
predictable as in the prototype instances are created randomly when needed, de-
pending on which nodes started sending queries first. For that reason, in this sec-
tion we omitted results with 0 initial replicas. All the experiments were run up to 
10 times to verify the consistency of the results. The graphs presented here show 
average values. 
In the following experiments we addressed the third question. We used 
NEMAN’s monitoring channel to see how many packets are being sent between 
MDS instances running on different nodes, as well as how much bandwidth was 
used. Experiments were done both with and without lazy synchronisation being in 
use, to see its impact on the results. 
Figure 12.3 shows how the number of replicas, and thus the amount of data 
needed for synchronisation purposes, affect the network usage in a mesh and a 
chain network (as explained earlier in the Methodology sub-section). The results 
show a constant overhead when lazy synchronisation is present. There is a slight 
increase in network traffic as a consequence of increasing the number of table rep-
licas. The figure also shows that having more neighbours (mesh network) causes 
more traffic, as more synchronisation is present. In this, as well as in the following 
experiments, bandwidth usage follows proportionally the number of packets. For 
that reason, we omit bandwidth usage graphs in the remainder of this section. 
In the next experiment, we used the synthetic workload as described earlier in 
the Methodology sub-section. Ratios between INSERT and SELECT statements 
were varied from 90%/10% to 10%/90%. Figure 12.4 shows separate results for the 
mesh and the chain network. As expected, having more direct neighbours in the 
mesh network increased the probability of finding data on a closer node and, con-
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Figure 12.3: Network traffic during the initialisation process  
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sequently the overall traffic in the network was reduced. Results also show that 
the usage pattern is an important factor when optimising the number of table rep-
licas in the network. We can see that with a SELECT ratio that was high enough 
(approximately 10% for the mesh network and 40% for the chain network), an in-
creased number of instances led to reduced network traffic, as the probability of 
finding a local replica increased. On the other hand, when the usage pattern con-
sisted mostly of inserting data (50% or more), having more replicas only increased 
the amount of data being replicated in the network, without giving real benefit 
(except for very disruptive networks where this would pay off by increasing avail-
ability). 
12.4.4 Emulation experiments on a mobile network 
In order to answer the fourth and last question, we introduced mobility to see 
what impact changes in a node’s neighbourhood have on packet loss. Within 
NEMAN the OLSR [1] routing protocol is used. Being a proactive routing protocol, 
OLSR generates periodic traffic (HELLO messages) to let the neighbouring nodes 
know about its presence. If a node suddenly does not hear HELLO messages from 
one of its neighbours, it assumes that the node might be out of reach. However, 
since the packet might just have been lost due to a collision, OLSR will wait for 
some time (i.e. 2-3 lost HELLO messages) before declaring the neighbour gone and 
trying to find a new, indirect route towards it. 
It is in this particular period that MDS is most vulnerable and packet loss may 
occur. One way of reducing these periods of vulnerability might be to reduce the 
interval of HELLO messages. The penalty is increased overall network traffic, and 
thus it should be considered carefully. In a specially targeted experiment, increas-
ing the frequency of HELLO messages from 2 seconds to 1 second gave a minimal 
gain, only reducing the amount of lost packets by 3 (out of a total of 600) at its 
best. Here we focus on packet loss experienced by applications, i.e. failed remote 
queries, while ignoring packet loss at the synchronisation components (GMDM and 
DS), as this is taken care of by the MDS and is transparent to the applications. 
The usage pattern (number of INSERT vs. SELECT operations) proved not to 
be a considerable factor with regards to the packet loss, and results were consis-
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Figure 12.4: Network traffic when workload is added 
(in a mesh and a chain network) 
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tently very similar for these. As expected, one factor that did play a big role in 
packet loss, was the number of table replicas in the network. If only one node has 
a replica, the probability of reaching it in a disruptive network will be much lower 
than if more nodes have it. On the other hand, if all nodes have a replica, all the 
queries will be performed locally and the application will not experience packet loss 
at all, something results shown in Figure 12.5 confirm. 
We ran the experiment on a mobile network having an area of 400x300 m, 
where each of the 10 nodes had a 150 m wireless range. The random waypoint 
model was used for the mobility pattern. The same experiments were performed in 
three different dynamic network topologies. 
In the first topology, there were frequent changes in each node’s neighbour-
hood (a total of 350 route changes in the network were reported during the 60 s 
the scenario was running), but there were no partitions, i.e. all the nodes should 
have been reachable all the time. In the second topology, there was a network split 
for 15 s during which two partitions, each having 5 nodes, could not communicate. 
It can be seen that with a low number of table replicas, and especially when there 
was only one replica, the number of lost packets came to its maximum. By adding 
just one replica into the second partition, the packet loss was notably reduced. In 
the third topology, there were no changes in the nodes’ neighbourhood except for a 
network split similar to the one in the second topology. As a control experiment 
we ran the same scenario with no partitions and no route changes (getting a com-
pletely static network) and, as expected, no packets were lost. 
These results show that a dynamic environment does indeed affect the success-
fulness of the queries. However, the overall number of unsuccessful queries is rela-
tively small compared to the total number of queries (3-5% at most). By having 
knowledge of the application requirements, MDS can adjust the number of replicas 
to achieve a good trade-off between cost and performance. 
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Figure 12.5: Unsuccessful queries due to packet loss  
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12.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented an evaluation of the MDS prototype implementa-
tion. MDS replicates data in order to achieve high availability, in particular in the 
presence of partitioning. Inconsistency of data is handled by not deleting or updat-
ing data but instead storing a new version, and through this providing the applica-
tions the means for imposing their own conflict resolution policies. 
Evaluating a distributed system prototype for use in a disruptive environment 
is a challenging task. We have therefore conducted both field tests and emulation 
experiments. In more detail, we have used a step-by-step approach, first evaluating 
MDS on different single stand-alone devices, then investigating response times for 
remote queries through varying the kind of device sending and receiving the query, 
and finally using network emulations and varying the topology and the application 
workload. In short our findings are as follows: (1) The general overhead, i.e., the 
response time introduced by MDS processing application queries and executing of 
the resulting set of internal queries, gives an average factor of 34. (2) As expected, 
the kinds of devices/platforms used, impact both the local and remote query re-
sponse time, ranging from tens to hundreds of milliseconds. The increase of re-
sponse time of remote queries compared to local queries is between 5 and 15 times. 
(3) By varying the ratio of INSERT and SELECT operations and the number of 
replicas in a static network, we observed an interesting trend revealing what im-
pact the number of replicas has on bandwidth usage and response time. These re-
sults can be used for tuning the number of replicas based on either predicted ap-
plication behaviour or by monitoring the MDS usage at run-time. (4) The avail-
ability of the data was measured by counting the number of unsuccessful queries 
during the experiments. In our test scenarios these vary from 0 to 5%. 
The results presented in this paper show that the choice of data placement is a 
very important factor when considering the resource usage and the applications’ 
perceived quality of the overall system. The results provide a good basis for our 
further work, where we focus on replication strategies that adapt to dynamic 
changes in network topologies. 
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Abstract: The dynamic nature of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) can easily 
lead to data being inaccessible due to constant route changes and network parti-
tions. One method often used for increasing reliability and availability of data is 
replication. However, replication comes with costs, those of transferring and stor-
ing data and keeping track of consistency between replicas. For that reason, we 
have identified the core factors impacting the resulting network traffic. We have 
performed experimental studies with a real world prototype of a distributed data 
management system for MANETs. Furthermore, we have done an extensive simu-
lation study showing where table replicas should be placed in the network, in order 
to minimize network traffic generated by access to the databases and by the syn-
chronization data. The results of the experiments are consistent and show that by 
using clustering techniques we can achieve close-to-optimal traffic by placing repli-
cas on approximately 10 % of nodes. 
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13.1 Introduction 
Replication is a well known method for increasing reliability and availability of 
data. This is especially important in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), where 
the network topology is constantly changing. Moreover, whole groups or nodes 
might detach from the rest of the network, forming their own partitions. By repli-
cating data, we minimize the probability that data is unavailable in such cases. 
However, this comes with costs, those of transferring and storing data multiple 
times, and managing consistency between replicas. 
The MIDAS middleware [2] aims to provide applications an environment for 
sharing data, with special focus on MANETs and their disruptive nature. As part 
of the project, a working prototype of MIDAS has been implemented and used in 
two real world field tests. The MIDAS Data Space (MDS) [12] is a component in 
MIDAS providing a distributed data space, where the actual location of data is 
transparent to the applications. To the applications, MDS looks like a single ordi-
nary relational database, with support for standard SQL queries. In reality, in-
stances of tables (i.e. replicas) are distributed among different nodes in the net-
work, and MDS keeps track of their location. MDS analyzes each query and, when 
necessary, issues remote queries to nodes in the network having a replica of the ta-
bles being queried. 
One important aspect of such a distributed system is replica placement, i.e. to 
decide how many replicas are needed and where they should be placed, something 
MDS is in charge of. Well chosen placement of replicas makes it possible to mini-
mize network traffic and provides robustness and redundancy in case of network 
partitioning. It is therefore important to understand how the MDS access pattern, 
the replica placement, and the network topology impact the network traffic. Bad 
placement of replicas can lead to two problems. First, too few replicas might cause 
read operations being forwarded to distant nodes, or important data not being ac-
cessible due to network partitioning. Second, too many replicas can lead to excess 
synchronization traffic which in turn can cause link saturation and, as a conse-
quence, a part of the network not being usable at all. The same situation can hap-
pen if the locations for replicas are not well chosen. This is especially important for 
write operations, since changes need to be propagated to all replicas. The network 
topology determines the path used for forwarding packets and directly affects 
bandwidth usage and power usage on nodes on the path. However, due to the 
broadcast nature of wireless networks one must not only take the links of the end-
to-end path into account, because all nodes in transmission range of all forwarding 
nodes are also affected. In the measurements performed in this paper, we take into 
account the impact MDS traffic has on nodes in close vicinity to the packets’ end-
to-end paths, something that is often ignored, yet important. Such collateral traffic 
not only uses nodes’ bandwidth, but also other resources such as CPU and, as a 
consequence, battery power.  
In order to perform good replica placement in MDS, i.e. a placement that in-
creases data availability and decreases network traffic and energy consumption, we 
have developed a Traffic Controller for MDS. It monitors the network topology 
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and the applications’ access pattern to MDS in real-time, and makes decisions on 
replica placement based on this information. The current network topology is ac-
quired non-intrusively from the underlying proactive routing protocol. MDS access 
statistics are reported constantly by all nodes hosting replicas. By analyzing access 
statistics and network topology, the Traffic Controller can calculate the costs or 
savings of potential changes in the replica placement, including the cost of trans-
ferring data to replicas. However, these relationships are quite complex and the 
problem space defined by the range of possible access patterns and the range of 
possible network topologies is extremely large. Therefore, we have performed a sys-
tematic, but still extensive empirical study varying the abovementioned factors, to 
determine proper replica placement strategies. 
The results of the experiments are consistent and show that by using clustering 
techniques we can, as a rule, achieve better results than by using random place-
ment. In the cases where workload is not known upfront, we can achieve close-to-
optimal traffic by placing replicas on approximately 10 % of nodes, if chosen cor-
rectly (e.g., by using clustering techniques). We have also analyzed the costs of re-
configuration of clusters, in different cases of adaptation to changes in network to-
pology. The results show clearly that the system should not react blindly to topol-
ogy changes, as it might cause undesired network traffic. Even though this study 
has been made with the MDS implementation, its results are also useful for other 
replication problems in MANETs. To the best of our knowledge, no similar study 
of this complexity or with corresponding insights has been performed yet. Fur-
thermore, we consider in our evaluation the intrinsic property of the broadcast na-
ture of wireless networks, which is ignored in most existing works. Based on the 
evaluation results, we have developed a new approach for further reduction of syn-
chronization traffic, based on a combination of warm standby and caching tech-
niques. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II gives an overview of 
some related work. In Section III, we present shortly the current state of MDS, 
and describe in detail the Traffic Controller mechanism. The methodology used for 
performing the experiments is described in Section IV, followed by a description of 
experiments on static networks in Section V, and mobile networks in Section VI. 
Finally, in Section VII we give a conclusion and present ideas for future work. 
13.2 Related Work 
Existing work on data replication in MANETs typically takes the nodes’ physical 
locations into consideration to determine what group or cluster a node is member 
of and to predict partitioning. In [11], the authors present a comprehensive survey 
of different replication techniques, placing them into five main categories depend-
ing on whether the techniques are power-aware, real-time-aware or partition-
aware. Several techniques ([3], [16], to name a few) take into consideration nodes’ 
physical locations to determine what group or cluster a node is member of, as well 
as for predicting partitioning. Even though physical location can give an indication 
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on nodes’ present and future connectivity, we argue that one must not rely solely 
on this information. Nodes that are physically in close proximity might for various 
reasons (obstacles, traffic congestion, etc.) not have network connectivity at all. In 
addition, target devices might not be equipped with a GPS receiver, and target 
scenarios might be places in locations where GPS signal might not be present (e.g. 
in a large building, tunnel, etc.). Supported by results in [5], we rely in our work 
instead on the actual connectivity for replica placement, as reported by the routing 
protocol. By using clustering techniques based on nodes’ neighborhoods, MDS can 
partially predict partitions and act accordingly. MDS does not support real-time 
transactions, nor does it (in its current implementation) take into consideration 
the nodes’ resources. As such, MDS can be placed into the non-power-aware, non-
real-time-aware and partition-aware category. REDMAN [1] is a middleware for 
managing replicas in dense MANETs, defined as networks where each node has at 
least a certain number of direct neighbors, and where the node density in the de-
ployment area is relatively constant during time. Like in MDS, REDMAN distrib-
utes metadata information about replica placements, however unlike in MDS, it is 
not distributed on all nodes. In [19], the ARAM algorithm and two enhancements 
are presented. The number of hops is used as the main metric of the communica-
tion cost of data access. In ARAM, nodes containing replicas decide locally on rep-
lica placements, based on periodic analysis of information on access from their 
neighbors. Like in MDS, both read and write operations are performed on the clos-
est node, while write operations are then forwarded to all other replicas. Also, like 
in MDS, nodes hosting replicas keep access statistics locally, but unlike MDS, the 
decisions regarding replica placements are done locally in the ARAM family of al-
gorithms. In [18], the same authors present a clustering-based algorithm, where 
nodes’ position and the distance between them are used as the basis for calcula-
tions. The algorithm presented in [17] has a goal similar to ours, i.e., to minimize 
replication cost, given as a compound of several factors, but is developed for static 
networks. 
Another characteristic of MDS distinguishing it from some other systems (such 
as [16]), is the fact that MDS does not make a distinction between a main (often 
called master) copy and secondary ones, i.e., all replicas are treated equally. In 
that respect, MDS can be considered as being a peer-to-peer system. 
13.3 MDS and the Traffic Controller 
As part of the MIDAS project, we developed a working proof-of-concept 
implementation of the MDS. The implementation includes a fully functioning 
metadata managing system [9], data versioning system, subscription and 
notification mechanism, as well as eager and lazy synchronization [14]. Due to time 
constraints, however, only very simplified versions of some of the other sub-
components are present in the implementation. One of them is the Data Allocator 
(DA) sub-component, responsible for placing replicas in the network. In this paper, 
we present a solution for the DA sub-component based on a Traffic Controller 
mechanism. 
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The Traffic Controller (TC) is the node monitoring the network traffic caused 
by MDS usage, and the network topology, to decide where to place replicas; and 
by this how to control the MDS traffic in the network. The core challenge we ad-
dress in this paper is how to determine good placement strategies for the possible 
MDS access patterns and network topologies. It is also important to make sure 
that there is exactly one TC instance in every partition and that all nodes in the 
partition know about it. A detailed description of how to assure this in dynamic 
MANETs is out of the scope of this paper, but we briefly sketch the basic idea of 
our approach. First of all, on all MDS nodes there is a TC instance, but only one 
is supposed to be active in each partition. Since the routing table gives any node in 
each partition a quite good view of the network topology, it is possible to simply 
choose the node with the highest ID to be the TC. The TC announces its presence 
by sending periodic beacons. Incomplete or outdated topology information can lead 
to more than one active TC instance or no instance at all, but both cases are iden-
tified by detecting irregularities in beacon announcements and can be afterwards 
corrected. Please note that the proper functioning of MDS is not depending on the 
TC; fixing a missing TC or too many TCs in one partition only shortly delays the 
possibility to adapt the replica placement. 
Each node having a replica of one or more tables sends periodical messages to 
the TC with its own usage statistics. These data are grouped by tables and source 
nodes, and include the total incoming and outgoing traffic generated by their que-
ries. By putting the usage statistics together with the knowledge about the current 
network topology, the TC can easily calculate the usage of each and every link in 
the network and, as a consequence, choose to do reconfiguration. This would typi-
cally be done in the case a different configuration would cause less bandwidth us-
age. Using the statistical data, the TC node can predict what the future band-
width usage will be if it indeed decides to perform reconfiguration of replicas. An-
other case where reconfiguration might be triggered is when TC notices that a link 
 
Figure 13.1: Screenshot from the test application 
on top of the real MDS prototype, showing in addition the report channels towards the TC 
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(or more of them) became saturated. TC uses an adjustable parameter to define 
the threshold of when a link becomes saturated. Through this parameter, the TC 
can also implicitly consider non-MDS traffic in the decision making. The cost of 
gathering statistics at the TC node is negligible compared to the regular traffic 
(typically a few hundreds of bytes per packet, sent every 10 seconds), and for that 
reason it was not taken into consideration in the following experiments. 
In order to visualize the protocols and to see how the system reacts on concrete 
actions, we have developed a test application that can be run on the TC node. 
Figure 13.1 shows a screenshot of the test application running in real time on one 
of the nodes in the emulated environment. The thickness of the lines represents 
bandwidth usage on a particular link, while a thicker round border means that a 
node has a replica of the table being monitored. The application illustrates the 
network, as well as link usage in real time, as reported by the nodes gathering sta-
tistics. It also gives the possibility to manually create or remove replicas, start and 
stop queries at given nodes, change clustering parameters, etc. That way, we can 
instantly see how the network reacts to any action. The figure shows also how the 
DA sub-components on the nodes having replicas communicate with the TC node. 
There are two main types of queries towards MDS that cause very different ef-
fects with respect to network traffic, i.e. read and write (issued by the applications 
as SELECT and INSERT SQL statements, respectively). A read operation com-
prises typically a short query message and a possibly large response from the single 
node having the nearest replica. A write operation comprises a short query mes-
sage (possibly large if images are inserted), a short acknowledgement from the 
nearest node, and the messages needed to perform instant (eager) update of all the 
remaining replicas within the network partition. It is important therefore to match 
the number and location of replicas as closely as possible to the applications’ ac-
cess pattern on the various nodes. 
Network topology is the second factor that has a major impact on the overall 
network traffic. During a short period of time, the topology can be considered be-
ing static and MDS can configure the replica placement accordingly. However, mo-
bility can cause constant reconfiguration of routes within the network, as well as 
network partitioning. Both of these can have a huge impact on replica placement 
choices. While in practice nothing much can be done after partitioning has already 
happened, there are several ways MDS can react to an internal reconfiguration of 
the network. It can decide to remove some of the existing replicas or add one or 
more new ones. However, the latter comes with a cost, that of copying data to a 
new location, so any such decision has to be planned carefully to see whether such 
a reconfiguration would pay off in a short or long term. The two most important 
parameters TC needs to consider when deciding whether to perform reconfigura-
tion or not, can be put in the following simple equation: 
sync_traffic  app_traffic 
where sync_traffic denotes the cost of creating a new replica and synchronizing 
it (i.e. copying all necessary old data to it), and app_traffic denotes the pre-
dicted difference in the traffic between the current status and the new placement, 
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in a certain period of time. In short, the cost of creating a replica should not be 
bigger than the gain achieved by doing it. However, there are a few challenges that 
arise, e.g. to determine what is the period to be looked in, and then how exactly 
the replica location should be reconfigured. 
The TC can recalculate the assumed future network traffic if any of the repli-
cas is removed or a new is added. One way to minimize the effect of re-clustering 
might be to always only move the replica or replicas that have the worst statistics, 
i.e. cause a lot of traffic that might have been avoided if a change was made. 
To understand more in-depth the relation between the network traffic and rep-
lica placement, a more thorough study had to be made. The following sections pre-
sent the experiments we performed, and some conclusions we drew out of their re-
sults. These results will help us to better design the algorithms within the TC and 
MDS in general. 
13.4 Methodology 
To be able to perform a thorough study and get meaningful and reproducible re-
sults, we had to run simulation or emulation experiments. In our emulation tool 
NEMAN [13], we can perform network experiments on a single machine. Even 
though a working implementation of MDS in Java already exists, which runs in 
NEMAN, we could not use it for large scale experiments due to high resource us-
age present when running a larger number of Java processes on the same machine. 
Therefore, we created a simulation model of MDS and verified its correctness by 
comparing it in simple scenarios with the real implementation. In the simulated 
experiments, the most important features of MDS, i.e. remote queries and eager 
synchronization, are modeled to match the existing implementation. In the simu-
lated MDS, it was necessary to determine which path (i.e. which links) a packet 
would go through from the source to the destination node. Since these runs were 
not performed in real-time, the tested scenarios were first put into NEMAN, with 
the OLSR routing protocol [1] running on top, to gather routing information for 
the simulated MDS. As a consequence, the simulated MDS was able to calculate 
the exact same paths the real MDS would have used in the same situation. To cal-
culate each link’s bandwidth usage, the path for each packet was followed hop-by-
hop to see which links would be used when it was resent. This includes also links 
towards nodes which are not on the end-to-end path, but which do hear the packet 
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. 
In our experiments, we varied the following parameters: a) number and place-
ment of readers and writers, b) number of nodes, c) size of the area, d) mobility, 
and e) number and placement of replicas. Links were considered to be ideal, i.e. we 
did not take into consideration the possible bandwidth saturation. Since it would 
be computationally unfeasible to study all possible combinations, we have used a 
systematic approach in choosing test cases. We have identified some extreme cases 
(e.g. placing replicas on one node on the border of the network, as opposed to plac-
ing them on all nodes), as well as some sample cases in between. We have then 
identified three typical static scenarios, and a mobile one. To be able to analyze 
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the mobile scenario, we took static snapshots of the network topology every 60 
seconds. The location of replicas was chosen in two ways. First, they were placed 
manually (for small amounts) and randomly (for larger amounts) varying from 
having only 1 replica at different places in the network, to having replicas on all 
nodes. Later, different clustering algorithms were used, where replicas were placed 
on the chosen cluster heads, to see the effect that clustering has on performance. 
The first set of experiments was run on 3 different static scenarios, by varying 
the placement of replicas and application generated traffic. The scenarios are simi-
lar in that the average number of neighbors (i.e. network density) is the same, 
while the number of nodes and the network configuration are varied. 
The first scenario to be tested (S1, as seen in Figure 13.1) was a snapshot from 
a scenario generated by RoboCup Rescue [8] and consisted of 40 nodes (of which 2 
were disconnected at that very point in time when the snapshot was taken). In this 
scenario, each node has an average of 3.75 neighbors. We call this parameter net-
work density. Since network density is an important factor for the performance of 
MDS, this number was used as a reference when creating the next two scenarios, 
to be able to compare the results. The second and third scenario (S2 and S3) con-
sist of 100 nodes within an area of 4000x1000 and 2000x2000 respectively. The 
scenarios are generated by using the network simulator ns2’s tool setdest, with mi-
nor manual adjustments to match the desired average density. 
In all scenarios, the traffic was varied from having almost no traffic at all, to 
having all nodes performing both read and write operations. Table 13.1 shows the 
queries that were used in the experiments, with the respective request and re-
sponse sizes. The request and response sizes were obtained from empirical experi-
ments with real MDS and are very dependent on the queries themselves and the 
current status of the database, especially the request size for write queries and re-
sponse size for read queries. 
 
Table 13.1: Request and response size of the queries 
used in the experiments 
Type Actual query Req Resp 
read SELECT * FROM table LIMIT 10 90 bytes 1900 bytes 
write INSERT INTO table (descr) VALUES (’val’) 220 bytes 680 bytes 
13.5 Static Network Experiments 
All the experiments presented in Sections 13.5 and 13.6 are based on the current 
MDS implementation, as described in Section 13.3. This includes the present solu-
tions for eager and lazy synchronization. The results of the experiments are pre-
sented as graphs showing bandwidth usage (in bytes per second) for each of the di-
rect bidirectional links in the simulated wireless network, both individually and 
cumulative for several experiments. In the graphical interpretation, the links are 
always sorted ascending by bandwidth usage to make it easier to analyze the re-
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sults visually. The rightmost links are the ones being used most in a single run. 
The surface under each line represents the total bandwidth usage in the network. 
 
Scenario S1. This experiment consisted of runs having 18 different replica place-
ments, each analyzed with 6 different configurations of readers and writers. Figure 
13.2 shows a few representative runs (with 1, 5 and 38 replicas) for an example 
with 4 readers and 4 writers. The number in the brackets for the cases 1a and 1c 
denotes the node hosting the replica (node 1 is a border node, whereas node 24 is 
placed centrally). 
In the first 6 runs there was only one replica in the network, placed on the re-
spective node. The graph shows clearly the difference between placing a replica on 
a border node as opposed to placing it centrally. 
The next four runs had 3 replicas in the network, followed by two runs with 5 
replicas, then two runs with 10 replicas, and continuing to up to 38 replicas (i.e. all 
nodes having a replica). It can be seen that increasing the number of replicas re-
duces the individual and total bandwidth usage, but only up to a certain point. In 
this case, 3 or 5 well placed replicas (in Figure 13.2 we show only the case with 5, 
denoted as 5a) gave the best results. Having more than 5 replicas started increas-
ing the bandwidth usage due to synchronization traffic, with only 4 writers already 
(see the extreme case with 38 replicas, denoted as 38a). With more writers, this in-
crease is even more visible.  
After comparing all the six configurations of readers and writers (i.e. read-
ers/writers: 12/1, 12/4, 12/12, 4/4, 1/12, and 38/38), the overall conclusion is that 
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Figure 13.3: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S1, 
manual replica placement 
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Figure 13.4: Link usage, S1, using clustering 
algorithms 
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the configuration 5a gave the lowest total bandwidth usage. The total bandwidth 
usage presented in Figure 13.3 is a sum of bandwidth usages in each of the 6 con-
figurations. 
In the next experiment, different clustering algorithms were tested to see the 
potential benefits of using clustering techniques, compared to manual or random 
placement. In Figures 13.4 and 13.5, we can see that the results for most of the 
clustering algorithms are comparable to the best results achieved with careful 
manual placement. To illustrate this, the previously described 5a configuration is 
added to the graphs below for comparison. In Figure 13.5, the numbers in brackets 
represent the number of replicas in the given configuration. 
We used the following clustering techniques: Recursive clustering [10], K-Mean 
[7], Spinglass [15] (with 3 differently chosen cluster heads) and Betweenness [2] 
(with maximal diameter varying from 1 to 6). The general conclusion after the ex-
periments with scenario S1 is that, without prior knowledge of applications’ access 
pattern (i.e. the amount of nodes reading and writing), it is safe to choose between 
4 and 6 replicas in the network. In this particular scenario, this number represents 
10-15 % of nodes. 
Scenarios S2 and S3. This experiment consisted of runs having 10 different replica 
placements, each analyzed in 8 different configurations of readers and writers. Fig-
ures 13.6 and 13.7 show two very different examples, one with 1 reader and 100 
writers, compared to one with 100 readers and 1 writer. The most relevant runs 
(i.e. those having 1, 10 and 100 replicas) are marked using thicker lines.  
The line showing 100 replicas (i.e. one replica on each node) shows clearly 
what happened in both situations. When all nodes performed write operations, this 
would create enormous amounts of traffic due to data synchronization. On the 
other hand, when there were almost no nodes performing write operations, there 
was no traffic at all, i.e. any node wanting to read something had a local replica 
and did not need to query a remote node. What can be seen from these graphs is 
that having between 10 and 15 replicas gave most stable results with regard to 
changes in the applications’ access pattern. The total bandwidth usage was lowest 
between 3 and 20 replicas (as seen in Figure 13.8). 
Next, we used the Betweenness clustering algorithm to see the potential bene-
fits of using clusters, compared to manual or random placement. We varied the 
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Figure 13.6: Link usage, S1, manual replica 
placement 
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Figure 13.7: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S1, 
manual replica placement 
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maximal diameter (from 1 to 10), getting as a result 3 to 46 clusters, i.e. replicas. 
Figure 13.9 presents a case with 1 reader and 100 writers. With 10 replicas (de-
noted as Betw05 in the graph), the network traffic proved to be least susceptible 
to the variation in applications’ access pattern. 
The experiments made on scenario S3 gave results comparable to those from 
S2. There were only minor differences in the results caused by the different con-
figuration of the network, which do not impact the conclusions. 
13.6 Mobile Network Experiments 
Mobility might cause clusters to constantly change, something that would also 
change the desired location of replicas. It can be a very costly process to con-
stantly move replicas around in the network. In the following experiments we have 
investigated how TC can react to topology changes caused by mobility, and what 
the costs or gains of such actions might be. 
13.6.1 Frequent Reconfiguration vs. Static Configuration 
To see the effect that mobility has on data distribution and replica placement, we 
used the original RoboCup Rescue scenario from which the snapshot S1 was taken. 
This scenario (S4) is 18000 seconds (5 hours) long, of which, due to table size re-
strictions in Microsoft Excel, only the first 15000 seconds were considered. Snap-
shots were taken every 60 seconds to see the topology changes and cluster configu-
rations at those moments, and how these affect traffic caused by the usage of 
MDS. 
Figure 13.10 shows a comparison of the total traffic in the four cases where we 
had (a) the ideal placement of replicas achieved by calculating all possible combi-
nations, (b) re-clustering every 60 seconds and creating new replicas accordingly, 
(c) random placement of replicas, and (d) the worst possible placement achieved 
by calculating all possible combinations. For visual clarity, only the first 5000 sec-
onds are shown here, but the rest of the scenario follows the same trend. In all four 
cases, all 40 nodes were constantly performing both read and write operations. For 
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Figure 13.8: Cumulative bandwidth usage, S2, 
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Figure 13.9: Link usage, S2, using clustering, 1 
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fair comparison, there was always one replica in each partition, since the clustering 
algorithm (Betweenness, with the maximal cluster diameter of 4) in all cases chose 
only one cluster (and, as a consequence, only one replica) per partition. The cost of 
creating new replicas and copying data into them is not yet taken into considera-
tion. 
The average bandwidth usage was about 2.5 MB/s. The average savings of 
having the ideal choice compared to the worst possible choice were approximately 
790 KB/s. Using random placement saved approximately 480 KB/s, while per-
forming constant clustering saved approximately 570 KB/s compared to the worst 
case. To put it the other way around, the random placement was 380 KB/s, while 
clustering was only 216 KB/s more expensive than the ideal placement. Since the 
ideal placement is only theoretical and might not be computationally feasible in 
real time, the results show that by doing active re-clustering, to adapt to the new 
network topology, we do achieve considerable savings in bandwidth usage if only 
user generated traffic is considered. However, creating new replicas comes with a 
cost, that of transferring old data to the newly generated replicas in order to have 
a consistent view on the shared space. This cost is represented by the series in the 
graph marked Lazy synchronization and is explained later. 
13.6.2 Gains and Costs of Frequent Reconfiguration 
The next experiment was performed to see what is the actual saving (if any) at 
each point in time (t) when clusters are re-configured, as opposed to keeping the 
current configuration (t-60). Figure 13.11 shows the results of the experiment. 
At each point in time where reconfiguration was to be done, there might have 
been replicas that should have been removed, and there might have been new ones 
to be created. The ones to be removed are not taken into consideration at this 
time as that action does not cause any considerable traffic. The amount of newly 
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Figure 13.10: Total bandwidth usage in 4 different cases, S4 
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created replicas varied from 0 to 6, with an average of about 1.91. The reconfigu-
ration that included creation of new replicas was desirable in about 30 % of checks, 
i.e. there was at least 1 new replica to be created. The savings at each step varied 
from about 550 KB/s in one end to negative numbers (i.e. reconfiguration would 
be more expensive than keeping the current state) in the other. If only the positive 
numbers are taken into consideration, which is the only case where we benefit from 
making changes, we have to see what is the maximal cost of creating each new rep-
lica (i.e. maximal table size). If the table at that moment is larger than the given 
value, the cost of reconfiguring is larger than the short-term gain that would be 
achieved by doing it. In this very experiment, the average savings were about 140 
KB/s. It has to be noted that, if a node already has had a replica of the table in 
the past, it will not be necessary to re-synchronize the whole table but only the 
newly added or changed records since it had been deactivated. This is possible as 
long as replicas are only deactivated and not physically removed, i.e., by having 
them in warm standby. In addition, nodes on the end-to-end path (who anyway 
receive all the packets) might transparently cache queries and synchronization traf-
fic going through them. This, in combination with replicas in warm standby, might 
significantly reduce network traffic when a new replica is created. 
Another important thing to remember is that, when a new replica is created 
due to partitioning of the network, this will not cause any traffic at the moment of 
creation since the partition is isolated. This can be clearly seen as negative spikes 
in Figure 13.11, implying that not doing reconfiguration would have given consid-
erably better results (e.g. at 4400 s). This is due to 4 new replicas that were to be 
created if clustering was done, and which would not be there if clustering was not 
done (i.e. there was no replica in the partition so the nodes seemingly performed 
local queries and thus generated no traffic). In reality, only the first node perform-
ing a query would create a local replica, while the rest would then continue to use 
that one, making the replica placement random, and real results would follow ac-
cordingly. Also, the minute the partition would come in contact with another one 
having a replica, lazy synchronization would have taken place to make sure all rep-
licas were up to date. 
In this particular scenario, the total generated network traffic during the 15000 
seconds was calculated to be 36 430 MB. Synchronization costs due to reconfigura-
tion (i.e. lazy synchronization), in the case where clustering is performed every 
minute, and under the assumption that data from de-allocated replicas was kept 
for possible future re-allocation, came to a total of 3 419 MB per hop (i.e. it is de-
pendent on where the nearest replica is located). This is the worst case where each 
record to be synchronized was sent uncompressed. In reality, MDS has imple-
mented batching, i.e. grouping all messages to be sent to one destination into one 
single message, in combination with compression. The real total cost for lazy syn-
chronization, when both batching and compression are taken into consideration, 
would be significantly lower, with an estimated total of about 73 MB per hop (in 
average, about 300 KB every minute when synchronization would take place). 
Such a compression is possible due to the fact that the queries are plain-text, in 
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addition to be similar. The standard traffic generated during the scenario by the 
applications, as well as eager synchronization performed immediately, do not allow 
for savings in such a degree, since the messages are sent separately. 
The line in Figure 13.10, marked as lazy synchronization, shows the estimated 
cost for lazy synchronization with constant re-clustering. For comparison, the 
other three cases have very similar total estimated cost (ranging from 70 to 95 
MB) and similarly distributed throughout the simulation, which makes the total 
usage generally follow the pattern of the data-only distribution. 
13.7 Conclusion 
Due to the dynamic nature of mobile ad-hoc networks, the availability of remotely 
located data might decrease substantially. Data replication provides a means for 
increasing data availability, but the location and number of replicas must be 
planned carefully. In this paper, we have presented an extensive study of different 
replica placement strategies for the MIDAS Data Space. Our experiments have 
confirmed that placement of replicas plays a big role in the amount of traffic in the 
network caused by usage of MDS (either direct or indirect, i.e. synchronization 
protocol). We could also see that having replicas on approximately 10 % of the 
nodes in the network gave balanced overall results when applications' access pat-
tern was not known beforehand. These replicas also needed to be carefully placed, 
and different clustering algorithms have shown to be helpful in that matter, com-
pared with arbitrary placement. We have also analyzed the possible gains and 
costs of performing reconfiguration of replicas in the network. The results have 
shown that the Traffic Controller should not blindly react to topology changes, 
since reconfiguration could cause a lot of undesired network traffic. 
By constantly monitoring the applications' access pattern, network topology, 
and table sizes, the Traffic Controller can deviate from the default placement algo-
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rithm, and adapt to the situation that takes all of the factors into consideration. 
As part of future work, we intend to work further on optimizing the algorithm 
used by the Traffic Controller, as well as other protocols used in MDS. We will 
continue analyzing how a node's resources are affected by the overall situation in 
its neighborhood, as opposed to only looking at each node or link separately. Fi-
nally, we will take a deeper look into what gain can be achieved by implementing 
the presented idea of warm standby replicas combined with caching. 
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